



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



3 2044 019 312 925

GT 55.325-10

GT 55.325-10 (1)



*C. Thayer*

Gr 55.325.10(1)




**HARVARD COLLEGE  
LIBRARY**

FROM

*Mrs. N. N. Thayer*







—

—





1





THUCYDIDES

*Engraved by Freeman*

# THUCYDIDES.

---

TRANSLATED BY

WILLIAM SMITH, D. D.

DEAN OF CHESTER.

---

VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY A. J. VALPY, M. A.

AND SOLD BY ALL BOOKSELLERS.

1831.

Vol 33 1936 10



*W. L. G. and W. L. G.*

# CONTENTS

## OF

### THE FIRST VOLUME.

---

	PAGE
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THUCYDIDES . . . . .	vii
Arguments . . . . .	xvii

### PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

Book I. . . . .	1
— II. . . . .	134
— III. . . . .	236

‘ Dr. Smith’s Translation of Thucydides is a work of  
standard merit and excellence.’—BIBLIOGRAPHICAL MISCEL-  
LANY.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

OF

## THUCYDIDES.

---

THUCYDIDES, a native of Athens, was born in the year before Christ 471, thirteen years after Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius; and about three years before Socrates, as the birth of the latter is settled by Laërtius. His father's name was Olorus, and among his ancestors he reckoned the great Miltiades.

The education of our author appears to have been such as might be expected from the splendor of his birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taste then prevailing in Athens; although the little information that can be gleaned on this subject from ancient writers is merely of a presumptive, though probable kind. Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philosophy, according to the testimony of Marcellinus; who adds, 'that it was whispered about that *Thucydides* was atheistical, because he











Brasidas had already got fast possession of Amphipolis. The city of Eion is situated also on the river Strymon lower down, about two miles and a half from Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and secured the place. 'Brasidas,' says he, 'had designed that very night to seize Eion also; and unless our squadron had come in this crisis to its defence, at break of day it had been lost.' Thucydides, without losing a moment, provided for its defence. Brasidas, with armed boats, fell down the river from Amphipolis, and made two attempts on it; in both of which he was repulsed. On this he gave up the scheme, and returned.

One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be expected on this occasion, and deserved to be thanked instead of punished. The people of Athens, however, came to a different conclusion. Cleon was now the demagogue of the greatest influence there, and is generally supposed to have exasperated his countrymen against the man who could not perform impossibilities, in saving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain that their fury against him rose so high, that they stripped him of his command, and passed on him a sentence of banishment. He himself in-

forms us that 'it was his lot to suffer a twenty years' exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis.'

Having retired to Scaptesyle in Thrace, where he possessed some mines in right of his wife, Thucydides began his 'History of the Peloponnesian War.' Though treated with ingratitude, he scorned to be angry with his countrymen; and there appears no sign of resentment in his constitution. To judge of him from his History, he was so nobly complexioned, as to be all judgment and no passion. Discharged of all his former duties, and free from all public avocations, he was left without any attachments but to truth, and proceeded to qualify himself for commemorating exploits in which he could have no share. He was now forty-eight years old, and intirely at leisure to attend to the great object of his ambition; that of writing the history of the present war; a calm spectator of facts, and a dispassionate observer of the events he was determined to record. 'Exile,' says Plutarch, 'is a blessing which the Muses bestow on their favorites. By this means they enable them to complete their most beautiful and noble compositions. Thucydides the Athenian compiled his

‘ History of the Peloponnesian War ’ at Scapte-syle in Thrace.’

It was fortunate for our historian that his mines lay not within the dominions of the Athenian republic; otherwise, his possessions would have been forfeited to the state. During his exile in Thrace he made several excursions to observe transactions and procure intelligence. He was now conversant with several leaders of the Peloponnesian party, and he likewise carried on an extensive correspondence with some eminent Athenians. He was ever ready to expend considerable sums of money in obtaining the most authentic information. This was his employment until the conclusion of the war; and it is certain he had collected materials for carrying down his History to that period, when, in his own words, ‘ the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the Long Walls and the Piræus.’ But whoever reads this work will be inclined to think that he deferred drawing it up in that accurate and elaborate manner in which it now appears until the war was finished. He might possibly keep every thing by him in the form of annals, and might go on altering or correcting, as he saw better

reason, or gained more light. His complete, well-connected history, though the first thing in his intention, was the last in execution.

The banishment of Thucydides had lasted twenty years, when an amnesty was published at Athens, in the archonship of Euclides, after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. He was now at liberty to return, and pass the remainder of his days at Athens: whether he did so or not, we are quite ignorant. He lived twelve years after, and died in the year before Christ 391, being at that time about fourscore years old.

This great historian has been universally admired for the justness and dignity of his sentiments, the vigor of his style, the fidelity and accuracy of his details, and his judicious reflections on every plan proposed and every measure pursued. His speeches may be considered as the philosophical part of his History, since they develope the causes of events, together with the interests and views of all the states engaged in that ruinous war. In the narration of great events he has seldom been equalled. The plague at Athens, the siege of Plataea, the sedition of Corcyra, and the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, are painted in the most picturesque and forcible manner: his relations are authentic,



## XVI BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THUCYDIDE

as he himself was interested in the events he mentions ; and his impartiality is unquestionable. His animated harangues have been always esteemed ; he found a model in Herodotus, but he greatly surpassed the original ; and succeeding historians have adopted, with success, a peculiar mode of writing which introduces an orator addressing himself to the passions and feelings of his auditors.

Comparison has sometimes been made between Herodotus and Thucydides, but each has his peculiar excellence. Sweetness of style, grace, and elegance of expression may be called the characteristics of the former ; while Thucydides stands unequalled for the fire of his descriptions, and strong and energetic manner of his narratives.

The History of Thucydides was so much admired, that Demosthenes, in order to perfect himself as an orator, transcribed it eight several times and read it with such attention, that he could most repeat it by heart.

## ARGUMENTS.

### BOOK I.

THE subject of the History of the Peloponnesian War, to evince the importance of which, the historian takes a survey of the state of Greece from the earliest age down to the commencement of the war now to be recorded—Its earliest state one in which its inhabitants were barbarous and migratory clans, without even the common name of Grecians or Hellenians—The dawn of civilisation in the time of Minos, king of Crete, who first possessed a navy, and suppressed piracy: for robbery and piracy had anciently prevailed every where, both by sea and land; insomuch, that the Greeks of that age constantly carried arms like the barbarians of later times—Hence the more ancient cities were built for security remote from the sea; but on the suppression of piracy by Minos, navigation and commerce grew secure, and growth in civilisation and increasing wealth prepared the Greeks for the expedition against Troy; which originated and was chiefly organised by the power and influence of Agamemnon, king of Mycene; a potent monarch for those times; and the expedition against Troy on a larger scale than Greece had ever before engaged in, but yet not comparable with those of the Peloponnesian war; an inferiority however arising more from want of wealth than of population—After the Trojan war Greece long continued in an unsettled and little improving state, until at length growing more settled and populous, colonisation became necessary and frequent—From the increase of wealth, much political power is usurped by the rich, wealth now overbalancing nobility—The first serious attention to nautical affairs paid by the Corinthians; next by the Ionians, and especially Polycrates, despot of Samos; afterwards by the despots of Sicily and the Corcyreans—Power of the Grecian states much advanced by their navies; yet the progress of Greece in wealth and consequence slow, and kept down by

various impediments—Thus the Asiatic Greeks were checked by the proximity of Persian power; and the Greeks in general were hampered by the selfish policy of the despots, who aimed at nothing but upholding their own power—After the suppression of these tyrannies soon supervened the Persian war, which produced a confederacy of Grecian states for mutual defence, which afterwards parted into two, one headed by the Lacedæmonians, the other by the Athenians—Of the Lacedæmonian the confederates were oligarchies, faithfully attached to them because their assistance was necessary to hold the body of the people in subjection; while those of the Athenians were subject states, under unwilling but compulsory obedience—Causes of the Peloponnesian war real and avowed; the former, the jealousy of the power of Athens entertained by the Lacedæmonians; the latter, the quarrels engendered by the affair of Epidamnus and Potidæa.

The affair of Epidamnus. The nobles being exiled by the commonalty, take into pay some of the neighboring barbarians, and harass the city with a predatory warfare—The commonalty implore the aid of Corcyra, their mother country, but without success—They then have recourse to Corinth, the mother country of Corcyra—The Corinthians, from jealousy of the Corcyreans, grant their request, and send them soldiers and colonists—Whereon the Corcyreans espouse the cause of the exiled nobles, and endeavor to effect their restoration by besieging Epidamnus—Then the Corinthians send a fleet composed of their own ships and some of their allies, to raise the siege—After some ineffectual endeavors to settle the dispute by negotiation, the Corcyreans come to battle with and defeat the Corinthian fleet, and obtain possession of Epidamnus—They pursue their advantage until the Corinthians send out another fleet to maintain their ground; and in the mean time make extensive preparations for war; whereon the Corcyreans, in alarm, send an embassy to implore the aid of the Athenians, and the Corinthians a counter embassy to intreat their non-interference—Oration of the Corcyreans—The counter oration of the Corinthians—On hearing which, the Athenians decide on concluding a defensive alliance with the Corcyreans; and send a fleet to their aid—Meanwhile

the Corinthians and their allies proceed against Corcyra with a fleet of one hundred and fifty sail, and occupy a naval station at Chimerium—The Corcyreans and Athenians with one hundred and fifty sail take one opposite, at the Sybota islands—Both parties prepare for battle—They fight; and victory, after some uncertainty, decides for the Corinthians—In following up which the Corinthians are checked by a reinforcement of twenty ships from Athens, which join the enemy; and retreat to their own naval camp—On the day following, the Corcyreans and Athenians offer them battle; which they decline, being desirous rather of returning home—Meanwhile both parties erect a trophy and claim the victory—The Corinthians then return homeward with their prisoners, of whom they use the better sort with marked kindness, hoping, by their influence, to gain over Corcyra to the Peloponnesian confederacy—Affair of Potidæa, which was the second avowed cause of the war—Potidæa, a colony of Corinth, but of the Athenian confederacy, falling under the suspicion of the Athenians, is required to adopt certain measures as securities for its fidelity—Meanwhile Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, endeavors to form a confederacy against Athens among the neighboring states, and to excite the Peloponnesian alliance to a war with Athens—The Potidæans, after vainly endeavoring to induce the Athenians to dispense with the securities demanded, venture on revolt, in conjunction with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans—The Athenian forces in those parts are too weak to check the revolt—Meanwhile the Corinthians have time to send succors to Potidæa—The Athenians, after receiving reinforcements from home, compel Perdiccas to terms of peace (which however he almost immediately breaks), and proceed against Potidæa—The Potidæans and their allies come to a battle with the Athenians in front of Potidæa, and are defeated and driven violently into the city; whither Aristæus, the commander of the Corinthian auxiliaries, with great difficulty escapes—Potidæa is now closely besieged, first on the side of the continent, and then, on the arrival of reinforcements from Athens, on that of the peninsula of Pallene likewise—Aristæus after in vain proposing to break through the enemy with the whole garrison, except five hundred, himself contrives to

escape, and maintains the war in the neighboring parts—Meanwhile, however, Phormio devastates the territories of the Chalcidians and Bottiæans—The Corinthians, more than ever embittered against the Athenians, prevail on the Lacedæmonians to summon a congress of their allies at Sparta, where, after several states had complained of the injustice and ambition of Athens, the Corinthians pronounce a most bitter invective, and urge the confederacy to immediately declare war against the Athenians—Oration of the Corinthians—An Athenian embassy being then at Sparta, they come forward to refute the representatives of the Corinthians, and to justify the conduct and policy of Athens—After the delivery of these speeches the Lacedæmonians take counsel how to decide, and their king Archi-Samus delivers a speech in favor of deferring to go to war—To which Sthenelaidas, one of the ephori, replies in a truly Spartan harangue, wherein he touches on the injuries sustained by various members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, which he is bound, he says, in honor to avenge by an immediate declaration of war—The question is then put to the vote, and the majority decide for going immediately to war—The real motive which influenced them to this decision was alarm at the formidable power of Athens—The narrative is now interrupted by a digression, in which is given a sketch of the origin and progress of the Athenian dominion from the Persian to the Peloponnesian war—First is related the mode by which the rebuilding of the walls of Athens was brought about, after the final defeat of the Persians—Also how, by the counsel of Themistocles, Piræus was fortified, and the navy made the principal object of attention to the Athenians—Pausanias is sent out as commander-in-chief of the Grecian allies to accomplish the remainder of the Persian war—By his unpopularity the Asiatic, the Insular Greeks, and those of the Thracian coast, secede from the Lacedæmonians, and attach themselves to the Athenians as chiefs of the confederacy—Up rise of the Athenian empire (A. C. 447)—Which part of the Grecian history being either passed over, or inaccurately treated, our historian is induced to give a sketch of it, especially as showing how the power of Athens came

to humble it—The Athenians, after at first showing themselves moderate, and obtaining popularity, soon became domineering and rapacious, and thus caused the allies to revolt—Their power over them chiefly obtained by allowing them to compound for their personal service in the war with Persia by a money payment, which thus enabled the Athenians to maintain a navy which should keep the allies in subjection, at the expense of the allies themselves—Then are recounted various martial affairs of the Athenian confederacy; battles at the Eurymedon; the revolt of Thasos; attempt to colonise Amphipolis—The Thasians intreat the assistance of the Lacedæmonians, who are prevented from sending it by the great earthquake at Sparta, and the consequent revolt of the helots; whereon Thasus surrenders—The Lacedæmonians apply for and obtain the assistance of the Athenians against the helots, but entertaining a jealousy of them, send them back; a circumstance which engendered much of the subsequent irritation—Termination of the contest with the revolting helots, who evacuate the country, and are settled by the Athenians at Naupectus—Megara goes over to the Athenian alliance, and Nisæa and Pegæ are occupied by the Athenians—The Egyptians revolt from the king of Persia, and are supported by the Athenians—Various acts of hostility occur between the Athenians and Peloponnesians—Ægina is besieged by the Athenians; whereon the Corinthians, to cause a diversion, make an incursion into the country of Megara; but are defeated with great loss by the Athenians commanded by Myronides.

The long walls of Athens erected—The Spartans assist the Dorians against the Phocians—The Athenians prepare to prevent their return home by occupying the passes of Geranea—They stay in Bœotia, and try to obtain their end by political intrigue for the overthrow of democracy at Athens—At length a general engagement takes place at Tanagra, in which the Athenians are utterly defeated, and the Lacedæmonians retire home without opposition—Soon afterwards the Athenians overcome Bœotia, and complete the conquest of Ægina—Continuation and completion of the war in Egypt; which terminates in the utter defeat of the Egyptians, and the destruction of the Athenian auxiliaries *there*, and also reinforcement sent for their relief—The

Athenians make an ineffectual attack on Thessaly—Pericles obtains a victory over the Sicyonians—Accession of Athens to the Athenian confederacy—Expedition of the Athenians against Cyprus, where Cimon dies—Bœotia revolts from Athens—Battle of Corones, by which the Bœotians recover their independence—Revolt of Eubœa and Megara from Athens—The Peloponnesians make an incursion into Attica, but are induced to retire—Eubœa reduced to unconditional submission by Pericles—Thirty years' peace concluded between the Athenians and Peloponnesians; five years after which a war between Miletus and Samos produces a revolt of Samos from Athens, in which the Byzantines partake—Pericles goes against Samos, and, defeating their forces, besieges the city; and, on the arrival of reinforcements from Athens, compels them to submission, and to deliver up their fleet—This is followed by the submission of the Byzantines—The thread of the history resumes—The Lacedæmonians, after having resolved on war, consult the oracle at Delphi, from which they receive a favorable answer—They convene their allies, and put the question for immediate war, for which the Corinthians strongly contend—Oration of the Corinthians to that effect—On the question being put, the votes for war are a decided majority; preparation for it accordingly—Meanwhile, to give color of religion to their proceedings, the Lacedæmonians demand of the Athenians to expel 'the accursed,' as explained in the narrative of Cylon—The real object of the Lacedæmonians to excite odium against Pericles, as being descended from those accursed—The Athenians make counter demand to the Lacedæmonians to drive out the accursed; who those are, is explained by a narration of the treason and death of Pausanias—In the examination of the proofs of treason against Pausanias matter is found to implicate Themistocles, whose fortunes up to his death are recounted—The thread of the story is then resumed—After some ineffectual negotiation, ambassadors are sent to Athens by the Lacedæmonians with their ultimatum, that every Grecian state should be restored to independence; a demand which Pericles counsels them by no means to comply with, in a most rousing and masterly speech; by which he prevails on the Athenians to dismiss the Lacedæmonian ambassadors with a refusal of their demands—Yet dur-

all this period, some intercourse, though not without mutual suspicions, is kept up between the two countries.

## BOOK II.

YEAR I. The Thebans, by treachery, enter Plataea—They acquiesce not in the designs of the traitors ; but offer terms of peace and amity, which the Plataeans accept—The Plataeans take courage, and collect themselves together by digging through the common walls of their houses—They assault the Thebans, who take to flight, but cannot get out of the city—The Thebans cooped up in a house which they entered by mistaking the door for the city gate—They yield at discretion—The whole power of Thebes comes to rescue them—The Thebans seek to apprehend the Plataeans in the villages—The Plataeans induce the Thebans to go, on promise not to harm their prisoners—The Thebans depart, and the Plataeans fetch in their men and goods, and then kill their prisoners—The Athenians apprehend such Boeotians as are in Attica—They victual Plataea, and put a garrison into it, and take out the unnecessary population—Both sides prepare for war—Prophecies and oracles precede the war—How the Greeks stand affected towards the belligerent states—The confederates of the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians detailed—The Lacedæmonians meet in the isthmus, and invade Attica—Archidamus sends forward an ambassador to the Athenians, and tries all means to procure justice before having recourse to war—The ambassadors from Archidamus convoyed back without conference—Archidamus marches forward—Pericles imagining Archidamus might spare his estates, promises, if he should do so, to give them up to the state—The speech of Pericles to the assembly at Athens respecting the means for the war, &c.—The length of the walls to be garrisoned ; the number of their galleys—The Athenians convey their wives and children and movables into the city ; being most of them accustomed to live in the country, they remove thither unwillingly—Athens thronged with the country people—The Athenians fit out one hundred galleys to cruise about Peloponnesus—The Peloponnesian army assaults Ceneæ, a frontier town of Attica, in vain—



Archidamus accused of backwardness, and of favoring Athenians—He with his army enters into Attica, and to Acharnæ, where he stays a long time, cutting down corn and trees—His design in staying there so long Athenians with difficulty contain themselves from so forth—A skirmish between the Athenian and Bœotian—Archidamus removes from Acharnæ—The Athenian one hundred galleys to devastate the sea-coast of Peloponnesus—The Peloponnesians go home—The Athenians appropriate one thousand talents and one hundred galleys for defence against an invasion by sea—They assault Megara, which is defended by Brasidas—They take Pheia, a town of Elis—The inhabitants of Ægina expelled thence by the Athenians; are received by the Peloponnesians—Eclipse of the sun so great, that some stars are discerned—The Athenians seek the favor of Sitalces, king of Thrace, and Alexander, king of Macedonia—They take Solium and Asine, and the isle of Cephallenia; they invade Megara; greatest force here assembled; they regularly once again invade Megara—The end of the first summer—Euarchus, tyrant, recovers Astacus—The custom of the Athenians of burying the bones of those first slain in war—The Funeral Oration of Pericles.

YEAR II. The second invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians—The pestilence at Athens: originated in Ethiopia—The Peloponnesians supposed to have poisoned the water—The author sick of this disease, which is described—and beasts perished that fed on the dead bodies—No one recovered of it mortally the second time—People died in the streets—The moral effects of the pestilence—Neglect of religious law—Predictions called to mind—An ambiguous prophecy explained by the event—The Peloponnesians depart from Attica—The Athenian fleet returns from Peloponnesus—Pericles undertakes an expedition against Potidæa, which, owing to the pestilence, proves unsuccessful—The Athenians, pressed at once with the war and pestilence, bitterly inveigh against Pericles—The Oration of Pericles—Pericles fined in respect of money—Athens at its utmost height of power in the time of Pericles—His death and eulogy—The Lacedæmonians undertake a naval expedition against Zacynthus—The Lacedæmonian ambassadors taken by the Athenian general.

Thrace, and conveyed to Athens, are put to death by the Athenians—The Ambraciots go on an expedition against Acarnania—The end of the second summer—Potidæa surrendered to the Athenians.

YEAR III. The siege of Platæa—Speech of the Platæans to Archidamus—Answer of Archidamus to the Platæans—Reply of the Platæans, and answer of Archidamus thereto—The Platæans reply again, and desire to know the pleasure of the Athenians—Message of the Athenians to the Platæans—Last answer of the Platæans to Archidamus from the wall—Protestation of Archidamus—A mound raised against Platæa—The Platæans raise their wall higher against the mound, by a frame of timber, in which they laid their bricks; they contrive, too, to draw the earth from the mound through the wall—The Peloponnesians find a preventive—The Platæans draw away the earth from under the mound by a mine; they, moreover, make another wall within that which was toward the mound—The Peloponnesians assault the wall with battering engines—Defence of the Platæans against the engines—The Peloponnesians throw fagots and fire into the town from the mound—A great fire—The siege of Platæa turned into a blockade—The Athenians send an army against the Chalcidians—The Athenians engaged with by the Chalcidians at Spartolus, and are overthrown, with the loss of three commanders—The Ambraciots invade Acarnania, together with the Lacedæmonians—The army of the Ambraciots and their confederates; they reach Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania—Weariness of the Grecians—Rashness of the Chaonians—Stratagem of the Stratians—The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots retire without effect—Phormio, with twenty Athenian galleys, overcomes forty-seven of the Peloponnesian galleys—The order of the Peloponnesian and Athenian galleys, and stratagem of Phormio—The Peloponnesians take to flight—Preparations for another engagement—Twenty sail of Athenians sent to the assistance of Phormio delayed in Crete—The Peloponnesians sail by the coast of Panormus—Oration of Cnemus—Phormio, suspecting the courage of his soldiers, encourages them by an harangue—Stratagem of the Peloponnesians, and attack on the Athenians, who gain the victory—*Timocrates*, a Lacedæmonian commander, slays him-

self—The end of the third summer—The Peloponnesians resolve to make an attempt on Piræus : they dare not execute their design, but proceed to Salamis—Expedition of the king of Thrace against the king of Macedonia—Description of Thrace—The great power of the Scythians—The origin and progress of the kingdom of Macedonia—The Macedonian kings descended from the Temenidæ, a family in Argos, of the Peloponnesians—The Macedonians retire into their walled towns—Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, the ninth king of Macedonia, of the family of the Temenidæ—Sitalces and Perdiccas come to a conference about the reasons for the war—The Grecians, at the coming of this army, stand on their guard, fearing they were called in by the Athenians to subdue them—Seuthes, corrupted by Perdiccas, persuades Sitalces to return—Phormio expels suspected persons from Stratus and Coronæ—The course of the river Achelous—Acarnania, whence so called—The end of the third year of the war.

## BOOK III.

YEAR IV. The Peloponnesians invade Attica—The revolt of Lesbos—The intention of the Lesbians to revolt discovered to the Athenians ; who send forty galleys to Lesbos, and apprehend such Mityleneans as are at Athens, and seize their galleys—The Athenians allow the Mityleneans to exculpate themselves at Athens—The Mitylenean ambassadors return from thence without effecting any thing—On which the Mityleneans make a sortie on the Athenians, but without success : they keep quiet, expecting help from Peloponnesus—The Athenians summon to their aid their allies ; they send Asopius, the son of Phormio, with twenty galleys, to cruise about Peloponnesus—Asopius slain—The Mitylenean ambassadors sent to Lacedæmon are desired to attend the general assembly of the Grecians at Olympia—The oration of the ambassadors of Mitylene—The Mityleneans received into the Lacedæmonian alliance—The Lacedæmonians prepare for the invasion of Attica, both by sea and land—The Athenians, to make show of their power, and to deter the enemy from the enterprise, send one hun-

contradict the representations which the Lesbian ambassadors had made to the Lacedæmonians of their weakness—The greatness of the Athenian navy tends to exhaust their treasury—The Mityleneans undertake an expedition against Methymna, hoping to have it delivered up to them—The Athenians send Paches with one thousand heavy-armed to Mitylene—The end of the fourth summer—The escape of two hundred and twelve men from Platæa, through the enemy's lines—Description of the circumvallation of the Platæans about Platæa—Description of the Platæans getting over the enemy's walls—Salæthus, a Lacedæmonian, enters secretly into Mitylene, and cheers them with hope of speedy assistance.

YEAR V. Attica the fourth time invaded—Salæthus arms the populace for a sally; they mutiny and give up the city—Some of the Mityleneans, fearing the worst, take sanctuary—Paches induces them to come forth, and sends them to be in durance at Tenedos—Voyage of Alcidas with forty galleys into Ionia; he with his fleet at Embatium hears of the loss of Mitylene—The harangue of Teutiaplus in the council of war—The advice of certain refugees from Ionia, and some Lesbians—The cowardly measures of Alcidas; he kills his prisoners; is sharply reproved by the Samians; hastens from Ephesus homewards; Paches pursues, but does not overtake him; parleys with Hippas; his equivocation with Hippas, whom he puts to death contrary to promise; takes Pyrrha and Eressus; apprehends Salæthus in Mitylene—The Athenians put to death Salæthus; their cruel decree against the Mityleneans; they repent of it, and consult anew—Oration of Cleon—Oration of Diodotus—The opinion of the latter prevails—A galley sent out after the other, with a sentence of mercy; its speed in executing this commission—A thousand of those most guilty of the revolt executed—Nicias takes the island of Minoa—The Platæans yield their city—The Lacedæmonians are not disposed to take Platæa by force, but wish to have it by voluntary surrender—Unjust proceedings of the Lacedæmonians—Oration of the Platæans—Oration of the Thebans—The Platæans are put to death, and twenty-five Athenians with them—Platæa utterly demolished—The forty galleys, with Alcidas, *come home amidst stormy weather*—The æ-

dition of Corcyra, occasioned by the captives that came from Corinth; who persuade them to renounce their alliance with Athens—Pithias, one of the Athenian faction accused; being acquitted, he impeaches some of the other faction—Pithias and others slain in the senate-house—The Lacedæmonian faction make an attack on the democratic party; the latter prevails—Alcidas and the Peloponnesians arrive and commence a sea-fight against the Corcyreans—Cowardly conduct of Alcidas—Sixty Athenian ships come to the aid of the Corcyrean democrats—The Peloponnesians depart with their fleet—The people, on the approach of the Athenians, butcher whomsoever they meet with of the contrary faction—The Athenian fleet departs; five hundred of the nobility, who have escaped, seize on such places as belonged to the Corcyreans on the continent; they come over and fortify themselves in Istone—The Athenians send twenty galleys into Sicily; their reason for so doing—End of the fifth summer—The plague again appears at Athens—The Athenians attack Lipara and the other isles of Æolu

## PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

---

### BOOK I.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, has compiled the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, as managed by each of the contending parties. He began to write on its first breaking out, from an expectation that it would prove important, and the most deserving regard of any that had ever happened. He grounded his conjecture on the earnestness of both the flourishing parties to make all necessary preparations for it; and he saw that all the rest of Greece was engaged on one side or the other, some joining immediately, and others intending soon to do it; for this was the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, since in it some barbarians, and it may be said the greatest part of mankind were concerned. The actions of an earlier date, and those still more ancient, cannot possibly, through length of time, be adequately known; yet, from all the lights which a research into the remotest time afforded me, I cannot think they were of any great importance, either in regard to the wars themselves, or any other considerations.

It is certain, that the region now known by the name of Greece was not formerly possessed by any fixed inhabitants, but was subject to frequent transmigrations,

as constantly every distinct people easily yielded up their seats to the violence of a larger supervening number. For, as to commerce there was none, and mutual fear prevented intercourse both by sea and land; as then the only view of culture was to earn a penurious subsistence, and superfluous wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was not their employment, it being uncertain how soon an invader might come and dislodge them from their unfortified habitations; and as they thought they might every where find their daily necessary support, they hesitated but little about shifting their seats; and for this reason they never flourished in the greatness of their cities, or any other circumstance of power. But the richest tracts of country ever were more particularly liable to this frequent change of inhabitants, such as that which is now called Thessaly, and Bœotia, and Peloponnesus mostly, except Arcadia, and in general every the most fertile part of Greece: for the natural wealth of their soil increasing the power of some amongst them, that power raised civil dissensions, which ended in their ruin, and at the same time exposed them more to foreign attacks. It was only the barrenness of the soil that preserved Attica, through the longest space of time, quiet and undisturbed, in one uninterrupted series of possessors. One, and not the least convincing proof of this is, that other parts of Greece, because of the fluctuating condition of the inhabitants, could by no means in their growth keep pace with Attica. The most powerful of those who were driven from the other parts of Greece by war or sedition betook themselves to the Athenians for secure refuge, and as they obtained the privileges of citizens,<sup>1</sup> have

<sup>1</sup> They were admitted to the same privileges with free-

constantly, from remotest time, continued to enlarge that city with fresh accessions of inhabitants; insomuch, that at last, Attica being insufficient to support the number, they sent over colonies into Ionia.

There is another, and to me a most convincing proof of the weakness of the ancients. Before the affairs of Troy, it does not appear that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one common undertaking; nor had the whole country that one general appellation: nor indeed did the same subsist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion; the several nations taking their distinguishing names from themselves, and Pelasgicum being that of the greatest tract. But when Hellen and his sons had acquired power in Pthiotis, and led out their dependants by way of aid to other cities, conversation made the use of this name become much more frequent among the several people, though it was long before it so prevailed as to become the general appellation of them all. For this Homer is my principal authority, who, though born a long time after the Trojan war, has nowhere mentioned them all in this general style, but has appropriated it to those who came with Achilles from Pthiotis, and were the first that bore this name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems Danüans and Argives and Achæans are their distinguishing titles.

born native Athenians. But this was practised only in the infancy and early growth of that state. It was afterwards an honor very seldom and with difficulty granted. Those who came from other places to settle at Athens are distinguished from citizens, by the name of sojourners, who had taken up their residence and cohabited with them. They performed several duties as subjects to the state which gave them protection, but never became Athenians, or citizens of Athens, in the emphatical sense of the term. The English reader will please to remember this, as the distinction often occurs in the sequel of our history.



Nor has he farther once mentioned the barbarians for this plain reason, in my opinion, because Grecians were not yet distinguished by this one comprehensive name in contradistinction to that other. These Grecians, therefore, whatever, whether so apart in the different cities, or united by mutual converse, or length comprehended in one general name, for want of strength and correspondence, never acted together in joint confederacy before the war of Troy: nor till the use of the sea had opened free communication amongst them that they engaged together in that expedition.

For Minos is the earliest person whom we know from tradition to have been master of a navy, and have been chiefly lord of the sea which is called Grecian. To him were the isles of the Cyclades subject; nay, most of them he planted himself with colonies, having expelled the Carians, and substituted his own sons in their different commands. And then of course he exerted his utmost power to clear that of pirates, for the more secure conveyance of his tributes.

The Grecians formerly, as well as those barbarians who, though seated on the continent, lived on the coast, and all the islanders, when once they learned the method of passing to and fro in the vessels, soon took up the business of piracy under the command of persons of the greatest ability amongst them, for the sake of enriching such adventures subsisting their poor. They landed, and plundered surprise unfortified places and scattered villages, from hence they principally gained a subsistence. It was by no means at that time an employment of proach, but rather an instrument of glory. So the people of the continent are even to this day a proach

this, who still attribute honor to such exploits if gently performed:<sup>1</sup> so also are the ancient poets, in whom those that sail along the coasts are every where equally accosted with this question, 'Whether they are pirates?' as if neither they to whom the question was put would disown the employment, nor they who are desirous to be informed would reproach them with it. The people of the continent also exercised robberies on one another; and to this very day many people of Greece are supported by the same practices; for instance, the Ozolian Locrians, and Ætolians, and Acarnanians, and their neighbors on the continent; and the custom of wearing their weapons, introduced by this old life of rapine, is still retained amongst them.

The custom of wearing weapons once prevailed all over Greece, as their houses had no manner of defence, as travelling was full of hazard, and their whole lives were passed in armor, like barbarians. A proof of this is the continuance still in some parts of Greece of those manners, which were once with uniformity general to all. The Athenians were the first who discontinued the custom of wearing their swords, and who passed from the dissolute life into more polite and elegant manners. And it is not a long time since those amongst the rich, who were advanced in years and studied their ease, left off wearing their linen garments and fastening the hair of their head behind with grasshoppers<sup>2</sup> of gold; though the aged amongst the Io-

<sup>1</sup> 'With due respect, with humanity,' as the scholiast explains it. For then they never made booty of, or carried away by stealth the laboring cattle: they never made their attacks by night, or committed any murder.

<sup>2</sup> To intimate their being the original possessors and pure natives of the soil, as much as the very grasshoppers, which

nians have constantly persevered in the use of these ornaments as marks of their affinity. That moderate uniformity of dress, which is still in vogue, was first introduced by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom in other points also there was the greatest equality of dress and diet observed, both in the highest and the meanest ranks. They also were the first who performed their exercises naked, stripping themselves in public, and anointing with oil before they entered the lists; though, before the custom had prevailed at the Olympic games for the champions to wear scarfs about their loins; and it is only a few years since these were quite disused.<sup>1</sup> But even yet, amongst some barbarians, more especially those of Asia, where the matches of boxing and wrestling are in repute, the combatants engage with scarfs round their loins. Many other arguments might with ease be alleged to prove that ancient Greece had forms and modes of living quite similar to those of the present barbarian world.

As for cities, so many as are of a later foundation and better placed for the increase of wealth, since the improvement of naval skill; all these have been built on the sea-shore, and walled about, and are situated on necks of land jutting out into the sea, for the sake of traffic and greater security from the insults of neighboring people. But those of an earlier date, having been more subject to piratical depredations, are situated at a great distance from the sea, not only on islands, but also on the main. For even those which

they supposed to be a natural and spontaneous production of the earth. They regarded themselves as contemporary with the insects.

<sup>1</sup> See Mr. West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games, p. 40.


lived on the coast, though inexpert at sea, were used to make excursions up into the country for the sake of plunder; and such inland settlements are discernible to this very day.

But the people of the islands, that is, the Carians and the Phœnicians, were by much the most expert at these piratical adventures; for by them the greatest part of the isles was inhabited. This is proved from the expiation solemnised at Delos in the course of this war; on which occasion all the sepulchres of the dead in that island being broken open, more than half of the number appeared to be Carians; known to be such from the weapons found in their graves, and a particularity of interment still used amongst them.<sup>1</sup> It was not till after the equipment of fleets by Minos that a communication was opened at sea: for by him the mischievous banditti were ejected from the islands, and many colonies of his own planted there in their stead. And from this period it was that the maritime people, grown more intent on the acquisition of wealth, became also more fond of settled habitations; and such of them as then surpassed in wealth strengthened their settlements by walling them about. And this their passion for gain continuing to increase, the poorer hired out their services to those who had affluence; and the great, who had all needful supplies at hand, reduced less powerful cities into their own subjection. And their power by these methods gradually advancing,

<sup>1</sup> The Carians first invented the boss of shields and the crest of helmets. In remembrance of this, a small shield and a crest were always buried with them. By this means were the Carians known. The Phœnicians were distinguished by the manner of their interment: for, whereas other nations laid the faces of their dead towards the east, the Phœnicians reversed the posture, and laid them to the west.

they were enabled in process of time to undertake the Trojan expedition.

It is farther my opinion, that the assemblage of that armament by Agamemnon was not owing so much to the attendance of the suitors of Helen, in pursuance of the oaths they had sworn to Tyndarus, as to his own superior power. It is related by those who received from their ancestors the most certain memorials of the Peloponnesian affairs, that Pelops, arriving there from Asia with abundance of wealth, soon gained so great an influence over those needy people, that, though a foreigner, he had the honor to have the country called after his own name; and that the power thus gained by him was successively enlarged by his posterity. Eurystheus, indeed, whose mother was the sister of Atreus, perished in Attica by means of the Heraclidæ; and Eurystheus, when he departed on that expedition, left the government of Mycenæ and his kingdom, because of his affinity, in the care of Atreus, who then resided with him, having fled from his father on the murder of Chrysippus. When, therefore, the return of Eurystheus was prevented by death, and the Mycenæans, from a dread of the Heraclidæ, were well inclined to Atreus, as a person of great abilities and deep in the affections of the people, he easily obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ and all the territories which had belonged to Eurystheus; and from hence the family of Pelops quite overpowered the family of Perseus. To these enlargements of power Agamemnon succeeding, and being also superior to the rest of his countrymen in naval strength, he was enabled, in my opinion, to form that expedition more from awe than favor. It is plain that he equipped out the largest number of ships himself, besides those he lent to the



e Arcadians. Homer is my witness here, if his testi-  
at mony have any force; who hath farther, at the deli-  
o very of the sceptre, styled him,

Of many isles, and of all Argos king.

n And a king who lived on the continent could not pos-  
sibly be lord of islands, except such as were adjacent;  
f the number of which must needs be small, unless he  
n had a competent strength at sea: but from this arma-  
ment we have good light afforded to guess at the pre-  
ceding.

What though Mycenæ was a small city, or though  
any place at that time remarkable appear at present  
inconsiderable to us; yet no one ought on these mo-  
tives prematurely to imagine that armament to have  
been less considerable than it is described by the poets  
and reported by tradition. Supposing the city of  
Lacedæmon to be now in a ruined condition, nothing  
left but the temples and the pavements of the mass, I  
fancy, in process of time, posterity could not easily be  
induced to believe that their power had ever been pro-  
portioned to their glory. Of the five divisions of Pe-  
loponnesus,<sup>1</sup> they are actually possessed of two; have  
the command of the whole, and of many confederate  
states without; yet as the city is neither closely built,  
as the temples and public edifices are by no means  
sumptuous, and the houses detached from one another  
after the old mode of Greece, it would suffer dispa-  
ragement from such a view. If we farther suppose  
the Athenians in the same reverse of fortune, from the  
view the city then would afford, it might be guessed that  
once it had double the strength which it really has.

<sup>1</sup> These were Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Messenia, and  
Elis. The Lacedæmonians were possessed of Laconia and  
Messenia.

We ought not therefore to be incredulous, nor so much to regard the appearance of cities as their power; and of course, to conclude the armament against Troy to have been greater than ever was known before, but inferior to those of our age. And whatever credit be given to the poetry of Homer in this respect, who no doubt as a poet has set it off with all possible enlargement, yet even according to his account it appears inferior: for he has made it to consist of twelve hundred ships; those of the Bœotians carrying each one hundred and twenty men; those of Philoctetes, fifty: pointing out, as I imagine, the largest and the smallest rates; for of the rate of other ships he has not made the least mention in his catalogue, though he has expressly informed us that every person of the crews belonging to the ships of Philoctetes were both mariners and soldiers; since he has made all who plied at the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not probable that any ships carried supernumeraries, excepting kings or persons in command, especially as their point was a mere transportation with all the necessary habiliments of war, and as their ships were not decked, but built intirely in the fashion of the old piratical cruisers. If, therefore, a mean be taken between the largest and smallest rates, the number of the whole will turn out of small account for quotas sent in general from the whole of Greece.<sup>1</sup> The reason of this was not so much a scarcity of men as want of money: they adjusted the number of men to the slender store of provisions they already had, and the probability of procuring a competent subsistence in the course of the war. On their

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides makes it of small account, in regard to the war which is his subject. But the number of men employed in the expedition against Troy was 102,000. For the mean between 120 and 50 is 85, and  $85 \times \text{by } 1200 = 102,000$ .

first landing they got the better in fight: the proof is, that they could not otherwise have fortified their camp with a wall. Neither does it appear that they exerted all their strength at once, numbers being detached for supplies of provisions, to till the Chersonesus, and to forage at large. Thus divided as they were, the Trojans were better able to make a ten years' resistance, being equal in force to those who were at any time left to carry on the siege: for had the stores of provision at the first landing been ample enough for the whole number of men they brought, and had they been able to prosecute the war free from the avocations of foraging and tillage, their superiority in the field must have given them an easy and expeditious conquest: but in fact they did not ply the work with all their number, but only with a part constantly reserved for the purpose. Had they formed the siege with their whole force, in less time and with less difficulty they must have taken Troy. Through want of money it was that expeditions prior to this, and even this, the most celebrated of all that ever happened, are plainly found to have been less in reality than they are in fame or current estimation at present, through poetical assistance.

Nor did the prosperous event of the Trojan expedition put an end to the unsettled and fluctuating state of Greece, or secure that tranquillity so necessary to advancement. The return of the Grecians from Ilium, after so long an absence, gave rise to many innovations. Seditions were excited in almost every city; and those who were forced to withdraw built cities for themselves in other places. The present Bœotians, for instance, being driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, sixty years after the taking of Troy, planted themselves in the country now called Bœotia, though before

---



that time, Cadmeis: but a body of them had already seated themselves there, of whom were those who went in the expedition against Troy: and eighty years after it, the Dorians, with the Heraclidæ, took possession of Peloponnesus. It was not without much ado and length of time that Greece, quiet and settled at home, had opportunity to send colonies abroad. Then the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians the greatest part of Italy and Sicily, and even some colonies in the different tracts of Greece. But all these transactions are of a later date than the Trojan war.

But when once the state of Greece was grown more robust, and increase of wealth became their study more than ever before, as the public revenues grew apace, in many places tyrannies started up: for before this kingdoms were hereditary, and with limited authority. Now Greece throughout was employed in building navies, and became addicted to naval affairs with unusual application. The Corinthians are said to have been the first who, by varying the make of their ships, brought them to that model which is now in use; and Corinth to be the first place of Greece where triremes were built.<sup>1</sup> It is a known fact, that Aminocles, a ship-carpenter from Corinth, built four ships for the Samians: now, from the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the conclusion of the war which is now my subject, there passed at most but three hundred years. The

<sup>1</sup> The triremes were the ships of war, of the galley kind, and take their name from the three banks of oars with which they were furnished. They were also masted and carried sails; but they generally lowered the sails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, or to run down on the enemy with more force and steadiness. See Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 14.

oldest sea-fight we know any thing of was that of the Corinthians against the Corcyreans : but the distance between that and the same period is not more than two hundred and sixty : for the city of the Corinthians, being seated on the Isthmus, has ever been a place of trade ; as formerly the Grecians, both within and without Peloponnesus, more accustomed to land than sea, could have no traffic with one another without passing through their territory. They were also remarkable for wealth, as clearly appears from the ancient poets, who have given that city the epithet of ' rich.' And, when once navigation was practised in Greece, they lost no time in their own equipments ; they cleared the sea of pirates ; and, opening their town as a public mart, both by land and sea, made Corinth powerful by the increase of its revenue. The Ionians had no naval force till a long time after this, in the reign of Cyrus, first king of the Persians, and his son Cambyzes ; and, waging war with Cyrus, they were for a time masters of the sea which lies on their own coasts. Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos, in the reign of Cambyzes, having a powerful navy, subdued many of the islands, and among the rest Rhene ; which, as soon as conquered, he consecrated to Delian Apollo. The Phoceans, also, when planting their colony at Marseilles, had a successful engagement at sea against the Carthaginians.

These were the most remarkable equipments of a naval force ; and these, though beyond contest many generations later than the war of Troy, had a very small number of triremes, but consisted chiefly of vessels of fifty oars, and barges of the more ancient model. And it was but a little while before the Median war and the death of Darius, who succeeded Cambyzes in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of

Sicily and the Corcyreans became masters of any considerable number of triremes: for these last were the only instances of a naval strength in Greece, before the invasion of it by Xerxes, that deserve particular mention. The vessels of the *Æginetæ*, and some others, were few in number, and most of them but fifty oars. It was not till later times, when the Athenians had war with the *Æginetæ*, and also expected the approach of Xerxes, that at the persuasion of Themistocles they built those ships with which they fought successfully against the barbarians; and even these were not yet completely decked over.

Such therefore were the navies of Greece, both of an earlier and later date. And the states to which they belonged gained by them considerable strength, through an increase of their revenue and the enlargement of their dominions. Embarkations grown more frequent, especially to those who were pent up in a narrow soil, occasioned the reduction of the isles; but for a land war, and in consequence of that, an accession of power, none such was at that time known. All conflicts of that sort, which ever happened, were disputes of boundaries between contiguous states. The Grecians had not yet launched forth into distant expeditions, nor aimed ambitiously at foreign conquests. There were no dependent cities, which furnished quotas at the will of others who gave them law; nor did those who were on equality concur in any joint undertaking; each petty state took up arms occasionally in its own defence against the incroachments of its neighbors. At most, the greatest division of Greece that ever happened was in the old rupture between the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when leagues were formed in favor of both.

By these means was the growth of many states r

yented, and that of the Ionians by a different cause—the great and surprising growth of the Persian power. For Cyrus, after he had completed the conquest of Croesus, and all the country which lies between the river Halys and the sea, invaded them, and enslaved their towns on the continent : and Darius afterwards, victorious by the strength of a Phœnician fleet, did the same by the islands.

As for those tyrants, who had any where usurped the government of Grecian cities,—their whole application being confined to their own private concerns, to the guard of their persons or aggrandisement of their families—they resided in their own cities so far as was consistent with their own security. Nothing worthy of remembrance was achieved by them, unless we take into account the frequent broils between them and their neighbors. Not but that the tyrants of Sicily had advanced their power to a great height ; but Greece in general was thus withheld for a long course of time from performing any remarkable exploit, by the strength of her united, or the adventurous efforts of her separate states.

But after that the tyrants of Athens, and all the tyrants of other parts of Greece, generally and of old subject to these violent incroachments, notwithstanding their number and the fresh vigor of the last, were all, except those of Sicily, demolished by the Lacedæmonians :—for Lacedæmon, ever since it came into the hands of the Dorians, in whose possession it still continues, though harassed with seditions the longest of any place we know, yet has ever been happy in a well-regulated government, and has always been exempt from tyrants : for, reckoning to the conclusion of this present war, it is somewhat more than four

solution and contempt of danger, they accidental found Hipparchus at the Leocorium, superintending the Panathenaical procession,<sup>1</sup> and immediately slew him. There are many other things of a more recent date, and of memory, not yet invalidated by time, about which the other Grecians are very wrong in their notions; such as, that the Lacedæmonian kings had each of them a double and not a single vote in public questions; and, that amongst them the pittanate was a military band, which never yet existed. So easy a task to numbers is the search of truth; so eager are they to catch at whatever lieth next at hand!

But, from the testimonies alleged in support of what I have hitherto advanced, any one may depend on an account of things, without danger of false opinion. Let him withhold his credit from the songs of poets whose profession it is to give all possible enlargements to their subjects: let him do so farther by the writers of prose,<sup>2</sup> who study more that artful composition which captivates the ear than the plain and simple recital of truth, where proper attestations are never to be found, and many things through length of time have incredibly sallied out into mere fable; and then he will be convinced, on the plainest proofs, that the

<sup>1</sup> This procession was made at the great Panathenea, which festival was celebrated once in five years in commemoration of the union of all the people of Attica by Theseus. The lesser Panathenea was celebrated every third year, some say every year, and was lengthened out by public games. They were also used at the great Panathenea, in which the greatest splendor and magnificence were employed, and the procession added, here mentioned by Thucydides, and of which the curious reader may see a particular account in Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. i. p. 421.

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides is here supposed to glance at Herodotus; and again a little after he justly thinks that 'fiction' and 'fable ought to have no place in history.'

state of ancient Greece was nearly the same as I have described it. And this present war, when considered in all its operations, notwithstanding the propensity of mankind to imagine that war in which they are personally engaged to be the greatest that ever happened, and so soon as it is over to replace their admiration on others more ancient, will easily be owned to be the most important of all.

As to the speeches of particular persons, either at the commencement or in the prosecution of the war, whether such as I heard myself, or such as were repeated to me by others, I will not pretend to recite them in all their exactness. It has been my method to consider principally what might be pertinently said on every occasion to the points in debate, and to keep as near as possible to what would pass for genuine by universal consent. And as for the actions performed in the course of this war, I have not presumed to describe them from casual narratives, or my own conjectures, but either from certainty, where I myself was a spectator, or from the most exact information I have been able to collect from others. This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, because even such as were present at those actions disagreed in their accounts about them, according as affection to either side or memory prevailed.

My relation, because quite clear of fable, may prove less delightful to the ears. But it will afford sufficient scope to those who love a sincere account of past transactions, of such as in the ordinary vicissitude of human affairs may fully occur, at least be resembled again. I give it to the public as an everlasting possession, and not as a contentious instrument of temporary applause.

Of former transactions, the greatest was that at the Medes ; which, however, by two engagements at sea and as many at land, was brought to a speedy conclusion. But the continuance of this war ran out to a much greater length ; and Greece in the course was plunged into such calamities as were never before in an equal space. Never had so many cities made desolate by victories, some by barbarians, some by the violence of intestine feuds ; to say nothing of those where captivity made room for new possessions ; never so many instances of banishment ; never so many scenes of slaughter either in battles or seditions. Calamities farther, as were known only by report, had scarcely been felt in fact, now gained credit by experience : earthquakes, for instance, which at the largest part of the habitable globe, and shrouded with the utmost violence ; eclipses of the sun, happened more frequently than former times had remembered ; great droughts in some places, the sequence of which was famine ; and, what made the least ravage, but did its share of destruction, noisome pestilence : for all these things ensued the sequel of this war, which was carried on between Athenians and Peloponnesians, after breaking thirty years' truce concluded between them on the reduction of Eubœa.

The reasons for which this truce was broken, and their course of variance, I have in the first thought proper to write, that none may be at fault about the origin of so momentous a war among Grecians. The growth of the Athenian power seemed to have been the truest occasion of it, though never openly avowed : the jealousy struck by the Lacedæmonians made the contest necessary.

the pretences publicly alleged on either side for breaking the truce and declaring open war shall now be related.

Epidamnus is a city on the right hand as you sail into the Ionian gulf: adjoining to it live the barbarian Taulantii, a people of Illyria. The Corcyreans settled a colony here, the leader of which was Phalius, the son of Heratoclide, a Corinthian by birth, of the lineage of Hercules, invited to the office out of the mother city, according to the custom of ancient times: and besides this, some Corinthians and others of Doric descent, joined themselves to this colony. In process of time, the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous. Yet, having been afterwards harassed with seditions of many years' continuance, they were brought very low, according to report, by a war waged against them by the neighboring barbarians, and were deprived of the greatest share of their power. But the most recent event at Epidamnus before the present war was, that the people there had driven the nobles out of the city. These, sheltering themselves amongst the barbarians, began depredations on those who remained behind, both by land and sea. The Epidamnians of the place, suffering vastly from these depredations, despatched ambassadors to Corcyra as their mother city, beseeching them 'Not to behold their destruction with eyes unconcerned, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to deliver them from this barbarian war.' The ambassadors, sitting down submissively in the temple of Juno, offered these supplications. But the Corcyreans refusing to receive them, sent them home without effect. The Epidamnians, thus convinced that no redress could be had from Corcyra, and ignorant how to proceed in their present perplexities, sent to Delphos to



to set out immediately, and yet chose to have the benefit of the colony, he might deposit fifty Corinthian drachmas, and be excused his personal attendance.' The number of those who entered for immediate transportation, and of those who deposited their money, was large. They sent farther to the Megareans, requesting a number of ships to enlarge their convoy; that their passage might not be obstructed by the Corcyreans; from whom they received a supply of eight, and four more from Pale of the Cephallenians. The same request was made to the Epidaurians, who sent five. A single ship joined them from Hermione; two from Troezen; ten from the Leucadians; and eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they requested money; of the Eleans, empty ships and money. And the number of ships fitted out by themselves amounted to thirty, and of heavy-armed troops three thousand.

When the Corcyreans were informed of these preparations, they went to Corinth, purposely accompanied by ambassadors from Lacedæmon and Sicyon. There they charged the Corinthians 'to fetch away their garrison and new settlement from Epidamnus, as having no manner of pretensions there: that, if they had any thing to allege to the contrary, they were willing to submit to a fair trial in Peloponnesus, before such states as both sides should approve; and to whichever party the colony should be adjudged, by them it should be held.' They also intimated 'their readiness to refer the point in dispute to the oracle at Delphos: war,' in their own inclinations, 'they were quite against: but if it must be so, on their sides,' they said, 'mere necessity would prescribe the measure; and if thus compelled to do it, they should for assistance have recourse to friends, not eligible indeed, but better able

to serve them than such as they already had.' The Corinthians answered, that 'if they would withdraw their fleet and their barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then treat of an accommodation: but till this was done their honor would not suffer them to submit to a reference, whilst their friends were undergoing the miseries of a siege.' The Corcyreans replied, that 'if they would recall their people from Epidamnus, themselves also would do the like; but were ready farther to agree that both parties should remain in their present situation, under a suspension of arms, till the affair could be judicially determined.'

The Corinthians were not only deaf to every proposal, but so soon as ever they had manned their ships and their allies were come up, despatching a herald beforehand to declare war against the Corcyreans, and then weighing anchor with a force of seventy-five ships, and two thousand heavy-armed troops, they stretched away for Epidamnus, to make head against the Corcyreans. The commanders of this fleet were, Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes: those of the land forces were, Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus.

When they were come up as far as Actium, in the district of Anactorium, where stands the temple of Apollo, in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, they were met by a herald, despatched expressly in a row-boat by the Corcyreans, forbidding them 'at their peril to proceed.' But at the same time the Corcyreans were busied at home in managing their own ships, repairing such as were old, to make them fit for service, and equipping the rest with the utmost expedition. When the herald brought back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and their squadron was now

completed to eighty ships (for they had forty employed in the siege of Epidamnus), they sailed in quest of the enemy; and drawing up against them, came to an engagement. The victory fell beyond dispute to the side of the Corcyreans, and fifteen ships of the Corinthians were utterly destroyed.

Their good fortune was such, that on the very same day Epidamnus was surrendered to the besiegers on a capitulation, by which 'all the strangers in the place were to be sold for slaves, but the Corinthians to be detained prisoners at discretion.'

After the engagement at sea, the Corcyreans, having erected a trophy<sup>1</sup> on Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, put to death all the prisoners they had taken, except the Corinthians, whom they kept in chains: and after this, as the Corinthians and allies having been vanquished in fight, were forced to retire within their own harbors, they were quite masters of all the adjacent sea; and, sailing first to Leucas, a colony of the Corinthians, they laid its territory waste; and then burnt Cyllene, a dock of the Eleans, because they had supplied the Corinthians with ships and money. In

<sup>1</sup> This was constantly done by the Grecians on a victory. Nay, when the victory was claimed on both sides, both sides erected trophies, of which several instances occur in Thucydides. The trophies for a victory at land were decked out with the arms they had taken: those for a victory at sea, with arms also, and the shatters of the enemy's ships. 'To demolish a trophy was looked on as unlawful, and a kind of sacrilege, because they were all consecrated to some deity: nor was it less a crime to pay divine adoration before them, or to repair them when decayed, as may be likewise observed of the Roman triumphal arches; this being the means to revive the memory of forgotten quarrels, and engage posterity to revenge the disgrace of their ancestors. For the same reason, those Grecians, who first introduced the custom of erecting pillars for trophies, incurred a severe censure from the ages they lived in.' Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 12.

this manner they continued masters of the sea a long time after their naval victory, and in their cruises very much annoyed the allies of the Corinthians. It was not till the beginning of the summer that a check was given them by a fleet and land army, who were commissioned, in order to relieve their harassed allies, to station themselves at Actium and round the Chimerium of Thesprotis. There they lay, to cover Leucas and other places which were in friendship with them from the ravages of the enemy. The Corcyreans, on this, with a naval and land force, stationed themselves over-against them at Leucimna. But, neither party venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet in their opposite stations the whole summer; and on the approach of winter both sides withdrew to their respective homes.

During the remainder of the year, after the engagement at sea, and all the following, the Corinthians, whose indignation was raised in this their war against the Corcyreans, were building new ships, and sparing neither labor nor cost to get a strong armament ready for sea, and sent throughout Peloponnesus and the other parts of Greece to hire mariners into their service. The Corcyreans, hearing of these great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and with reason; for at that time they were in no alliance with any of the Grecians, nor comprehended either in the Athenian or Lacedæmonian league: and hence they thought it quite expedient to go and sue for the alliance of the Athenians, and endeavor to obtain some succor from them. The Corinthians, gaining intelligence of their design, despatched an embassy at the same time also to Athens, instructed by any means to prevent the junction of the Athenian to the naval strength of the Corcyreans, which might hinder them from bringing this war to a *successful* issue. The Athenians being

met in general assembly,<sup>1</sup> both embassies rose up plead their own cause; and the Corcyrean spoke follows:

<sup>1</sup> The general assembly of the people. In this the sovereignty was vested: and it is proper the English reader should grow acquainted with this particular form in the Athenian democracy.

The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, which presided by rotation. The year was divided into ten courses and each tribe presided about five weeks. The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by their authority, and in this name: these were called prytanes. This being too large a number for business, they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions presiding for a week; and these were called proedri. One of the proedri presided, or was in the chair a day, and was styled epistates. For that day, and he never enjoyed this pre-eminence a second time in his life, he was invested with the highest trust in the government. He kept the public seal, and the keys of the citadel and treasury: the assembly of the people he ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, put the question, and declared the majority.

The assemblies of the people were of two kinds, ordinary and extraordinary. Of the first kind, four were regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, and at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states had public audience. The latter were occasionally convened by the presidents in course, or by the generals of the state. Some days beforehand notice was publicly given by the senate or council of five hundred on what subjects they were to deliberate: this could not be observed on sudden emergencies.

They met early in the morning, generally in the Prytanæa, the summons of the public crier. At the second summons they were obliged to attend at their peril: for then the public officers ran along the forum with a rope stretched across, rubbed over with vermilion, and all on whom a mark was found were fined; but those who attended early and regularly received half a drachma each for attendance. The number which attended generally amounted to five or six thousand.

The assembly opened with the sacrifice of a young pig to Ceres, and the blood was sprinkled round by way of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud by the crier for the prosperity of the commonwealth of Athens; which ended a curse was next pronounced on every citizen who did anything to the prejudice of his country. Then the president of the week opened the points on which they were convened and the assembly proceeded to business.

‘It is quite proper, Athenians, that those who address themselves to a neighboring power, imploring their succor, which is now our case, without being able to plead the merit of prior good services, or an old alliance in their own behalf, should previously convince them, chiefly, that a compliance with such requests must turn to their advantage; at least, that it will cause no manner of inconvenience; and then, that the favor will be returned with effectual gratitude. If they are unable to give satisfactory conviction in any of these particulars, they can have no reason to be angry if their suit be rejected. The Corcyreans, confident that they can clear up these points beyond the reach of scruple, have sent us hither to request your alliance.

‘The method, indeed, which hitherto we have fondly observed, has proved in fact absurd towards you in this our exigency, and prejudicial to our own affairs in our present situation. In preceding times, we never chose to grant our alliance to any; yet now we are come to sue for alliance from others, being through our own maxims quite destitute of friends in this our war against the Corinthians: and that which before appeared the conduct of refined prudence, to keep clear of danger by shunning the intanglements of a foreign alliance, we now find by the event to have been both impolitic and weak.

‘Once already we have engaged the Corinthians at sea, and repulsed them merely by our own strength. But, since with a greater force collected from Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, they are again preparing to attack us; since we perceive ourselves unable to resist them merely with our own domestic strength; since, farther, with our subjection the danger will spread abroad; we are necessitated to apply to

you, and every where else for succor; and though now emboldened to act in opposition to our former inactive maxims, yet we deserve your pardon, as they were not the result of bad designs, but of mistaken judgments: and could we but obtain redress from you, this incidental necessity of ours will turn out highly to your honor on several accounts.

‘ In the first place, you will favor those with your assistance who have felt but never committed injustice. In the next place, by protecting those whose lives and liberties are at stake, you will confer so vast an obligation, that the memory of it can never be abolished. We are now masters of the greatest naval force except your own. Consider therefore how fair an occasion, very seldom to be met with, of the greatest advantage to yourselves, of the greatest vexation to your enemies, now lies before you; when that very power, the accession of which you would readily have purchased with ample sums of money, and a weight of obligation, comes here to invite your acceptance, and make a tender of itself without any danger or expense to you; nay, what is more, enabling you to gain the praise of the world, the grateful acknowledgements of those you defend, and an increase of power to yourselves. Few people, in preceding ages, have ever had at any one time so many fine opportunities within their reach. And few there are, who, suing for alliance, do it not rather from a view of receiving, than conferring security and reputation by their suit.

‘ If there be any one amongst you who imagines that war will never happen in which we may do you service, in such imagination he is quite mistaken. He doth not penetrate the designs of the Lacedæmonians, who, alarmed at your power, are intent on war; nor

those of the Corinthians, who, powerful of themselves, and your enemies, have begun with us to open the way for attacking you; that, united by common resentments, we might not stand up in our mutual defence against their violence: nor they be disappointed at least in one of their views, either effectually to humble us, or securely to establish their own power. It is your interest to prevent them, by accepting that alliance which we offer, and rather to anticipate their designs than counterplot them when ripening into act.


‘If, farther, they tax with a breach of justice your presuming to interfere with their colonies; let them learn that every colony, whilst used in the proper manner, payeth honor and regard to its mother-state, but when treated with injury and violence, is become an alien. They are not sent out to be the slaves, but to be the equals of those who remained behind. Their violence and injustice require no proofs: for, invited by us to submit the business of Epidamnus to a judicial trial, they chose rather to prosecute their claims at war than at equity. And let such behavior towards us their relations put you timely on your guard, that you may not be overreached by their collusions, nor hesitate one moment to grant our petitions: for he who finds the least room to repent of having gratified his enemies is most likely to persevere in uninterrupted security.

‘You will not break your treaty with the Lacedæmonians by our admission, who are allied to neither of you. By that treaty it is expressly stipulated, that ‘if any of the states of Greece be not at present in alliance with either of the contracting parties, permission is given them to go into either league, at their own discretion.’ And terrible indeed it is, if they must be at liberty to man their fleets out of places in



their alliance; nay more, than that out of Greece at large, and to no small amount, even out of your dependents; and we must be debarred not only your most inviting alliance, but every possible expedient of succor: then, after all, they must raise a cry of injustice, if we offer our requests to you and have them granted. But much greater reasons of complaint will lie with us if we cannot prevail on you: for then you will throw at a distance those who are beset with dangers and never were your enemies; you will not only not restrain the incroachments of enemies and invaders, but will behold them through your negligence assuming strength out of your dominions, which you ought never to endure. You ought either to hinder them from seducing your subjects into their pay, or send an immediate succor to us, in what manner you may be persuaded is the most expedient: but the course you ought principally to take is to form with us a defensive alliance, and to act immediately.

‘The advantage of such a measure, as we premised at first, we are clearly proving. But that which carrieth the greatest weight is this; that our enemies are enemies also to you; a point too clear to require proof, and enemies by no means despicable, but able to make revolvers feel their vengeance. The bad consequences of rejecting a land, cannot be equal to those of rejecting a naval alliance; especially to you, who should exert your utmost efforts to let none be masters of a fleet beside yourselves; or, if that be not feasible, to make the most powerful in that respect your fast allies. And whosoever, allowing the plain advantage of these our arguments, may yet dread a rupture if their influence prevail,—let such a one know, that the ever he feareth, accompanied by strength, will strike great dread into all your enemies; but that the zeal of hi



ould have us now rejected, since it is founded  
 weak presumption of their strength, must the  
 encourage those enemies to attack you. The

consultation is not confined to Corcyra, but  
 early concerneth Athens also. Let him there-  
 assured, that he doth not provide the best for  
 fare of Athens, when directly foreseeing a war  
 proaching and only not on foot, he hesitateth  
 it about gaining a people provided with all the  
 ry means of being a most serviceable friend or  
 prejudicial foe ;—a people opportunely situated  
 course to Italy and Sicily, so capable to hinder  
 ession of any naval force from thence to the  
 nnesians, and to secure a passage from hence  
 of those coasts ; not to mention the commodious-  
 it in many other respects.

reduce the whole to one short point, wherein all  
 ery individual of you is concerned, learn from  
 hat we are not to be abandoned : there are but  
 aval powers amongst the Grecians of any con-  
 ion ; your own, our own, and that of the Corin-

If you indolently suffer two of these to be in-  
 sted, by leaving us a prey to the Corinthians,  
 ust for the future make head against the Cor-  
 s and Peloponnesians both ; but, if you grant  
 lliance to us, the contest will lie against them  
 and your own naval strength be considerably  
 nted.'


his manner the Corcyreans spoke ; and when  
 ad concluded, the Corinthians took their turn  
 ows :

ice these Corcyreans have not confined their  
 rse merely to solicit the favor of your alliance,  
 ve enlarged it with invectives against our in-  
 in making war on them, we also lie under a  
 IUC.

necessity to make some previous observations on both of those points before we proceed to other matters. By this means you will perceive your own great security in complying with our demands, and what weighty reasons you have to reject their importunate solicitations.

‘ They allege it as a maxim of prudence that they have been hitherto averse to any foreign alliance; but their motives in this were founded on malice, and not on virtue. They would have no ally to be a witness of the wrongs they do; they declined the society of such as might put them to the blush. Their very island, farther, which is finely situated for such arbitrary tempers, suffereth them alone to judge those outrages they themselves commit; exempting them from fair and equitable trials, because they seldom go abroad to visit their neighbors, as their harbors are the constant and necessary resort of others. Here then lieth the modesty of their unassociating maxim; it was designed to prevent their having any partners in violence, that they might have it all to themselves; that, when they were superior, they might oppress without control; when there were none to watch them they might engross the spoil, and might enjoy their rapine without danger of a blush. Had they been those virtuous souls they proclaim themselves, then, clear of every bad imputation from their neighbors, they had a fine opportunity to manifest their integrity to the world by doing and by submitting to justice.

‘ But such neither we nor any other people have in fact experienced them: for, though planted by us they have ever disowned their allegiance to us, and now wage open war against us, pleading that they were not sent abroad to be maltreated and oppressed.



ever in our own behalf, that neither did we mean to receive their injurious requitals, but to keep them in lawful dependence, and to be honored and revered by them. Such dutiful returns the mother colonies punctually make us, and by such people are so well respected as ourselves. For great satisfaction therefore we give to all the world, plainly appeareth that we afford no reasonable help to these alone, and that without some glaring wrong we should have had no inclination to declare against them. But though we had actually transgressed, it would have been quite decent on their part to have shown condescension when we were angry; it would have been base in us to have pressed on such moderation. To their pride and the want of wealth their many transgressions against the law are justly to be ascribed. Hence it was that they claim to Epidamnus, which belongeth to us, harassed with intestine feuds; but when we refuse redress, then by force they seize and detain it. Now they pretend that previous to that they were willing to have submitted to a fair arbitration. But as we are not to be regarded, when offered by them, as already masters in possession, and our authority make appeal to justice: they are only of opinion when facts and words are equitable to be decided before the point hath been decided by arms. As not before they had besieged that city, but they thought that we were intent on saving it, they had recourse to the specious pretence of arbitration. And here they are at present, by no means content with the wrongs they have there committed, presuming to ask conjunction from you, not for help, but in violence, and on the merit of being wronged, against us to beg your protection. Then was

the proper time for such an address to you, when their affairs securely flourished ; not now when we have been outraged by them, and they are beset with dangers not when you, who have shared no benefit from their former power, are to relieve their distress, and by no means their accomplices in crimes, are to come in for an equality of censure from us. A prior conjunction of force justly intitleth to a share of what may be the event ; but those who had no participation in the guilt ought to be exempted from the consequences of it.—And thus we have clearly shown that we have addressed ourselves before you with all the requisites of a rightful cause, and that their proceedings are violent and rapacious.

‘ It is now incumbent on us to convince you that you cannot with justice receive them into alliance : for, granting it to be expressly stipulated in the treaty that any of the states not particularly mentioned may go into either league at their own discretion, yet the intent of the stipulation reached not to those who join party to the prejudice of another, but to such as having withdrawn from neither side are in need of protection—to such as bring not war instead of peace to those who receive them,—if they know their interest. And yet the latter must be your position if our arguments lose their influence : for you will not only become auxiliaries to them, but enemies also to us who are your allies by treaty. Of necessity, if you join with them, our vengeance must be levelled at them without separating you. Right above all things it would be for you to keep yourselves at distance from us both ; if that will not please, to reverse your proceedings, and join with us in opposition to them : for, to the Corinthians you are bound firm and lasting treaties ; with the Corcyreans ;

we never yet transacted even for a truce, and by no means to establish a new law for receiving revolted states in the other league. We ourselves did not, on the Persian revolt, give our suffrage against you when the Athenians of the Peloponnesians were divided on the question—whether they ought to be supported: but we only maintained that every state had a right to protect itself against its own dependents. For if you receive and undertake the defence of those who have behaved unjustly, the event will show that the greater number will come over to our side, and that you establish a disadvantage prejudicial to yourselves much more than to us.

The points of justice we have thus sufficiently urged up to you, according to the general laws of justice. We have only to add a word of advice and a claim of a favor, such a one as we now affirm on a principle of gratitude ought not to be denied us, who were neither your enemies so far as to hurt you, nor were your friends so far as to burden you. When formerly, before the invasion of the Medes, you were wanting of long ships in your war against the Æginetæ, you were supplied by the Corinthians with twenty ships: a service which we then did you, and that other service recent about the Samians, when we prevented them from receiving any support from the Peloponnesians, enabled you in their turns to vanquish the Æginetæ and to chastise the Samians. And these services were done to you at a season when the human attention, fixed solely on war, regardeth nothing but what tends to victory. Whoever forwardeth this men esteem their friend, though he was before their foe; and him who neglecteth it, their foe, though perhaps he may be their friend: for even domestic affairs are sordidly conducted at a time when the mind is inflamed by contention.

‘ Recollect these things. Let the young man learn the truth of them from his elders, and acknowledge we ought to be properly requited. Let him not entertain the thought, that what we say is agreeable to equity, but, that in case of a war, interest inclineth us to that way: for interest is most surely to be found there where the least injustice is committed. The emergency of that war, from the dread of which the Corcyreans encourage you to act unjustly, lieth yet in security, and ought not to inflame you into open immediate hostilities against the Corinthians. It would be prudent, farther, to lessen that jealousy we have already conceived from the proceedings at Lacedæmon. For a latter obligation, by the favor of the Athenians, though of less weight in itself, is able to cancel the charge of greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be allured with the promise of a powerful conjunction of naval force: for never to act unjustly against equity is a firmer security of power than to be elevated by present plausibilities, and enlarge it through a series of dangers. Our present circumstances resemble those concerning which we explicitly declared at Lacedæmon that every state had a right to proceed according to its own prudence: and now we beg that liberty to you; and that you, who have reaped the benefit of such a suffrage from us would not prejudice us by yours. Render us for it the just requital; remembering that this is the critical season, in which he that aideth is the best of friends, and he that opposeth the greatest foe. And, as for these Corcyreans, take them not into your alliance in despite of us, nor abet them in the injuries they have done us. By acting in this manner you will discharge the obligations incumbent on you, and will take those measures which are necessary for your own advantage.’

This is the substance of what was said by the Corinthians.

The Athenians having heard both parties,<sup>1</sup> met twice in full assembly on this occasion. At the first meeting they thought there was validity in the arguments of the Corinthians; but, at the second, they came to a different resolution—not indeed to form such an alliance with the Corcyreans as to have the same enemies and the same friends; for then, if the Corcyreans should summon them to join in an expedition against Corinth, their treaty with the Peloponnesians would be broken; but an alliance merely defensive, for the reciprocal succor of one another, if either Corcyra or Athens or any of their respective allies should be assaulted. A war with the Peloponnesians seemed to

<sup>1</sup> Here the English reader should be informed in what manner business went on when difficulties, diversities of opinion, and consequently debates ensued. When it appeared that the point proposed would not pass unanimously, the crier, at the command of the president in the chair, proclaimed aloud 'What citizen above fifty years of age has a mind to speak?' When such had been heard, the crier made a second proclamation, that 'any Athenian whatever had liberty to speak.' The debate being ended, the president in the chair bade the crier put the question. It was decided by holding up of hands. The chairman distinguished the numbers in the affirmative and negative, and declared the majority. Then the resolution or decree was drawn up in form: and the archon's name, who gave title to the year, the day of the month, and the name of the presiding tribe were prefixed.

The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy observation. The sentiments of age and experience were first to be heard, and then the spirit and resolution of the younger were called in to assist at the public consultation. Nay, they carried it farther; no person convicted of profaneness, debauchery, cowardice, or public misdemeanor, was suffered to speak in this assembly. From them they expected no sound instruction, no disinterested advice. If any such offered to speak, the presidents of the assembly immediately enjoined them silence; or, if they were refractory, ordered the criers to pull them down, and turn them out of the *assembly*



them unavoidable; and they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which had so great a naval force, for a prey to the Corinthians; but, to break them to the utmost of their power against one another, that on occasion they might be the better able to war with the Corinthians, thus weakened to their hands, though joined by other states of Greece which had power at sea. At the same time that island appeared to them most conveniently situated in the passages to Italy and Sicily. On these motives the Athenians received the Corcyreans into their alliance: and not long after the departure of the Corinthians, sent ten ships to their aid under the command of Lacedæmonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles. Their orders were 'by no means to engage the Corinthians unless they stood against and endeavored to make a descent at Corcyra, or any of its dependent places; if they did so, to resist them with all their efforts.' These orders were given with a view of not infringing the treaty; and this their aid of shipping arrived at Corcyra.

The Corinthians, when they had completed their preparations, set sail for Corcyra with a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships. Of these, ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to the Megareans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-seven to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and the other ninety were their own. The quotas from the allied cities had each of them their respective commanders; but the Corinthian squadron was commanded by Xenoclides, the son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. So soon as they were all assembled at that part of the continent which looks towards Corcyra, they set sail from Leucas, and arrive at the Chimerium in Thesprotia. A harbor opens *itself here*; and above it is the city of Ephyre, at a

distance from the sea, in Eleatis, a district of Thesprotis: near it is the outlet into the sea of the lake of Acherusia, into which the river Acheron, having run through Thesprotis, is at last received; from which it also derives its name. The river Thyamis also runs here, dividing Thesprotis from Cestrine; and between these two rivers arises the cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians therefore arrive at this part of the continent, and fix their station there: but the Corcyreans, so soon as ever advised of their sailing, having manned a hundred and ten ships under the command of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, took their station at one of those isles which are called the Sybota, accompanied by the ten Athenian ships. Their land force was left at the promontory of Leucimna, with an aid of a thousand heavy-armed Zacynthians. The Corinthians had also ready on the continent a numerous aid of barbarians; for the people on the coast have ever continued their friends. When every thing was in order among the Corinthians, taking in provisions for three days, they weigh by night from Chimerium with a design to fight; and having sailed along till break of day, they discover the ships of the Corcyreans already out at sea, and advancing against them. When thus they had got a view of each other, both sides form into the order of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyreans were the Athenian ships; the rest of the fleet was all their own, ranged into three squadrons, each of which were respectively under the orders of the three commanders: in this manner was the order of the Corcyreans formed. In the right of the Corinthians were the ships of the Megareans and Ambraciots; in the centre the other allies in several arrangements: the Corinthians formed the left wing themselves, as their ships were the best to oppose the Athenians and the right of the C

---

ans.<sup>1</sup> When the signal-flags were hoisted on both sides, they ran together and began the engagement; both sides having stowed their decks with bodies of heavy-armed, with many farther that drew the bow or tossed the javelin. Their preparations still retained something of the awkward manner of antiquity. The engagement was sharply carried on, yet without exertions of skill, and very much resembling a battle on land. When they had laid one another close, they were not easily separated again, because of the number and hurry of the vessels. The greatest hope of victory was placed in the heavy-armed fighting on the decks; who, fixed to their post, engaged hand to hand, whilst their ships continued without any motion. They had no opportunity to make their charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of strength and courage, without any dexterity. The tumult was great on all sides, and the whole action full of disorder: in which the Athenian ships relieved the Corcyrean wherever they were pressed too hard, and did what they could to intimi-

<sup>1</sup> To give the English reader once for all a proper light into their method of beginning an engagement, I shall quote the following paragraph from Archbishop Potter's *Archæologia*, v. ii. c. 21:—

'Before they joined battle both parties invoked the gods to their assistance by prayers and sacrifices; and the admirals going from ship to ship in some of the lighter vessels, exhorted their soldiers in a set oration to behave themselves like men: then all things being in readiness, the signal was given by hanging out of the admiral's galley a gilded shield, as we read in Plutarch, or a red garment or banner. During the elevation of this the fight continued, and by its depression or inclination towards the right or left, the rest of the ships were directed in what manner to attack their enemies, or retreat from them. To this was added the sound of trumpets, which was begun in the admiral's galley, and continued round the whole navy; it was likewise usual for the soldiers, before the fight, to sing a pæan, or hymn to Mars, and after the fight another to Apollo.'

date the enemy ; but their commanders refrained from any direct attack, remembering with awe the orders of the Athenians. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered the most : for the Corcyreans, with twenty ships, having put them to flight, chased them when dispersed, to the continent ; and, continuing the pursuit to their very camp, land immediately, where they set fire to their abandoned tents, and carried off all the baggage. In this part therefore the Corinthians and their allies were vanquished, and the Corcyreans plainly superior : but in the left, where the Corinthians personally engaged, they easily prevailed ; as twenty ships of the Corcyreans, and those too from a number at first inferior, were gone off in the pursuit. But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyreans thus distressed, now came up to their support more openly than before, having hitherto refrained from any direct attack : and when the chase was clearly begun, and the Corinthians followed their success, then every one amongst them applied himself to action. There was no longer any time for discretion : Corinthians and Athenians were forced by absolute necessity to engage one another.

The chase being thus begun, the Corinthians towed not after them the hulks of the vessels they had sunk ; but turned all their attention to the men who were floating about, and cruised at large more to slaughter than take alive : and, having not yet discovered the defeat of their right, they slaughtered through ignorance their own friends : for the number of ships being large on either side, and covering a wide extent of sea, after the first confusion of the engagement they were not able easily to distinguish which were the victors or which the vanquished ; since Grecians against Grecians had never at any time before engaged at sea with

---

so large a number of vessels. But after the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyreans to land, they turned to look after their shattered vessels and their own dead: and most of these they took up and carried to Sybota, where also lay the land force of the Ionian barbarian auxiliaries: this Sybota is a desert haven in Thesprotis. Having performed this duty, they gathered together again into a body and went in quest of Corcyreans; who, with those damaged vessels that could swim, and with all that had no damage, together with the Athenians, came out to meet them, fearful lest they might attempt to land on their shore. It was now late in the day, and they had sung their pæan, going to attack, when on a sudden the Corinthians slackened their course,<sup>1</sup> having descried a reinforcement of twenty sail coming up from Athens. The second squadron the Athenians had sent away to support the former ten, fearing (what really happened) lest the Corcyreans might be vanquished, and that their own ten ships be too few for their support. The Corinthians, therefore, having got a view of them, suspecting they came from Athens, and in a larger number than they yet discovered, began gradually to fall away. They were not descried by the Corcyreans (for the course kept them more out of their ken), and were surprised to see the Corinthians thus slacken their course, till some, who had gained a view, informed them that such ships were coming up, and that they also fell back themselves: for now it began to grow dark, and the Corinthians being turned about, had

<sup>1</sup> Literally, 'they knocked the hind deck,' a phrase ingeniously applied by Thucydides to those that retreat fighting and still facing their enemies. It was done by running the ships backwards on their hind decks in order to tack about. See *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 20.

solved their order. In this manner were they separated from one another; and the naval engagement ended with the night.

The Corcyreans having recovered their station at Leucimna, those twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glauco the son of Leager, and Andocides the son of Leogoras, having passed through floating carcases and wrecks, came up to the station not long after they had been descried. Yet the Corcyreans (for now it was night) were in great consternation lest they should be enemies: but they were soon known, and then came to anchor.

Next morning the thirty Athenian ships, accompanied by such of the Corcyreans as were fit for sea, weighed away, and made over for the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians lay, designing to try whether or no they would engage again. The Corinthians, putting their ships from off the shore, and drawing up into order in the deeper water, remained there without advancing. They had no design or inclination to begin another engagement, as they were sensible of the junction of the fresh Athenian ships, and of the numerous difficulties with which they were beset, about the custody of the prisoners whom they had on board, and the want of necessary materials to repair their ships on this desert coast. Their thoughts were more employed on their return home, and the method to accomplish it, from the apprehension lest the Athenians, judging the league to be broken as they had come to blows, might obstruct their passage. For this reason they determined beforehand to despatch a boat with proper persons, though without the solemn protection of a herald, and so to sound their intentions. The message to be delivered was this:

‘You are guilty of injustice, ye men of Athens, in

beginning war and violating treaties; for you hinder us from taking due vengeance on our enemies, by lifting up your arms against us. If you are certainly determined to hinder our course, either against Corcyra, or any other place whither we are willing to go, and to violate treaties, take us first who are here in your power, and treat us as enemies.'

The persons sent thus delivered their message: and the whole company of the Corcyreans who heard it, shouted out immediately, to 'apprehend and put them to death:' but the Athenians returned this answer:

'We neither begin war, ye men of Peloponnesus, nor violate treaties. We are come hither auxiliaries to these Corcyreans, our allies. If therefore you are desirous to sail to any other place, we hinder you not; but if you go against Corcyra or any other place belonging to it, we shall endeavor to oppose you to the utmost of our power.'

On receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians prepared for their return home, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent. But the Corcyreans were employed in picking up the wrecks and bodies of the dead, driving towards them by favor of the tide and the wind, which blowing fresh the night before, had scattered them all about; and, as if they too had the victory, erected an opposite trophy at Sybota in the island. The reasons on which each side thus claimed the victory were these:—the Corinthians erected a trophy, because they had the better of the engagement till night, and so were enabled to pick up most of the shatters and the dead; they had, farther, taken a number of prisoners, not less than a thousand, and had disabled about seventy ships of the enemy. The Corcyreans did the same, because they also had disabled about thirty; and, on the coming up of the

Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and dead bodies driving towards them; and because the Corinthians, tacking about, had retired from them the night before, so soon as they descried the Athenian ships; and when they came to offer them battle at Sybota durst not come out against them. In this manner did both sides account themselves victorious.

The Corinthians, in their passage homewards, by stratagem seized Anactorium, which lies in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It belonged in common to the Corcyreans and themselves: they put it intirely into the hands of the Corinthian inhabitants, and then retired to their own home. Eight hundred of their Corcyrean prisoners, who were slaves, they sold at public sale: two hundred and fifty they reserved in safe custody, and treated them with extraordinary good usage, that after their ransom they might serve them in their design of gaining Corcyra: for the majority of them were persons of the greatest authority in that state. Thus, therefore, is Corcyra preserved in the war of the Corinthians; and the ships of the Athenians after such service left them. But this was the first ground of war to the Corinthians against the Athenians, because they had assisted the Corcyreans in a naval engagement against themselves, who were in treaty with them.

Immediately after this transaction other misunderstandings also happened between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, tending to a war: for, all the schemes of the Corinthians aiming at revenge, the Athenians, jealous of their enmity, sent an order to the inhabitants of Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallene (and though a Corinthian colony, yet allied with and tributary to them), 'to demolish that part of their wall\* which faces the Pallene; to give them hostages; to send away the *epidemiurgi*; and not to receive those



magistrates for the future who were annually sent th from Corinth.' They were apprehensive of a revolt the instigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and their seducing into the same defection the other dependents of Athens in Thrace. These steps the Athenians thought proper to take with the people of Potidæa, immediately after the sea-fight of Corcyra: the Corinthians were manifestly at variance with them, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, was now become their enemy, who before had been their ally and friend. His enmity was occasioned by an alliance the Athenians had formed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were jointly in opposition against him. Alarmed at this, he sent proper persons to Lacedæmon to stir up against them the Peloponnesian war, and to draw over the Corinthians into his interest, in order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He had also been tampering with the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiæans, to persuade them to revolt at the same time; concluding, that if he could bring about a junction of the adjacent peoples, he might venture a war against them with great probability of success. The Athenians perceived this scheme, and were desirous to prevent the revolt of these cities. They had begun an expedition against his territories with a fleet of thirty ships and a thousand heavy-armed, under the command of Arcestratus, the son of Lycomedes, associated with ten others in the service. They gave particular orders to the commanders to take hostages from the Potidæans, and demolish their walls, and to keep a watchful eye on the neighboring cities, that they might not revolt. The Potidæans had already sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to dissuade them if possible from the execution of any new designs against them; and had at the same time despatched an embassy to Lacedæmon along with

the Corinthians, instructed to procure a promise of redress if there should be occasion. But, when their long negotiation at Athens proved quite ineffectual, and the fleet was gone out to sea both against Macedonia and themselves; when, farther, the regency at Lacedæmon had given a promise to make an irruption into Attica, if the Athenians should attempt any thing against Potidæa; on this encouragement, without loss of time, they revolt in conjunction with the Chalcideans and Bottiæans; all combined by an oath of mutual defence and support. Perdiccas, farther, prevails with the Chalcideans to abandon and demolish all their towns on the sea-coast, and then to remove to Olynthus, and fortify that town by a junction of all their strength. And to these people thus abandoning their own homes he made a cession of that part of Mygdonia which lies round the lake of Bolbe, for their subsistence during the war with the Athenians. Having thus demolished their own cities, they went to another place of residence, and were employed in preparations for the war.


The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving on the coast of Thrace, find Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. The commanders, judging it impossible with their present strength to act against Perdiccas and the revolted cities both, turn their course towards Macedonia, pursuing the first design of the expedition. Landing there, they joined in the war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who with an army had made an irruption from the inland country.

In the mean time, Potidæa being now in revolt, and the Athenian fleet on the Macedonian coasts, the Corinthians, anxious for the security of that place, and making the danger their own, despatched thither some volunteers of their own people, and other Pelopon-

nesians taken into their pay, in all sixteen hundred heavy-armed and four hundred light-armed.<sup>1</sup> The command of this body of men was given to Aristeus the son of Adimantus; since, out of their own private affection to him who had ever been a steady friend to Potidæa, most of the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken the service: and the time of their arrival in Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidæa.

An express soon arrived at Athens with the news of the revolt of the cities; and when afterwards they heard of the arrival of that body under Aristeus, they sent away two thousand of their heavy-armed, and forty ships, under the command of Callias the son of Calliades, and four colleagues, to reduce the revolted. These, arriving first of all in Macedonia, find the former thousand employed in besieging Pydne, having a little before got possession of Therme. They sat down with them for a time to carry on the siege of Pydne; but afterwards, making with Perdiccas a composition and alliance the best they could in their present exigency, since Potidæa and the arrival of Aristeus were very urgent points, they evacuate Macedonia. They marched next to Berœa; and turning from thence, after having first made an unsuccessful attempt on the place, they marched by land towards Potidæa. Their army consisted of three thousand heavy-armed

<sup>1</sup> The heavy-armed wore a complete suit of armor, and engaged with broad shields and long spears. They were the flower and strength of the Grecian armies, and had the highest rank of military honor. The light-armed were designed for skirmishes, and fighting at a distance. Their weapons were arrows, darts, or slings. The targeteers, mentioned often in this history, were a middle sort of soldiery, armed with targets or narrow shields and spears, neither large nor heavy.



of their own, without including a large body of auxiliaries, and six hundred Macedonian horse, who had served with Philip and Pausanias: seventy ships at the same time sailed along the coast: and thus, by moderate marches, they came up in three days to Gignonus, and there encamped.

The Potidæans, with the body of Peloponnesians commanded by Aristeus, expecting the Athenians, had formed a camp near Olynthus within the isthmus, and had a market kept for them without the city. The command of the infantry had been given to Aristeus by the voice of the confederates, and that of the cavalry to Perdiccas: for now again he had abruptly broken with the Athenians and joined the Potidæans, deputing Iolaus to command in his absence. It was the design of Aristeus, by encamping the body under his own command within the isthmus, to observe the motions of the Athenians if they advanced, while without the isthmus the Chalcideans and allies and two hundred horse belonging to Perdiccas should continue at Olynthus, who, when the Athenians came forward against them, were to throw themselves in their rear, and thus shut up the enemy between the two bodies. But Callias, the general of the Athenians, in concert with his colleagues, detached the Macedonian horse and a few of their allies to Olynthus, to prevent any sally from thence; and then, breaking up their camp, they marched directly for Potidæa. But, when they were advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their enemies drawn up in order to fight, they also formed; and in a little time they came to an action. The wing under Aristeus, Corinthians, and the very flower of their strength, who engaged with him, soon compelled their enemies to turn their backs, and pursued execution to a great distance: but the rest of the army,

composed of Potidæans and Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenians, and chased to the very walls of Potidæa. Aristeus, returning from his post, perceived the rout of the rest of the army, and he did not whither with the least hazard to retreat, whether to Olynthus or Potidæa. But at last he determined to embody together those he had about him, and as Potidæa lay at the smallest distance, to throw himself into it with all possible speed. This with difficulty effected, by plunging into the water near the remains of the pier amidst a shower of missile weapons, with the loss indeed of some of his men, but the safety of the larger number.

Those who should have come to succor the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is at no greater distance than sixty stadia,<sup>1</sup> and situated in view, at the beginning of the battle, when the colors were elevated, advanced indeed a little way as designing to do it, the Macedonian horse drew up against them as if signing to stop them. But, as the victory was quickly gained by the Athenians, and the colors were dropped, they retired again within the walls, and the Macedonians marched away to the Athenians: so that the cavalry of neither side had any share in the action. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a suspension of arms to the Potidæans, fetching off their dead. There were killed of the

<sup>1</sup> About six miles.

<sup>2</sup> The elevation of the colors or ensigns was the signal for joining battle, and they were kept up during the whole continuance of it: the depression of them was a signal to discontinue or the consequence of a defeat. The depression of the colors in this instance was a proof to the Macedonian cavalry that all was over. The Athenians in their colors bore an owl sacred to Minerva, the tutelary goddess of Athens. *Potter's Archaeologia Græca*, vol. ii. c. 9.

tidæans and allies very near three hundred, and of the Athenians one hundred and fifty, with Callias their general.

The Athenians, without loss of time, throwing up a work against the wall which faces the isthmus, blockaded the place on that side, but the wall towards the Pallene they left as they found it: for they thought their number was by no means sufficient to keep the guard within the isthmus, and to pass over to the Pallene side, and block it up also there. They were apprehensive, that thus divided, the Potidæans and their allies might fall on them. And the Athenians at home, hearing there was no work on the Pallene side, sent thither a thousand and six hundred heavy-armed of their own people, under the command of Phormio the son of Asopius, who arriving on the Pallene, and having landed his men at Aphytis, marched forwards to Potidæa, advancing slowly, and laying waste the country as he moved along: and, as nobody ventured out to give him opposition, he also threw up a work against that side of the wall which faces the Pallene. By these methods was Potidæa closely blocked up on either side, and also by the ships which lay before it at sea.

The blockade being thus perfected, Aristeus, destitute of any means of saving the place, unless some relief should arrive from Peloponnesus, or some miracle should happen, proposed it as his advice that 'all excepting five hundred men should lay hold of the first favorable wind to quit the place, that the provisions might for a longer time support the rest; declaring his own readiness to 'be one of those who stayed behind.' Though he could not prevail with them, yet willing in this plunge to do what could be done, and to manage affairs abroad in the best manner

he was able, he made his escape by sea, undiscovered by the Athenian guard. Continuing now amongst the Chalcideans, he made what military efforts he could, and killed many of the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuscade he formed before that city; and endeavored to prevail with the Peloponnesians to send up a timely relief. Phormio, also, after completing the works round Potidæa, with his sixteen hundred men ravaged Chalcidica and Bottiæa: and some fortresses he took by storm.

These were the reciprocal causes of dissension between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Corinthians were enraged at the blockade of Potidæa, a colony of their own, in which were shut up both Corinthians and other Peloponnesians. The Athenians resented the proceedings of the Peloponnesians in seducing to a revolt a city in alliance with and tributary to them, and siding openly by a voluntary expedition with the warring rebels of Potidæa. Yet a war open and avowed had not yet broken out between them: hostilities were suspended for a time. Hitherto it was merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians.

But, when once the blockade of Potidæa was formed, the Corinthians could hold no longer. In it their own people were shut up, and they were at the same time in anxiety about the place. They summoned their allies to repair immediately to Lacedæmon, and thither they went themselves with loud accusations against the Athenians, that 'they had violated the treaty, and injured Peloponnesus.' The Æginetæ indeed, from a dread of the Athenians, did not openly despatch their embassy; but underhand they had a great share in fomenting the war, asserting that 'they were restrained in the privilege of governing themselves, which had been allowed them by the treaty.'

The Lacedæmonians, summoning to appear before them not only their allies, but whoever had any manner of charge to prefer against the Athenians, assembled in grand council as usual, and commanded them to speak: others who were present laid open their respective complaints, but the Megareans preferred the largest accusations; in particular, that 'they had been prohibited the use of all the harbors in the Athenian dominions and the market of Athens, contrary to the treaty.' The Corinthians were the last who stood forth. Having first allowed sufficient time to others to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, they preferred their own charge as follows:—

'That faith, ye Lacedæmonians, which ever both in public conduct and in private life you so punctually observe, renders what others, what we ourselves may have to say, more difficult to be believed. By it you have gained indeed the reputation of probity, but contract a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote occurrences: for, though we have frequently suggested to you what wrongs we were apprehensive of receiving from the Athenians, yet have you not deigned to make inquiry into the grounds of those suggestions, but rather have suspected our ingenuity as speaking from selfish views and private resentments. And it is not to prevent our sufferings, but now, when we already feel their weight, that you convene these confederates together; before whom we ought to be indulged in a larger share of discourse, as we have by much the largest share of complaints to utter: wronged as we have been by the Athenians, and by you neglected.

'If indeed by treachery lurking and unobserved they had violated the peace of Greece, those who had not discerned it might justly have demanded explicit



proofs. But now, what need can there be of multiplying words, when some you already see enslaved; against others, and those not the meanest of your allies, the same fate intended; and the aggressors fully prepared to receive you, if at length a war should be declared? With other views, they had not clandestinely laid hands on Corcyra, and forcibly detained it from us, nor had they dared to block up Potidæa; of which places, this latter lieth the most convenient for extending our power in Thrace; the former could supply Peloponnesus with the greatest navy. But to your account these events are to be charged, who after the invasion of the Medes first suffered the strength of Athens to be increased, and afterwards their long walls to be erected. Ever since, you have connived at liberty overthrown, not only in whatever communities they have proceeded to enslave, but now, where even your own confederates are concerned. For not to the men who rivet on the chains of slavery, but to such as, though able, yet neglect to prevent it, ought the sad event with truth to be imputed; especially when, assuming superior virtue, they boast themselves the deliverers of Greece.

‘ With much ado we are now met together in council, but not even now on the plain and obvious points. We ought not to be any longer debating whether we have been injured, but by what measures we should avenge ourselves. The aggressors, having long since planned out their proceedings, are not about to make, but are actually making attacks on those who are yet come to no resolution. Nor are we unexperienced by what steps, what gradual advances, the Athenians break in on their neighbors. Imagining themselves to be still undiscovered, they show themselves the less audacious because you are insensible. But when once

know you alarmed and on your guard, they will more resolutely forwards. For you, Lacedæmons, are the only people of Greece who sit indolently at ease, protecting not with present but with misadvised succor: you alone pull down, not the coming, but the redoubled strength of your foes. You have indeed enjoyed the reputation of being steady, but are indebted for it more to report than fact. We ourselves know that the Persian had advanced from the ends of the earth quite into Peloponnesus before you exerted your dignity in resistance. Now also you take no notice of the Athenians, not remote as he was, but seated near you; and, instead of invading them, choose rather to lie on your defence against their invasions, and to expose yourselves more to the hazards of war against a grown augmented power. And all this while you know that the barbarian was guilty of many errors in his conduct; and the very Athenians frequently, in their contests with us, have been defeated more through their own blunders than the vigor of your resistance: for their confidence in you has caused the destruction of some, who on that very confidence were taken unprepared.

‘ Let no one in this assembly imagine that we speak more from malice than just grounds of complaint. Complaint is just towards friends who have failed in their duty; accusation is against enemies guilty of injustice. And surely, if ever any people had, we have good reason to think we have ample cause to throw blame on our neighbors; especially, when such great embroilments have arisen, of which you seem to have no manner of feeling, nor ever once to have reflected, in regard to the Athenians, with what sort of people, how far, and how in every point unlike yourselves, you must soon contend. They are people fond of in-

novations, quick not only to contrive, but to put their schemes in effectual execution: your method is, to preserve what you already have, to know nothing farther, and when in action to leave something needful ever unfinished. They again are daring beyond their strength, adventurous beyond the bounds of judgment, and in extremities full of hope; your method is, in action to drop below your power, neither resolutely to follow the dictates of your judgment, and in the pressure of a calamity to despair of a deliverance. Ever active as they are, they stand against you who are habitually indolent; ever roaming abroad against you, who think it misery to lose sight of your homes. Their view in shifting place is to enlarge their possessions: you imagine that in foreign attempts you may lose your present domestic enjoyments. They, when once they have gained superiority over enemies, push forward as far as they can go; and if defeated, are dispirited the least of all men. More than this, they are as lavish of their lives in the public service as if those lives were not their own, whilst their resolution is ever in their power, ever ready to be exerted in the cause of their country. Whenever in their schemes they meet with disappointments, they reckon they have lost a share of their property. When those schemes are successful, the acquisition seems small in comparison with what they have farther in design: if they are baffled in executing a project, invigorated by reviving hope, they catch at fresh expedients to repair the damage. They are the only people who instantaneously project, and hope, and acquire; so expeditious are they in executing whatever they determine. Thus, through toils and dangers they labor forwards so long as life continueth, never at leisure to enjoy what they already have, through a constant eagerness to acquire

more. They have no other notion of a festival than of a day whereon some needful point should be accomplished; and inactive rest is more a torment to them than laborious employment. In short, if any one, abridging their characters, should say they are formed by nature never to be at quiet themselves, nor to suffer others to be so, he describeth them justly.

‘When such a state has taken the lists of opposition against you, do ye dally, O Lacedæmonians? do you imagine that those people will not continue longest in the enjoyment of peace who timely prepare to vindicate themselves, and manifest a settled resolution to do themselves right whenever they are wronged? You indeed are so far observers of equity as never to molest others, and stand on your guard merely to repel damage from yourselves;—points you would not without difficulty secure, though this neighboring state were governed by the same principles as you are: but now, as we have already shown you, your customs compared with theirs are quite obsolete; whereas those which progressively improve must, like all the works of art, be ever the best. Were indeed the continuance of peace insured, unvarying manners would certainly be preferable: but such people as are liable to frequent vicissitudes of foreign contest have need of great address to vary and refine their conduct. For this cause the manners of the Athenians, improved by a long tract of experience, are formed in respect of yours on a model intirely new. Here therefore be the period fixed to that slow-moving policy you have hitherto observed. Hasten to the relief of others, to that of the Potidæans as by contract you are bound. Invade Attica without loss of time, that you may not leave your friends and your relations in the mercy of their most inveterate foes, and constrain us through

---

your sloth to seek redress from a new alliance. Such a step, if taken by us, could neither scandalise the gods who take cognisance of solemn oaths, nor men who own their obligation: for treaties are not violated by those who, left destitute by some, have recourse to others, but by such as being sworn to give it, withhold their assistance in time of need. Yet, if you are willing and ready to perform your parts, with you we firmly abide. In changing then we should be guilty of impiety; and we never shall find others so nicely suited to the disposition of our own hearts. On these points form proper resolutions; and exert yourselves, that the honor of Peloponnesus be not impaired under your guidance, who have received from your ancestors this great pre-eminence.'

To this effect the Corinthians spoke. And it happened at this very juncture an Athenian embassy was at Lacedæmon, negotiating some other points; who, so soon as they were advertised of what had been said, judged it proper to demand an audience of the Lacedæmonians. It was not their design to make the least reply to the accusations preferred against them by the complainant states, but in general to convince them; that 'they ought not to form any sudden resolutions, but to consider matters with sedate deliberation.' They were farther desirous 'to represent before them the extensive power of their own state, to excite in the minds of the elder a recollection of those points they already knew, and to give the younger information in those of which they were ignorant;' concluding, that 'such a representation might turn their attention more to pacific measures than military operations.' Addressing themselves therefore to the Lacedæmonians, they expressed their desire to speak in the present assembly, if leave could be obtained. An order of ad-

mittance being immediately sent them, they approached and delivered themselves as follows:—

‘It was not the design of this our embassy to enter into disputations with your confederates, but to negotiate the points for which our state has employed us. Yet, having been advertised of the great outcry raised against us, hither we have repaired, not to throw in our plea against the accusations of the complainant states; for you are not the judges before whom either we or they are bound to plead; but, to prevent you forming rash and prejudicial resolutions, on concerns of high importance, through the instigation of these your confederates. Our view is, farther, to convince you, notwithstanding the long comprehensive charge exhibited against us, that we possess with credit what we have hitherto obtained, and that the state of Athens is deserving of honor and regard.

‘And what need is there here to go back to remote antiquity, where hearsay tradition must establish those facts to which the eyes of the audience are utter strangers? This we shall wave, and call forth first to your review the Persian invasions and those incidents of which you are conscious, without regarding that chagrin which the remembrance of them will constantly excite in you. Our achievements there were attended with the utmost danger: the consequence was public benefit, of which you received a substantial share: and though the glory of that acquisition may not be all our own, yet of a beneficial share we ought not to be deprived. This shall boldly be averred; not with a view of soothing you, but doing justice to ourselves, and giving you to know against what a state, if your resolutions now are not discreetly taken, you are going to engage. For we aver, that we alone adventured to engage the barbarian in that most danger-

ous field of Marathon. And when, on the second invasion, we were not able to make head by land, we threw ourselves on ship-board with all our people, to fight in conjunction with you by sea at Salamis; which prevented his sailing along the coasts of Peloponnesus, and destroying one by one your cities, unable to succor one another against that formidable fleet. The truth of this the barbarian himself hath undeniably proved: for, thus defeated at sea, and unable to gather together again so large a force, he hastily retired with the greatest part of his army. In this so wonderful an event, where beyond dispute the preservation of Greece was achieved at sea, the three most advantageous instruments were contributed by us; the largest number of shipping; a person of the greatest abilities to command; and the most intrepid courage: for, of the number of ships, amounting in all to four hundred, very near two-thirds were our own. Themistocles was the commander, to whom principally it was owing that the battle was fought in the straits, which was undeniably the means of that great deliverance: and you yourselves paid him extraordinary honor on that very account,<sup>1</sup> more than

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus relates, that after the great victory at Salamis the Grecians sailed to the isthmus, to bestow the prize on him who had deserved best of Greece by his behavior in the war; but on their arrival, when the commanders gave in their billets on the altar of Neptune, in which they had written the name of him who had behaved best, and of him who was second, each of them had given the preference to his own self; but most of them agreed in awarding the second place to Themistocles. Thus, while each competitor was only honored with his own single voice for the first place, Themistocles was clearly adjudged to deserve the second. Envy prevented the Grecians from proceeding to a just declaration, and they broke up and departed, leaving the point undecided. Themistocles, however, was celebrated and honored as the man who in prudence far surpassed all the Grecians then

o any stranger who hath appeared amongst you. ourselves showed farther, on this occasion, the daring courage ; since, though none before ed up to our succor, and every state already ed had opened the road against us, we bravely nined to abandon even Athens, to destroy our own ; nor, like the generality of those who were yet olished, to desert the common cause ; or, disg ourselves, to become useless to our allies ; but, bark at once, to face the urgent danger, without ast resentment against you for your preceding ardness of aid. So that we aver the service we did you to be no less than what we afterwards ed : for to our aid indeed at last you came, from yet inhabited, from cities you ever designed l still be inhabited, when once you were alarmed ur own safety much more than for ours. So long were safe, your presence was in vain expected : e, launching forth from a city no longer our own, azarding our all for a place we almost despaired overing, effected our own preservation, and with great measure yours. Had we, overcome with gone over early to the Mede, as others did, to our lands ; had we afterwards not dared, as andone beyond recovery, to throw ourselves on

Thus denied the honor due to him for having undly excelled them all in the affair of Salamis, he imme- repaired to Lacedæmon, desirous to have justice done ere. The Lacedæmonians received him nobly, and ho- him abundantly. They gave indeed to Eurybiades the of olive, as first in valor ; but for wisdom and dexterity stowed a second crown of olive on Themistocles. They ted him farther with the first chariot in Sparta. And o much applause, he was conducted, in his return, to ntier of Tegea, by three hundred picked Spartans, who sed the royal guard. He was the only person ever to have received such a compliment from the Spartans.' tus in Urania.



board; you never had been obliged to fight at sea, not having sufficient strength to do it; but the invader without a struggle would have leisurely determined the fate of Greece.

‘Do we then deserve, Lacedæmonians, that violent of envy with which the Grecians behold us, for the courage we manifested then, for our judicious resolution, and the superior power we now enjoy? This power, superior as it is, was by no means the effect of violent encroachments. You would not abide with us to glean away the relics of the barbarian war. To the associated states were obliged to have recourse and intreat us to lead them to its completion. Thus by the necessary exigence of affairs, obliged to be in action, we have advanced our power to what it now is at first, from a principle of fear; then from the principle of honor; and at length from that of interest. When envied by many, when obliged to reduce their obedience some who had revolted, when you, no longer well-disposed towards us, were actuated by jealousy and malice, we thought it not consistent with our own security to endanger our welfare by giving us our power, since every revolt from us was an accession of strength to you. No part of mankind will find any reproach on men who try every expedient to ward off extremities of danger. Nay, it is your own method also, Lacedæmonians, to manage the states of Peloponnesus as suits your own interest best, and prescribe them law. And, had you abided with us and persevered in that invidious superiority as we have done, we are well convinced that you would soon have grown no less odious to your allies; and so been obliged either to have ruled with rigor, or to have risked the loss of your all. It follows therefore that we have done nothing to raise surprise, nothing to disappoint

the human expectation, in accepting a superiority voluntarily assured, in firmly maintaining it thus accepted, on those most prevailing principles of honor, and fear, and interest.

‘The maxim by which we have acted was not first broached by us, since it has been ever allowed that inferiors should be controlled by their superiors. To be the latter we thought ourselves deserving: you thought so too till now, when private interests engaging your attention, you begin to cry out for justice, which no people ever yet so studiously practised as, when able to carry a point by strength, to check their inclination and let it drop. And worthy, farther, are they of applause who, pursuing the dictates of human nature, in gaining rule over others, observe justice more steadily than their scope of power requires from them. And so far we have reason to conclude, that were our power lodged in other hands, plain evidence would soon decide with what peculiar moderation we use it: though, so hard indeed is our lot, that calumny and not applause has been the consequence of such our lenity. In suits of contract against our dependents we are often worsted; and, though ever submitting to fair and impartial trials in our own courts, we are charged with litigiousness. Not one of them reflects, that those who are absolute in other places, and treat not their dependents with that moderation which we observe, are for that very reason exempted from reproach: for where lawless violence is practised there can be no room for appeals to justice. But our dependents, accustomed to contest with us on equal footing, if they suffer never so little damage where they fancy equity to be along with them, either by a judicial sentence or the decision of reigning power, express no gratitude for the greater share of property they yet enjoy, but

resent with higher chagrin the loss of such a pittance, than if at first we had set law aside, and seized their all with open violence: even in this case they could not presume to deny that inferiors ought to submit to their superiors. But mankind, it seems, resent the acts of injustice more deeply than the acts of violence: those coming from an equal are looked on as rapines; these, coming from a superior, are complied with as necessities. The far more grievous oppressions of the Mede they bore with patience, but our government they look on as severe. It may be so; for to subjects the present is always grievous. If you therefore by our overthrow should gain the ascendant over them, you would soon perceive that good disposition towards you, which a dread of us has occasioned, to be vanishing away; especially should you exert your superiority according to the specimens you gave during your short command against the Mede: for the institutions established here amongst yourselves have no affinity with those of other places: and more than this, not one Spartan amongst you, when delegated to a foreign charge, either knows how to apply his own or make use of those of the rest of Greece.

‘Form your resolutions therefore with great deliberation, as on points of no small importance. Harken not so far to the opinions and calamities of foreign states as to embroil your own domestic tranquillity. Reflect in time on the great uncertainty of war before you engage in it. Protracted into long continuance, it generally used to end in calamities, from which we are now at an equal distance; and to the lot of which of us they will fall lies yet to be determined by the hazardous event. Men who run eagerly to arms are first of all intent on doing some exploits, which ought in point of time to be second to something more

important; and when smarting with distress, they have recourse to reason. But since we are by no means guilty of such rashness ourselves, nor as yet perceive it in you, we exhort you, whilst healing measures are in the election of us both, not to break the treaty, nor to violate your oaths, but to submit the points in contest to fair arbitration, according to the articles subsisting between us. If not, we here invoke the gods, who take cognisance of oaths, to bear us witness, that we shall endeavor to revenge ourselves on the authors of a war, by whatever methods yourselves shall set us an example.'

These things were said by the Athenian embassy. And when the Lacedæmonians had thus heard the accusations of their allies against the Athenians, and what the Athenians had urged in their turn, ordering all parties to withdraw, they proceeded to serious consultations amongst themselves. The majority agreed in the opinion, that 'the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that a war ought to be immediately declared.' But Archidamus, their king, esteemed a man of good understanding and temper, standing forth, expressed his own sentiments thus:

'I have learned myself, by the experience of many wars, and I see many of you, ye Lacedæmonians, as great proficient in years as I am, that no one should be fond of an enterprise because it is new, which is a vulgar weakness, judging it thence both advisable and safe. The war, which is at present the subject of your consultation, you will find, if examined discreetly, to bode a very long continuance. Against Peloponnesians, it is true, and borderers on ourselves, we have ever a competent force in readiness, and by expeditious steps can advance against any of them. But, against a people whose territories are far remote; who

are, farther, most expert in naval skill; who, with all the expedients of war, are most excellently provided with wealth, both private and public, with shipping with horses, with arms, and with men, far beyond what any other state in Greece can singly pretend to: who, more than this, have numerous dependent states on whom they levy tribute—where is the necessity sanguinely to wish for war against such a people? and wherein is our dependence, if thus unprepared we should declare it against them? Is it on our naval force? But in that we are inferior: and if to this we shall apply our care, and advance ourselves to an equality with them, why this will be a work of time. Or, is it in our wealth? In this we are yet much more deficient; and neither have it in any public fund, nor can readily raise it from private purses. But the confidence of some may perhaps be buoyed up with our superiority in arms and numbers, so that we may easily march into their territory and lay it waste: yet other territories and of large extent, are subject to their power; and by sea they will import all necessary supplies. If, farther, we tempt their dependents to revolt, we shall want a naval strength to support them in it, as the majority of them are seated on islands. What therefore will be the event of this our war? For, if we are unable either to overpower them at sea or divert those revenues by which their navy is supported, we shall only by acting prejudice ourselves. And in such a situation, to be forced to give it up will be a blemish on our honor; especially if we shall be thought to have been the authors of the breach: for let us not be puffed up with idle hope that this war must soon be over, if we can lay their territory waste. I have reason, on better grounds, to apprehend that we shall leave it behind us a legacy to our children.

It is by no means consistent with the spirit of Athenians either to be slaves to their soil, or, like unpractised soldiers, to shudder at a war. Nor, again, on the other hand, am I so void of sensibility as to advise you to give up your confederates to their outrage, or wilfully to connive at their encroachments; but only not yet to have recourse to arms, to send ambassadors to prefer our complaints, without betraying too great an eagerness for war, or any tokens of pusillanimity. By pausing thus, we may get our own affairs in readiness, by augmenting our strength through an accession of allies, either Grecian or barbarian, wheresoever we can procure supplies of ships or money. And the least room there cannot be for censure, when a people in the state we are at present, exposed to all the guiles of the Athenians, endeavor to save themselves not merely by Grecian but by barbarian aid. And at the same time, let us omit no resource within the reach of our own ability.

‘If, indeed, on our sending an embassy, they will hearken to reason, that will be the happiest for us all. If not, after two or three years’ delay, then better provided, we may, if it be thought expedient, take the field against them. But in good time, perhaps, when they see our preparations, and the intent of them clearly explained by our own declarations, they may make each requisite concession, before their territory is destroyed by ravage, and whilst yet they may save their property from utter devastation. Regard their territory, I beseech you, in no other light than as an hostage for their good behavior; and the more firmly such, the better may be its culture. Of this we ought to be sparing as long as possible, that we drive them not into desperate fury, and render more impracticable their defeat: for if, thus unprovided as we are, and

---

worked up to anger by the instigations of our confederates, we at once begin this ravage, reflect whether we shall not taint its reputation, and the more embroil Peloponnesus; since accusations, as well of states as private persons, it is possible to clear away; but in a war, begun by general concurrence for the sake of a single party, when it is impossible to see how far it will extend, we cannot at pleasure desist, and preserve our honor.

‘Let no one think it a mark of pusillanimity, that many as we are we do not rush immediately on one single state. That state has as large a number of dependents who contribute to its support: and a war is not so much of arms as of money, by which arms are rendered of service; and the more so, when a landed power is contending against a naval. Be it therefore our earliest endeavor to provide amply for this; nor let us prematurely be too much fermented by the harangues of our allies. Let us, to whose account the event, whatever it be, will be principally charged—let us, with sedate deliberation, endeavor in some degree to foresee it; and be not in the least ashamed of that slow and dilatory temper, for which the Corinthians so highly reproach you: for through too great precipitancy you will come more slowly to an end, because you set out without preparations. The state of which we are the constituents has ever been free and most celebrated by fame: and that reproach can at most be nothing but the inborn sedateness of our minds. By this we are distinguished, as the only people who never grow insolent with success, and who never are abject in adversity. And when again they invite us to hazardous attempts by uttering our praise, the delight of hearing must not raise our spirits above our judgment. If any, farther, endeavor to exasperate

a flow of invective, we are not by that to be seduced the sooner to compliance. From temper evenly balanced it is that we are warm in the field, and cool in the hours of debate: the former, as a sense of duty has the greatest influence over our private disposition, and magnanimity the keenest of shame: and good we are at debate, as our education is not polite enough to teach us a contempt of ourselves; and by its severity gives us so much good sense as never to disregard them. We are not a people so impertinently wise as to invalidate the preparations of our enemies by a plausible harangue, and absurdly proceed to a contest; but we reckon the faults of our neighbors to be of a similar cast with our own, and that hazardous contingences are not to be terminated by a speech. We always presume that the projects of our enemies are judiciously planned, and then seriously prepare to defeat them: for we do not found our success on the hope that they will certainly blunder in their conduct, but that we have omitted no proper step for our security. We do not imagine there is so mighty a difference between man and man; but that he is the most accomplished who has been regularly trained through a course of needful industry and toil.

Such is the discipline which our fathers have handed down to us; and by adhering to it, we have reaped considerable advantages. Let us not forego it now, for in a small portion of only one day precipitately to mine a point wherein so many lives, so vast an empire, so many states, and so much honor are at stake. But let us more leisurely proceed, which our fathers will warrant us in doing more easily than others. Let us attach ambassadors to the Athenians concerning Potidaea; despatch them concerning the complaints our



allies exhibit against them ; and the sooner, as they have declared a readiness to submit to fair decisions. Against men who offer this we ought not to march before they are convicted of injustice : but, during this interval, get every thing in readiness for war. Your resolutions thus will be most wisely formed, and strike into your enemies the greatest dread.'

Archidamus spoke thus. But Sthenelaidas, at that time one of the ephori, standing forth the last on this occasion, gave his opinion as follows :

'The many words of the Athenians, for my part, I do not understand. They have been exceeding large in the praise of themselves ; but as to the charge against them, that they injure our allies and Peloponnesus, they have made no reply. If, in truth, they were formerly good against the Medes, but are now bad towards us, they deserve to be doubly punished ; because, ceasing to be good, they are grown very bad. We continue the same persons both then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, pass over the injuries done to our allies, nor wait any longer to revenge them, since they are past waiting for their sufferings. But other people, forsooth, have a great deal of wealth, and ships, and horses. We too have gallant allies, whom we ought not to betray to the Athenians, nor refer them to the law and pleadings, since it was not by pleadings they were injured : but we ought, with all expedition and with all our strength, to seek revenge. How we ought to deliberate when we have been wronged let no man pretend to inform me : it would have better become those who designed to commit such wrongs to have deliberated a long time ago. Vote then the war, Lacedæmonians, with a spirit becoming Sparta : and neither suffer the Athenians to grow still greater, nor let us betray our own conse-

derates; but, with the gods on our side, march out against these authors of injustice.'

Having spoken thus, by virtue of his office as presiding in the college of ephori,<sup>1</sup> he put the question in the Lacedæmonian council: but, as they vote by voice and not by ballot, he said, 'he could not amidst the shout distinguish the majority;' and being desirous that each of them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might show they were more inclined to war, he proceeded thus: 'To whomsoever of you, Lacedæmonians, the treaty appears broken, and the Athenians to be in the wrong, let him rise up and go thither,' pointing out to them a certain place: 'but, whoever is of the contrary opinion, let him go yonder.' They rose up and were divided; but a great majority was on that side which voted the treaty broken.

On this, calling in their confederates, they told them, 'They had come to a resolution that the Athenians were guilty of injustice; but they were desirous to put it again to the vote in a general assembly of all their confederates; that by taking their measures in concert, they might briskly ply the war, if determined by common consent.'

Matters being brought to this point, they departed to their respective homes; and the Athenian ambassadors, having ended their negotiations, stayed not long behind. This decree of the Lacedæmonian council,

<sup>1</sup> The college of ephori (or inspectors) at Sparta consisted of five. They were annually elected by the people from their own body, and were designed to be checks on the regal power. They never forgot the end of their institution, and in fact quite lorded it over the kings. In a word, the whole administration was lodged in their hands, and the kings were never sovereigns but in the field at the head of the troops. One of the ephori had the honor to give its style to the year, in the same manner as the first archon did at Athens.

that 'the treaty was broken,' was passed in the fourteenth year of the treaty concluded for thirty years after the conquest of Eubœa. But the Lacedæmonians voted this treaty broken and a war necessary, not so much out of regard to the arguments urged by their allies, as from their own jealousy of the growing power of the Athenians. They dreaded the advancement of that power, as they saw the greatest part of Greece was already in subjection to them.

Now the method by which the Athenians had advanced their power to this invidious height was this.

After that the Medes, defeated by the Grecians both at land and sea, had evacuated Europe, and such of them as escaped by sea were utterly ruined at Mycale, Leotychides, king of the Lacedæmonians, who commanded the Grecians at Mycale, returned home drawing away with him all the confederates of Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, with the confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, who were now revolted from the king, continuing in those parts, laid siege to Sestus, then held by the Medes; and, pressing during the winter season, the barbarians at length abandoned the place. After this they separated, sailing away from the Hellespont, every people to their own respective countries.

But the Athenian community, when the barbarian

<sup>1</sup> The series of history on which Thucydides now enters though not strictly within the compass of his subject, yet most needful to give it light, and to show how present events are connected with, and how far they resulted from preceding, is excellent in its kind. He states important facts in the clearest and most orderly manner; he opens before us the source of the Athenian power, and by a neat and concise enumeration of notable events, conducts it to that height, which excited the jealousy of other states, and was the true political cause of the succeeding war.

had evacuated their territory, immediately brought back again from the places of refuge their wives and children, and all their remaining effects, and vigorously applied themselves to rebuild the city of Athens and the walls: for but a small part of these was left standing; and their houses, most of them had been demolished, and but few preserved by way of lodgings for the Persian nobles. The Lacedæmonians, informed of their design, came in embassy to prevent it; partly, to gratify themselves, as they would behold with pleasure every city in Greece unwall'd like Sparta; but more to gratify their confederates, inviting them to such a step from a jealousy of the naval power of the Athenians, now greater than at any time before, and of the courage they had so bravely exerted in the war against the Medes. They required them to desist from building their walls, and rather to join with them in levelling every fortification whatever without Peloponnesus. Their true meaning and their inward jealousy they endeavored to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence, that 'then the barbarian, should he again invade them, would find no stronghold from whence to assault them, as in the last instance he had done from Thebes;' alleging farther, 'that Peloponnesus was a place of secure retreat and certain resource for all.' To these representations of the Lacedæmonians the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, made this reply; that 'they would send ambassadors to them to debate this affair;' and so without farther explanation dismissed them. Themistocles next advised, that 'he himself might be despatched forthwith to Lacedæmon, and by no means hastily to send away the others who were to be joined in the commission with him, but to detain them till the walls were carried up to a height necessary at

least for a defence ; that the work should be expedited by the joint labor of the inhabitants without exception of themselves, their wives, and their children, sparing neither public nor private edifice from whence any proper materials could be had, but demolishing all.<sup>2</sup> Having thus advised them, and suggested farther what conduct he himself designed to observe, he sets out for Lacedæmon. On his arrival there, he demanded no public audience ; he protracted matters, and studied evasions. Whenever any person in the public administration demanded the reason why he asked not an audience, his answer was, that ‘ he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained by urgent business ; he expected they would speedily be with him, and was surprised they were not yet come.’ As they had a good opinion of Themistocles, they easily acquiesced in such an answer. But other persons afterwards arriving, and making clear affirmation that ‘ the wall is carrying on, and already built up to a considerable height,’ they had it no longer in their power to be incredulous. Themistocles, knowing this, exhorts them, ‘ not rashly to be biassed by rumors, but rather to send away some trusty persons of their own body, who from a view might report the truth.’ With this proposal they comply ; and Themistocles sends secret instructions to the Athenians how to behave towards these delegates ;— ‘ to detain them, though with as little appearance of design as possible, and by no means to dismiss them before they received again their own ambassadors :’ for his colleagues were by this arrived, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, who brought him an assurance that the wall was sufficiently completed. His fear was, that the Lacedæmonians, when they had *discovered* the truth, would put them under arrest.

The Athenians therefore detained the delegates according to instruction. And Themistocles, going to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, there openly declared, ‘ that Athens was now so far walled, as to be strong enough for the defence of its inhabitants : for the future, when the Lacedæmonians or confederates sent ambassadors thither, they must address themselves to them as to a people who perfectly knew their own interest and the interest of Greece ; since, when they judged it most advisable to abandon their city and go on ship-board, they asserted their native courage without Lacedæmonian support ; and, in all subsequent measures taken in conjunction, had shown themselves not at all inferior in the cabinet or the field : at present therefore they judged it most expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, and thus to render it a place of greater security for their own members and for all their allies : it would not be possible, with strength inferior to that of a rival power, equally to preserve and evenly to balance the public welfare of Greece.’ From hence he inferred, that ‘ either all cities of the states which formed the Lacedæmonian league should be dismantled, or it be allowed that the things now done at Athens were just and proper.’ The Lacedæmonians, on hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance of resentment against the Athenians. They had not sent their embassy directly to prohibit, but to advise them to desist on motives of general good : at that time also they had a great regard for the Athenians, because of the public spirit they had shown against the Mede : but, however, thus baffled as they were in their political views, they were inwardly provoked ; and the ambassadors on each side returned home without farther embroilments.

By this conduct the Athenians, in a small space of

time, walled their city round: and the very face of the structure shows plainly to this day that it was built in haste. The foundations are laid with stones of every kind, in some places not hewn so as properly to fit, but piled on at random. Many pillars also, from sepulchral monuments, and carved stones, were blended promiscuously in the work: for the circuit of it was every where enlarged beyond the compass of the city; and for this reason, collecting the materials from every place without distinction, they lost no time.

Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the Piræus: for it was begun before this, during that year in which he himself was chief magistrate at Athens.<sup>1</sup> He judged the place to be very commodious, as formed by nature into three harbors; and, that the Athenians, grown more than ever intent on their marine, might render it highly conducive to an enlargement of their power: for he was the first person who durst tell them that they ought to grasp at the sovereignty of the sea; and immediately began to put the plan in execution. And by his direction it was that they built the wall round the Piræus of that thickness which is visible to this day: for two carts carrying the stone passed along it by one another: within was neither mortar nor mud; but the intire structure was one pile of large stones, hewn square to close their angle:

<sup>1</sup> The number of the archons or rulers was nine. They were annually elected by lot, and were required to be of noble birth, of a pure Attic descent, irreproachable both in moral and political character, dutiful to their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first of the nine gave its style to the year, and was therefore called eponymus, or the namer: the second was styled king: the third polemarch: the other six in common thesmothetæ. All the civil and religious affairs of the state belonged to their department.

---

exactly, and grappled firmly together on the outside with iron and lead; though in height it was not carried up above half so far as he intended. He contrived it to be, both in height and breadth, an impregnable rampart against hostile assaults; and he designed that a few, and those the least able of the people, might be sufficient to man it, whilst the rest should be employed on board the fleet. His attention was chiefly confined to a navy; plainly discerning, in my opinion, that the forces of the king had a much easier way to annoy them by sea than by land. He thence judged the Piræus to be a place of much greater importance than the upper city. And this piece of advice he frequently gave the Athenians, that 'if ever they were pressed hard by land, they should retire down thither, and with their naval force make head against all opponents.' In this manner the Athenians, without losing time, after the retreat of the Medes, fortified their city, and prepared all the necessary means for their own security.

Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedæmon as commander-in-chief of the Grecians, with twenty sail of ships from Peloponnesus, joined by thirty Athenians, and a number of other allies. They bent their course against Cyprus, and reduced most of the towns there. From thence they proceeded to Byzantium, garrisoned by the Medes, and blockaded, and carried the place under his directions.

But being now grown quite turbulent in command, the other Grecians, especially the Ionians and all who had lately recovered their liberty from the royal yoke, were highly chagrined. They addressed themselves to the Athenians, requesting them, 'from the tie of consanguinity, to undertake their protection, and not to leave them thus largely exposed to the violence of



Pausanias.' This request was favorably heard by the Athenians, who expressed their willingness to put a stop to such grievances, and to resettle the general order, to the best of their power. But during this the Lacedæmonians recalled Pausanias, that he might answer what was laid to his charge. Many of the Grecians had carried to them accusations against him for an unjust abuse of his power, since in his behavior he resembled more a tyrant than a general. And it so fell out that he was recalled just at the time when the confederates, out of hatred to him, had ranged themselves under the Athenian orders, excepting those troops which were of Peloponnesus. On his return to Lacedæmon he was convicted on trial of misdemeanors towards particulars; but of the heaviest part of the charge he was acquitted: for the principal accusation against him was an attachment to the Medish interest! and it might be judged too clear to stand in need of proof. Him therefore they no longer intrust with the public command, but appoint in his stead Dorcis, with some colleagues, to command what little force of their own remained. To these the confederates would no longer yield the supreme command; which, so soon as they perceived, they returned home. And here the Lacedæmonians desisted from commissioning any others to take on them that post; fearing lest those who should be sent might by their behavior still more prejudice the Lacedæmonian interest; a case they had reason to dread from the behavior of Pausanias. They were now grown desirous to rid themselves of the Medish war: they acknowledged the Athenians had good pretensions to enjoy the command, and at that time were well affected towards them.

The Athenians having in this manner obtained the

supreme command, by the voluntary tender of the whole confederacy, in consequence of their aversion to Pausanias, they fixed by their own authority the quotas, whether of ships or money, which each state was to furnish against the barbarian. The color pretended was, 'to revenge the calamities they had hitherto suffered, by carrying hostilities into the dominions of the king.' This gave its first rise to the Athenian office of 'general receivers of Greece,'<sup>1</sup> whose business it was to collect this tribute; for the contribution of this money was called by that title. The first tribute received in consequence of this amounted to four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was appointed to be their treasury; and the sittings were held in the temple there.

Their command was thus at first over free and independent confederates, who sat with them at council, and had a vote in public resolutions. The enlargement of their authority was the result of wars and their own political management during the interval between the invasion of the Medes and the present war, when the contests were against the barbarian; or their own allies endeavoring at a change; or those of

<sup>1</sup> This nice and difficult point was adjusted by Aristides, to the general satisfaction of all parties concerned. Greece conferred on him this most important trust; he was called to this delicate commission by the united voice of his country; 'Poor,' says Plutarch, 'when he set about it; but poorer when he had finished it.' The Athenian state was now furnished with a large annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy the foreign enemies of Greece, but even those Greeks who should at any time presume to oppose the measures of Athens. They soon found out that their own city was a more convenient place for keeping this treasure than the isle of Delos, and accordingly took care to remove it thither.

the Peloponnesians, who interfered on every occasion on purpose to molest them. Of these I have subjoined a particular detail, and have ventured a digression from my subject, because this piece of history has been omitted by all preceding writers. They have either confined their accounts to the affairs of Greece prior in time, or to the invasions of the Medes. Hecælanicus is the only one of them who has touched it in his Attic history; though his memorials are short, and not accurately distinguished by proper dates. But this, at the same time, will most clearly show the method in which the Athenian empire was erected.

In the first place, under the command of Cimon, son of Miltiades, they laid siege to Eion, a town on the Strymon, possessed by the Medes, which they carried, and sold all found within it for slaves. They afterwards did the same by Scyros, an island in the Ægean sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, and placed in it a colony of their own people. They had, farther, a war with the Carystians singly, in which the rest of the Eubœans were unconcerned, who at length submitted to them on terms. After this they made war on the Naxians, who had revolted, and reduced them by siege. This was the first confederate state which wa

<sup>1</sup> Cimon was a great general, a worthy patriot, brave, open and ingenuous, upright in his political conduct like Aristides and though an able politician, yet not so mischievously refined as to discard honesty and sincerity from public measures. His father Miltiades, after performing most signal services to his country, was heavily fined, thrown into prison, because unable to pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards paid the fine, is now going also to perform great services to the state, is afterwards banished, but recalled, and again employed in foreign commands, dying at last in the service of his country, highly regretted not only at Athens, but throughout Greece.

aved to gratify their aspiring ambition; though rewards all the rest, as opportunity occurred, had same fate.

he occasions of such revolts were various; though principal were deficiencies in their quotas of tribute shipping, and refusals of common service: for the enians exerted their authority with exactness and r, and laid heavy loads on men who had neither accustomed nor were willing to bear oppression. ir method of command was soon perverted; they onger cared to make it agreeable; and in general ice disallowed an equality, as it was now more ever in their power to force revolters to submis-

. But these points the confederates had highly litated by their own proceedings: for, through a ctancy of mingling in frequent expeditions, a matty of them, to redeem their personal attendance, e rated at certain sums of money, equivalent to the ense of the ships they ought to have furnished.

sums paid on these occasions to the Athenians e employed by them to increase their own naval e; and the tributaries thus drained, whenever they mmed to revolt, had parted with the needful expeits of war, and were without resource.

fter these things it happened that the Athenians their confederates fought against the Medes both and and sea, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. ion the son of Miltiades commanded; and the Atheis were victorious the very same day in both eleits. They took and destroyed the ships of the enicians, in the whole about two hundred.

ater in time than this happened a revolt of the usians, arising from disputes about places of trade the opposite coasts of Thrace and the mines which r possessed there. The Athenians, with a sufficient

force, sailed against Thasus; and, after gaining a victory by sea, landed on the island. About the same time they had sent a colony, consisting of about ten thousand of their own and confederate people, towards the Strymon, who were to settle in a place called the Nine-ways, but now Amphipolis. They became masters of the Nine-ways by dispossessing the Edonians. But advancing farther into the midland parts of Thrace, they were all cut off at Drabescus of Edonia by the united force of the Thracians, who were all enemies to this new settlement now forming at the Nine-ways. But the Thasians, defeated in a battle and besieged, implored the succor of the Lacedæmonians, and exhorted them to make a diversion in their favor by breaking into Attica. This they promised unknown to the Athenians, and were intent on the performance, but were prevented by the shock of an earthquake. The helots,<sup>1</sup> farther, had seized this opportunity, in

<sup>1</sup> Helots was the name given in general to the slaves of the Lacedæmonians. The first of the kind were the inhabitants of Helos in Messenia, who were conquered and enslaved by the Lacedæmonians; and all their slaves in succeeding times had the same denomination. The tillage of the ground, the exercise of trades, all manual labor, and every kind of drudgery, was thrown on them. They were always treated by their Spartan masters with great severity, and often with the utmost barbarity; at their caprice, or sometimes for reasons of state, they were wantonly put to death, or inhumanly butchered. There is a remarkable instance of the latter in the fourth book of this history. According to Plutarch it was a common saying in Greece, that a freeman at Sparta was the freest and a slave the greatest slave in the world.—Thus miserably oppressed, no wonder they seized an opportunity of revolt. The earthquake here mentioned was so violent, that, according to Plutarch, it demolished all the houses in Sparta, except five. The helots rose at once effectually to demolish those Spartans too who were not buried in the ruins. But *Archidamus* had already, by way of precaution, sounded an alarm, and got them together in a body. The helots thus pre-

concert with the neighboring Thuriatæ and Etheans, revolt and seize Ithome. Most of the helots were descendants of the ancient Messenians, then reduced to slavery, and on this account all of them in general are called Messenians. This war against the rebels in Ithome gave full employ to the Lacedæmonians. And the Thasians, after holding out three years' blockade, were forced to surrender on terms to the Athenians:—they were 'to level their walls; to give up their shipping; to pay the whole arrear of their tribute; to advance it punctually for the future; and to quit all pretensions to the continent and the mines.'

The Lacedæmonians, as their war against the rebels at Ithome ran out into a length of time, demanded the assistance of their allies, and amongst others of the Athenians. No small number of these were sent to their aid, under the command of Cimon. The demand for assistance from them was principally owing to the reputation they then were in for their superior skill in the methods of approaching and attacking walls. The long continuance of the siege convinced them of the necessity of such methods, though they would fain have taken it by storm. The first open enmity between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians broke out from this expedition: for the Lacedæmonians, when the place could not be carried by storm, growing jealous of the daring and innovating temper of the Athenians, and regarding them as aliens, lest by a longer stay they might be tampering with the rebels in Ithome, and so raise them fresh embarrassments, gave a dismission to them alone of their allies. They strove indeed to conceal their suspicions, by alleging 'they have no longer any need of their assistance.' The Athenians then marched off, and seized Ithome, where they made a long and obstinate resistance.

Athenians were convinced that their dismissal was not owing to this more plausible color, but to some latent jealousy. They reckoned themselves aggrieved and thinking they had merited better usage from the hands of the Lacedæmonians, were scarcely withdrawn, than, in open disregard to the league subsisting between them against the Medæ, they clapped up an alliance with their old enemies the Argives: and in the same oaths and same alliance the Thessalians also were comprehended with them both.

The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of the siege, unable to hold out any longer, surrendered to the Lacedæmonians on the following conditions:—that 'term of security be allowed them to quit Peloponnusus, into which they shall never return again; that any one of them be ever found there, he should be made the slave of whoever apprehended him.' The Pythian oracle had already warned the Lacedæmonians 'to let go the suppliants of Jupiter Ithometes.' The men, therefore, with their wives and children, went out of Ithome, and gained a reception from the Athenians, who acted now in enmity to the Lacedæmonians, and assigned them Naupactus for their residence, which they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozoli.

The Megareans also deserted the Lacedæmonians and went over to the Athenian alliance, because the Corinthians had warred on them in pursuance of dispute about settling their frontier. Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built up for the Megareans the long walls that ran down from Megara to Nisæa, and took their guard themselves. This was by no means the least occasion of that violent enmity now beginning to arise between the Corinthians and Athenians.

Inarus the son of Psammetichus, a Libyan, and king of the Libyans bordering on Egypt, taking his route from Maræa, a city beyond the Pharos, had seduced the greatest part of Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. He himself was constituted their leader, and he brought over the Athenians to associate in the enterprise. They happened at that time to be employed in an expedition against Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own and their allies: but relinquishing Cyprus, they went on this new design. Having arrived on that coast, and sailed up the Nile, they were masters of that river, and two-thirds of the city of Memphis, and were making their attack on the remaining part, which is called the White-wall. It was defended by the Persians and Medes, who had resorted thither for refuge, and by those Egyptians who had stood out in the general defection.

The Athenians, farther, having made a descent at Halæ, a battle ensued against the Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victory was on the Corinthian side. And afterwards the Athenians engaged at sea near Cecryphlea with a fleet of Peloponnesians, and completely gained the victory. A war also breaking out after this between the Æginetæ and Athenians, a great battle was fought at sea by these two contending parties near Ægina. Both sides were joined by their respective confederates; but the victory remained with the Athenians; who, having taken seventy of their ships, landed on their territory, and laid siege to the city, under the command of Leocrates the son of Stroeus. The Peloponnesians, then desirous to relieve the Æginetæ, transported over to Ægina three hundred heavy-armed, who before were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and Epidaurians. In the next place they secured the promontory of Ge-



raena. The Corinthians now with their allies made an incursion into the district of Megara, judging it impossible for the Athenians to march to the relief of the Megareans, as they had so large a force already abroad in Ægina and in Egypt; or, if they were intent on giving them relief, they must of necessity raise their siege from Ægina. The Athenians however recalled not their army from Ægina, but marched away all the old and young that were left in Athens to the aid of Megara, under the command of Myronides: and having fought a drawn battle against the Corinthians; both sides retired, and both sides looked on themselves as not worsted in the action. The Athenians, however, on the departure of the Corinthians, as being at least so far victorious, erected a trophy. The Corinthians at their return heard nothing but reproaches from the seniors in Corinth; so, after bestowing an interval of about twelve days to recruit, they came back again; and, to lay their claim also to the victory, set about erecting a trophy of opposition. On this, the Athenians sallying with a shout out of Megara, put those who were busy in erecting this trophy to the sword, and routed all who endeavored to oppose them. The vanquished Corinthians were forced to fly, and no small part of their number, being closely pursued and driven from any certain route, were chased into the ground of a private person, which happened to be encompassed with a ditch, so deep, as to be quite impassable, and there was no getting out. The Athenians, perceiving this, drew up all their heavy-armed to front them, and then forming their light-armed in a circle round them, stoned every man of them to death. This was a calamitous event to the Corinthians: but the bulk of their force got home safe again from this unhappy expedition.

About this time also the Athenians began to build the long walls reaching down to the sea, both towards the Phalerus and towards the Piræus.

The Phocians were now embroiled with the Dorians, from whom the Lacedæmonians are descended. Having made some attempts on Bœon, and Cytineum, and Erineus, and taken one of those places, the Lacedæmonians marched out to succor the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their natives, and ten thousand of their allies, commanded by Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, in the right of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, their king, who was yet a minor; and having forced the Phocians to surrender on terms the town they had taken, were preparing for their return. Now in case they attempted it by passing over the sea in the gulf of Crissa, the Athenians having got round with a squadron, were ready to obstruct it. Nor did they judge it safe to attempt it by way of Geranea, as Megara and Pegæ were in the hands of the Athenians; for the pass of Geranea is ever difficult, and now was constantly guarded by the Athenians; and should they venture this route, they perceived that the Athenians were there also ready to intercept them. They determined at last to halt for a time in Bœotia, and to watch for an opportunity to march away unmolested. Some citizens of Athens were now clandestinely practising with them, to obtain their concurrence in putting a stop to the democracy and the building of the long walls. But the whole body of the Athenian people rushed out into the field against them, with a thousand Argives and the respective quotas of their allies, in the whole amounting to fourteen thousand. They judged them quite at a loss about the means of a retreat; and the design also to overthrow their popular government began to be suspected. Some Thessalian

horsemen came also up to join the Athenians, in pursuance of treaty, who afterwards in the heat of action revolted to the Lacedæmonians.

They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the victors rested with the Lacedæmonians and allies; but slaughter was great on both sides. The Lacedæmonians afterwards took their route through the district of Megara; and having cut down the woods, returned to their own home through Geranea and the Isthmus. On the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra the Athenians had taken the field against the Boeotians, under the command of Myronides.<sup>1</sup> They engaged them, and gained a complete victory at Oeropyta;<sup>2</sup> in consequence of which, they seized all territories of Bœotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls of Tanagra. They took from the Locrians Opus one hundred of their richest persons for hostages; and had now completed their long walls at Athens.

Soon after, the Æginetæ surrendered to the Athenians.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch in his 'Apophthegms' relates that when Myronides was putting himself at the head of the Athenians on this occasion, his officers told him 'they were not all come out into the field;' he replied briskly, 'all are come out that I fight,' and marched off.

<sup>2</sup> This battle is represented by some as more glorious to the Athenians than even those of Marathon or Plataea. In the latter they fought, accompanied by their allies, against the Boeotians; but here, with their own single force, they defeated a far more numerous body of the choicest and best disciplined troops in Greece. Plato has marked it in his 'Funeral Oration,' and told us those who fell in this battle were the first who were honored with a public interment in the Ceramicus. 'These brave men,' says he, as translated by Mr. Warton, 'having fought against Grecians for the liberties of Greece and delivered those whose cause they had undertaken to defend, were the first after the Persian war on whom the commonwealth conferred the honor of being buried in this public cemetery.'

nians on terms. They ‘demolished their fortifications, gave up their shipping, and submitted to pay an annual tribute for the future.’

The Athenians, farther, in a cruise infested the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command of Tolmidas, the son of Tolmæus. They burnt a dock of the Lacedæmonians, took Chalcis, a city belonging to the Corinthians, and landing their men, engaged with and defeated the Sicyonians.

During all this interval the army of the Athenians and allies continued in Egypt, amidst various incidents and events of war. At first, the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt. On this, the king<sup>1</sup> despatched to Lacedæmon Megabazus, a Persian noble, furnished with great sums of money, in order to prevail on the Lacedæmonians to make an incursion into Attica, and force the Athenians to recall their troops from Egypt. When Megabazus could not prevail, and some money had been spent to no manner of purpose, he carried back what was yet unexpended with him into Asia. He then sent Megabazus, the son of Zopyrus, a Persian noble, against them with a numerous army, who marching by land, fought with and defeated the Egyptians and their allies; then drove the Grecians out of Memphis; and at last shut them up in the isle of Protopis. Here he kept them blocked up for a year and six months; till having drained the channel by turning the water into a different course, he stranded all their ships, and rendered the island almost continent. He then marched his troops across, and took the place by a land assault. And thus a war, which had employed the Grecians for six continued years, ended in their destruction. Few only of the numbers sent

<sup>1</sup> Artaxerxes Longimanus.

thither, by taking the route of Libya, got safe away to Cyrene; the far greater part were intirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced to the obedience of the king: Amyrtæus alone held out, who reigned in the fenny parts. The large extent of the fens prevented his reduction; and besides, the Egyptians of the fens are the most remarkable of all for military valour. Inarus, king of the Libyans, the author of all these commotions in Egypt, was betrayed by treachery, and fastened to a cross. Beside this, fifty triremes from Athens and the rest of the alliance, arriving on the coast of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up to Medasium, a mouth of the Nile, quite ignorant of their fate. These some forces assaulted from the land, whilst a squadron of Phœnicians attacked them by sea. Many of the vessels were by this means destroyed, but some few had the good fortune to get away. And thus the great expedition of the Athenians and allies into Egypt was brought to a conclusion.

But farther, Orestes, son of Echekratidas, king of the Thessalians, being driven from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to undertake his restoration. The Athenians, in conjunction with the Bœotians and Phocians, now their allies, marched up to Pharsalus of Thessaly. They became masters of the adjacent country, so far as they could be whilst keeping in a body: for the Thessalian cavalry prevented any detachments. They took not that city, neither carried any one point intended by the expedition, but were obliged to withdraw, and carry Orestes back again with them, totally unsuccessful.

Not long after this a thousand Athenians going on board their ships which lay at Pegæ, for Pegæ was now in their possession, steered away against Sicyon,

under the command of Pericles<sup>1</sup> the son of Xantippus. They made a descent, and in a battle defeated those of the Sicyonians who endeavored to make head against them. From thence they strengthened themselves by taking in some Achæans; and stretching across the gulf, landed in a district of Acarnania, and laid siege to Oenias; yet, unable to carry it, they soon quitted, and withdrew to their own homes.

Three years after this a peace, to continue for five years, was patched up between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. On this the Athenians, now at leisure from any war in Greece, engaged in an expedition against Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty of these were afterwards detached to Egypt, at the request of Amyrtæus, king of the fenny part; but the rest of them blocked up Citium. Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent famine, they were compelled to

<sup>1</sup> Here the name of Pericles first occurs, and a hint should be given to those who are not well acquainted with him to mark a person that was a true patriot, a consummate statesman, a great general, and a most sublime speaker. He was born of one of the most illustrious families in Athens. He was educated in the best manner, and learned his philosophy, or the knowledge of nature, from Anaxagoras, whose doctrines agreed so little with the superstitious practices and tempers of the Athenians, that the master and all his disciples were charged with atheism, for which many of them were prosecuted, and the divine Socrates most injuriously put to death. He engaged early in public affairs, gained the ascendant over all his competitors, became at length, and continued to his death, master of the affections and liberties too of the Athenian people; and though master, yet guardian and increaser of the latter. In short, according to writers of the best authority, and the gravest historians, he was one of the most able, and most disinterested ministers that Athens ever had; Athens, the most democratical state that ever existed, so fertile in every thing great and glorious, and so overrun at the same time with faction, licentiousness, and wild tumultuary caprice.

quit the blockade of Citium: and being come up to the height of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at one time a united force of Phœnicians, and Cyprians, and Cilicians, both by land and sea. They gained the victory in both engagements; and being rejoined by the detachment they had sent to Egypt, returned home.

After this the Lacedæmonians engaged in that which is known by the name of the holy war; and having recovered the temple at Delphi, delivered it up to the Delphians. But no sooner were they withdrawn than the Athenians marched out in their turn, retook it, and delivered it into the hands of the Phœnicians.

At no great interval of time from hence the Athenians took the field against the Bœotian exiles, who had seized Orchomenus and Chæronea, and some other cities of Bœotia. Their force, sent out on this service, consisted of a thousand heavy-armed of their own, with proportional quotas from their allies, and was commanded by Tolmidas the son of Tolmæus. Having taken and enslaved Chæronea, they placed a fresh garrison in it, and so withdrew. But on their march they were attacked at Coronea by a body of men, consisting of the Bœotian exiles, sallying out of Orchomenus, joined by Locrians, and the exiles from Eubœa, and others of their partisans. After a battle, the victory remained with the latter, who made great slaughter of the Athenians, and took many prisoners. On this the Athenians evacuated Bœotia, and, to get the prisoners released, consented to a peace. The Bœotian exiles, and all others in the same circumstances, were by this resettled in their old habitations, and recovered their former liberty and rights.

It was not a great while after these last occurrences that Eubœa revolted from the Athenians: and Peri-

It was no sooner landed on that island with an Athenian army to chastise them than news was brought that 'Megara also had revolted; that the Peloponnesians were going to make an incursion into Attica; that the Athenian garrison had been put to the sword by the Megareans,'<sup>1</sup> excepting those who had thrown themselves into Nisæa; and that the Megareans had effected this revolt by a junction of Corinthians, and Cyonians, and Epidaurians.' On hearing this Pericles re-embarked with the utmost expedition, and sought back his army from Eubœa. And soon after, the Peloponnesians marching into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, laid the country waste, under the command of Pleistoanax<sup>2</sup> the son of Pausanias, king of Sparta: and then, without extending the ravage

<sup>1</sup> This revolt of Megara, a little republic almost surrounded by the dominions of Athens, leagued closely with her, and under her protection, gave rise to that decree which excluded the Megareans from the ports and markets of Athens. Others add that they slew an Athenian herald, who was sent to expostulate with them on this account. Could such offences be pocketed by Athenians? Could Pericles dissuade the people of Athens from showing resentment? They decided farther, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, that the generals of the state should swear at their elections to make an incursion twice a year into the Megaris. We all soon see that the Peloponnesians made it a pretext for the ensuing war, and that Pericles justified the decree, and persuaded the Athenians to hazard a war rather than repeal it. This is the true history of the point, though comedy, andillery, and libelling, strangely vary the account.

<sup>2</sup> As Pleistoanax on this occasion evacuated Attica on a sudden, he was banished from Sparta, as having been bribed by the Athenians to quit their territory. Diodorus Siculus states that he did it by the advice of Cleandridas, his guardian, who attended him in the field on account of his youth; and that Pericles afterwards passing his accounts at Athens, urged 'ten talents properly laid out for the service of the state,' which passed without farther explanation or exception.



any farther, they withdrew to their own homes. Now again the Athenians transported a military force into Eubœa, under the command of Pericles, and soon completed its reduction. The tranquillity of the rest of the island was re-established on certain conditions; but they wholly ejected all the inhabitants of Hestisea, and repeopled it with a colony of their own. And not long after their return from Eubœa they concluded a peace for thirty years with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, in pursuance of which they restored them Nisæa and Chalcis, and Pegæ and Trœzene; all which places, though belonging to the Peloponnesians, were in the hands of the Athenians.

In the sixth year of this peace a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene.<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Pericles here performed a great and signal service to his country. The motives to this war are, according to our historian, sufficiently strong, on the scheme now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the sovereignty of Athens by sea. Yet the comic poets, and writers of memoirs and private history, give another account of the affair, which it is surprising to find the authors of the 'Universal History' inclined to think as well founded as what is given by Thucydides, that 'Pericles engaged the republic in this war merely to gratify the resentment of Aspasia, who was a native of Miletus, against the Samians.' As this Aspasia had all the honor of Pericles' merit imputed to herself, and he has suffered a weight of reproach on her behalf, the reader will accept a short account of this famous lady. She is allowed on all hands to have been a woman of the greatest beauty, and the first genius; but averred by some to have been a libertine—nay, every thing scandalous and vile. Pericles was doubtingly fond of her, and got divorced from a wife whom he did not love to marry her. She taught him, it is said, his refined maxims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even composed the speeches on which so great a share of his reputation was founded. The best men in Athens frequented her house, and brought their wives to receive lessons from her of economy and right deportment. Socrates himself was her pupil in eloquence, and gives her the honor of that funeral oration which he delivers in the Menexenus of Plato.

Milesians, having the worst in the dispute, had recourse to the Athenians, to whom they bitterly exclaimed against the Samians. Nay, even some private citizens of Samos joined with them in this outcry, whose scheme it was to work a change in the government. The Athenians, therefore, putting to sea with a fleet of forty sail, landed on Samos, where they set up a democracy, and exacted from them fifty boys and as many grown men for hostages, whom they deposited at Lemnos. They had, farther, at their departure, left a garrison behind to secure that island: but a body of Samians, who would not submit to the new form of government, and therefore had refuged themselves on the continent, having gained the correspondence of the most powerful persons abiding in Samos, and the alliance of Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, at that time governor at Sardis, and collected a body of seven hundred auxiliaries, passed over by night into Samos. They first exerted their efforts against the popular party, and got a majority of them into their power: in the next place, they conveyed away the hostages from Lemnos by stealth; they openly declared a revolt; and delivered up the Athenian garrison, with their officers whom they had seized, to Pissuthnes; and then immediately prepared to renew their war against Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with them in the revolt.

There must have been some ground even for complimenting her in this extraordinary manner. And after every abatement, what must we think of a lady, who was in such high esteem with the greatest men that ever lived at Athens, who taught force to orators, grace to philosophers, and conduct to ministers of state; in a word, who had Pericles for her lover, and Socrates for her encomiast? See Bayle's Dictionary under 'Pericles,' and Universal History, vol. vi. p. 415, note.

No sooner were the Athenians informed of this than they put out against Samos with sixty sail; though sixteen of them were detached for other services. Some of the latter were stationed on the coast of Caria to observe the motions of a Phœnician fleet, and the rest were ordered to Chios and Lesbos, to give there a summons of aid. The remaining forty-four, commanded by Pericles<sup>1</sup> and nine colleagues, engaged near the isle of Tragia with the Samian fleet, consisting of seventy sail, twenty of which had land soldiers on board; and the whole was now on the return from Miletus; and here the Athenians gained a signal victory. Afterwards forty sail arrived from Athens to reinforce them, and twenty-five from the Chians and the Lesbians. With this accession of force they landed on the island; overthrew the Samians in battle; invested their city with a triple wall, and at the same time blocked it up by sea.

But Pericles, drawing off sixty of the ships from this service, steered away with all possible expedition

<sup>1</sup> The Athenians in the assembly of the people chose ten generals every year, according to the number of their tribes. They were sometimes, as in the present instance, all sent out in the same employ. They each in his turn was general for the day. Thucydides seldom gives more than the name of one, whom we may conclude to have been the person of the greatest weight and influence amongst them; in fact a general-in-chief. Philip of Macedon was used to joke on this multiplicity of generals. 'For my part,' said he, 'I have never had the good fortune to find more than one general in my life; and yet the Athenians find ten fresh ones every year.' Not but that these generals were often re-elected, and continued years in commission. Pericles, it is plain, did so; and in later times Phocion is said to have been elected five-and-forty times. Their power was great, not only in the field, but at Athens. Every point that had relation to war came under their department. Pericles in a foreign employ was always first of the generals, and within the walls of Athens was the first, or rather absolute, minister of state.

towards Caunus and Caria, on receiving advice that 'a Phœnician fleet was coming up against them.' Ste-sagoras, also, and others, had before been sent from Samos with five ships to meet that fleet. In this interval the Samians launched out in a sudden sally; fell on the unfortified station<sup>1</sup> of the Athenians; sunk the vessels moored at a distance by way of guard; and, engaging those who put out against them, victoriously executed their purpose; were masters of their own sea for fourteen days' continuance; and made whatever importations or exportations they pleased: but, as Pericles then returned, they were again blocked up by sea.<sup>2</sup> He afterwards received fresh supplies from Athens; forty ships under Thucydides, and Agnon, and Phormio; and twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles; beside thirty others from Chios and Lesbos. And though after this the Samians ventured a short engagement at sea, yet they now found all farther resistance impracticable; so that in the ninth month of the siege they surrendered on the following terms:— 'To demolish their walls; to give hostages; to deliver up their shipping; and to reimburse by stated pay-

<sup>1</sup> When the Grecians continued long on a station, or were apprehensive of being attacked by an enemy, they fortified their naval station and camp towards the land with a ditch and rampart, and towards the sea with a palisade. At other times a number of their ships lay out more to sea, by way of guard or watch to the rest, which were generally dragged ashore, whilst the soldiers lay round them in their tents. Sometimes they were only moored to the shore, or rode at anchor, that they might be ready on an alarm. See Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 20.

<sup>2</sup> The manner of doing this was 'to environ the walls and harbor with ships, ranged in order from one side of the shore to the other, and so closely joined together by chains and bridges, on which armed men were placed, that, without breaking their order, there could be no passage from the town to the sea.' Potter's *Archæologia*.

ments the expenses of the war.<sup>1</sup> The Byzantines also came in, on the engagement of being held only to such obedience as had formerly been required of them.

Not many years intervened between this period of time and the rise of those differences above recited concerning Corcyra and Potidæa, and all occurrences whatever, on which the pretences of this Peloponnesian war were grounded. All these transactions, in general, whether of Grecians against Grecians, or against the barbarian, fell out in the compass of fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the commencement of this present war; during which period the Athenians had established their dominion on a solid basis, and had risen to a high exaltation of power. The Lacedæmonians were sensible of it, yet never opposed them, except by some transient efforts; and for the most part of the time were quite easy and indifferent about it. That people had never been known in a hurry to run to arms; their wars were indispensably necessary; and sometimes they were entangled in domestic broils. Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern till the Athenian power was manifestly established, and encroachments were made on their own alliance: then, indeed, they determined to be no longer

<sup>1</sup> Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied with Athens herself, and had well-nigh defeated her grand plan of being mistress of the sea, Pericles was received on his return with all the honors a grateful people could give him, and was pitched on to make a funeral oration for those slain in the war. He performed his part with high applause. The ladies in particular were loud in their acclamations, and were eagerly employed in caressing, and crowning him with garlands. But for a smart piece of railery from one of them, on this occasion, and his smarter repartee, the reader may consult the Universal History, vol. vi. p. 429, the note. In the latter part of that note the authors seem willing both to deny and to allow Pericles the merit of having served his country in the reduction of Samos.

patient; they resolved on a war in which their utmost force should be exerted, and the Athenian power, if possible, demolished.

On these motives was formed the public resolution of the Lacedæmonians, that ‘the treaty was violated, and the Athenians were guilty of injustice.’ They had also sent to Delphi, to inquire of the god, ‘whether their war would be successful?’ He is reported to have returned this answer, that ‘if they warred with all their might, they should at last be triumphant, and he himself would fight on their side, invoked and uninvoked.’

They had now again summoned their confederates to attend, and designed to put it to a general ballot, ‘whether the war should be undertaken?’ The ambassadors from the several constituents of their alliance arrived, and assembled in one general council. Others made what declarations they pleased; the majority inveighing against the Athenians, and insisting on war: but the Corinthians (who had beforehand requested every state apart to ballot for war), alarmed for Potidæa, lest for want of some speedy relief it might be utterly destroyed, being present also at this council, stood forth the last of all, and spoke to this effect:—

‘We can no longer, ye confederates, have any room to complain of the Lacedæmonians, since their own resolution is already engaged for war, and they have summoned us hither to give our concurrence; for it is the duty of a governing and leading state, as in private concerns they observe the equitable conduct, so ever to keep their view intent on the general welfare, suitably to that superior degree of honor and regard, which in many points they pre-eminently receive.

‘For our parts, so many of us as have quitted Athe-

nian friendship for this better association, we require no farther trials to awaken our apprehensions. But those amongst us who are seated up in the inland parts, at a distance from the coast, should now be convinced, that unless they combine in the defence of such as are in lower situations, they would soon be obstructed in carrying out the fruits of their lands, and again in fetching in those necessary supplies which the sea bestoweth on an inland country. Let them by no means judge erroneously of what we urge as not in the least affecting them; but looking on it as a certainty, that if they abandon the guard of the maritime situations, the danger will soon advance quite up to them; and they of course, no less than we, are concerned in the issue of our present determinations. For this reason they ought, without the least hesitation, to make the timely exchange of peace for war.

‘It is indeed the duty of the prudent, so long as they are not injured, to be fond of peace: but it is the duty of the brave, when injured, to throw up peace, and to have recourse to arms; and, when in these successful, to lay them down again in peaceful composition: thus, never to be elevated above measure by military success, nor delighted with the sweets of peace to suffer insults: for he who, apprehensive of losing this delight, sits indolently at ease, will soon be deprived of the enjoyment of that delight which interesteth his fears; and he whose passions are inflamed by military success, elevated too high by a treacherous confidence, hears no longer the dictates of his judgment. Many are the schemes which, though unadvisedly planned, through the more unreasonable conduct of an enemy, turn out successful: but yet more numerous are those which, though seemingly founded on mature counsel, draw after them a disgraceful and

opposite event. This proceeds from that great inequality of spirit with which an exploit is projected, and with which it is put into actual execution: for in council we resolve, surrounded with security; in execution we faint, through the prevalence of fear.

‘We now, having been grossly injured, and in abundant instances aggrieved, are taking up arms; and, when we have avenged ourselves on the Athenians, shall at a proper time lay them down again. Success, on many considerations, we may promise ourselves: in the first place, as we are superior in numbers and military skill; in the next, as we all advance with uniformity to accomplish our designs. A naval force, equal to that in which their strength consists, we shall be enabled to equip, from competent stores we separately possess, and the funds laid up at Delphi and Olympia.<sup>1</sup> If we take up those on interest for immediate service, we are able, by enlarging their pay, to draw away all the foreigners who man their fleets. The Athenian power is not supported by a natural but a purchased strength; and our own is less liable to be injured by the same method, as we are strong in our persons more than in our wealth. Should we gain the victory but in one single engagement at sea, in all probability we have done their business; or, in case they continue the struggle, we shall then have a longer space to improve our naval practice: and when once we have gained an equality of skill, our natural courage will soon secure us the triumph: for that valiant spirit, which we enjoy by nature, it is

<sup>1</sup> In the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Jupiter at Olympia. The wealth repositied in these places must have been very large, considering the great veneration universally paid these deities, and the numerous and valuable offerings sent annually to these famous temples.



impossible for them to acquire by rules ; but that superiority, with which at present their skill invests them, we may easily learn to overmatch by practice.

‘ Those sums of money by which these points are chiefly to be compassed we will respectively contribute : for would it not in reality be a grievous case, when their dependents are never backward to send in those sums which rivet slavery on themselves, if we, who want to be revenged on our foes, and at the same time to secure our own preservation—if we should refuse to submit to expenses, and should store up our wealth to be plundered by them, to purchase oppressions and miseries for ourselves ?

‘ We have other expedients within our reach to support this war—a revolt of their dependents ; and, in consequence of that, a diminution of their revenue, the essence of their strength ; erecting forts within their territory ; and many others not yet to be foreseen : for war by no means yields to the direction of a predetermined plan ; but of itself, in every present exigence, confines and methodises its own course. In war, who moves along with a temper in proper command has got the firmest support : but he who has lost his temper is, for that reason, more liable to miscarry.

‘ Let us remember, that if any one single state amongst us had a contest with its foes about a frontier, there would be need of perseverance ; but now, the Athenians are a match for us all united, and quite too strong for any of us separately to resist : so that, unless we support one another with our collective forces, unless every nation and every state unanimously combine to give a check to their ambition, they will oppress us, apart and disunited, without a struggle. Such a triumph, how grating soever the

bare mention of it may be to any of your ears, yet, be it known, can end in nothing else but plain and open slavery. To hint in mere words so base a doubt, that so many states may be enslaved by one, is disgrace to Peloponnesus. In such a plunge we should either be thought justly to have deserved it, or through cowardice to suffer it, the degenerate offspring of those ancestors who were the deliverers of Greece. And yet we have not spirit enough remaining to defend our own liberty. We suffer one single state to erect itself into a tyrant, whilst we claim the glory of pulling down monarchs in particular societies. We know not by what methods to extricate ourselves from these three, the greatest of calamities, from folly, or cowardice, or sloth. For exempt from these in fact you are not, by taking up the plea of contempt of your enemies, for which such numbers have suffered. The many misfortunes arising from this have changed the sense of the word, and caused it to stand for arrant folly.

‘ But on the past what necessity is there to enlarge, or to blame any farther than may be necessary for the present? To prevent worse events for the future, we ought by immediate efforts, with toil and perseverance, to seek for redress. Through toil to acquire virtues, is hereditary to Peloponnesians. This custom is not to be dropped, though now in wealth and power you have made some petty advancements: for it never can become you to let go in affluence what was gained in want. It becomes you rather, on many accounts, with manly confidence to declare for war. The oracle of a god prescribes it; that god himself has promised his assistance; and the rest of Greece is ready to join you in the contest, some from a principle of fear, and some from a principle of interest. Neither on you will

the first breach of the peace be charged. The god who advises war plainly judges that to be already broken : you will only act to redress its violation : for the breach is not to be charged on those who arm to revenge it ; but on those who were the first aggressors.

‘ Since then war, considered in every light, appears honorable in regard to you, ye Lacedæmonians : since we, with united voices, encourage you to it, as most strongly requisite for our general and separate interests, defer no longer to succor the Potidæans, Demetrians by descent, and besieged by Ionians (the reverse was formerly the case), and to recover again the liberty of others. The business will admit of no longer delay, when some already feel the blow ; and others, if it once be known that we met here together, and durst not undertake our own defence, will in a very little time be sensible of the same. Reflect within yourselves, confederates, that affairs are come to extremities ; that we have suggested the most advisable measures ; and give your ballot for war. Be not terrified at its immediate dangers ; but animate yourselves with the hope of a long lasting peace to be procured by it : for a peace produced by war is ever the most firm ; but from tranquillity and ease to be averse to war, can by no means abate or dissipate our danger. With this certain conclusion, that a state in Greece is started up into a tyrant, and aims indifferently at the liberty of us all, her arbitrary plan being partly executed, and partly in agitation—let us rush against, and at once pull her down. Then shall we pass the remainder of our lives exempt from dangers, and shall immediately recover liberty for those Grecians who are already enslaved.’

*In this manner the Corinthians spoke : and the La-*

ædæmonians, when they had heard them all deliver their several opinions, gave out the ballots to all the confederates that were present, in regular order, both to the greater and lesser states : and the greatest part of them ballotted for war. But, though thus decreed, it was impossible for them, as they were quite unprepared, immediately to undertake it. It was agreed, therefore, that ' every state should get in readiness their several contingents, and no time to be lost.' However, in less than a year every thing needful was amply provided ; and, before its expiration, an irruption was made into Attica, and the war openly on foot. But even this interval was employed in sending embassies to Athens, charged with accusations, that reasons strong as possible for making war might appear on their side, if those should meet with disregard.

By the first ambassadors, therefore, whom the Lædæmonians sent, they required the Athenians—' To drive away the pollution of the goddess.' And the pollution was this :—

There was one Cylon an Athenian, who had been victor at the Olympic games, a person of noble descent, and of great consequence in his own person. He married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, who in those days was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, asking advice at Delphi about a scheme he had projected, was directed by the god to ' seize the citadel of Athens on the greatest festival of Jupiter.' In pursuance of this, being supplied with a party of men by Theagenes, and having obtained the concurrence of his own friends, on the day of the Peloponnesian Olympics he seized the citadel as instrumental to his tyranny. He imagined that to be the greatest festival of Jupiter, and to bear a particular relation to himself, who had been an Olympic victor. But whether

the greatest festival meant was to be held in Attica, or any other place, he had never considered, nor had the oracle declared. There is a festival of Jove observed by the Athenians, which is called the greatest festival of Jupiter the Propitious. This is celebrated without the city, in full concourse of the people, where many sacrifices are offered, not of real victims, but of artificial images of creatures peculiar to the country. Concluding, however, that he had the true sense of the oracle, he put his enterprise in execution. The Athenians, taking the alarm, ran out of the country in one general confluence to put a stop to these attempts, and investing the citadel, quite blocked them up. But in process of time, being wearied out with the tediousness of the blockade, many of them departed, leaving the care of it to the nine archons, with a full power of 'acting in whatever manner they should judge most expedient:' for at that time most parts of the public administration were in the management of the archons. The party with Cylon, thus closely invested, were reduced very low through scarcity of bread and water. Cylon therefore and his brother privately escaped. But the rest, reduced to extremities, and some of them had already perished by famine, sit themselves down as suppliants by the altar in the citadel. The Athenian guard, having ordered them to rise, as they saw them just ready to expire in the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation, led them out and slew them. But some of the number, who had seated themselves at the venerable goddesses, at the very altars, they murdered in the act of removal.<sup>1</sup> And for this action not only the persons

<sup>1</sup> When these suppliants were ordered to come out, they tied a string round the altar in the citadel, and keeping hold of it were come as far as the altars of the venerable god-

concerned in it, but their descendants also, were called the sacrilegious and accursed of the goddess. The Athenians, indeed, banished those sacrilegious persons out of the city: Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian drove them out again, when he was at Athens, on account of a sedition; nay, on this occasion they not only drove away the living, but even dug up the bones of the dead and cast them out: yet, in process of time, they returned again, and some of their posterity are still in Athens.

This was the pollution which the Lacedæmonians required them to drive away; with a face indeed of piety, as vindicating the honor of the gods; but knowing at the same time that Pericles the son of Xantippus was tainted with it by the side of his mother; and thence concluding, that if he could be removed, the Athenians would more easily be brought to an accommodation with them. They could not carry their hopes so far as actually to effect his banishment, but to raise against him the public odium, as if the war was partly owing to the misfortune they suffered in him: for, carrying with him the greatest sway of any Athenian then alive, and presiding intirely in the administration, he was most steady in opposition to the Lacedæmonians, dissuading the Athenians from any concession, and exciting them to war.

The Athenians in return required the Lacedæmonians 'to drive away the pollution contracted at Tæmarus:' for the Lacedæmonians some time ago, having caused their supplicant helots to rise out of Nep-

lesses. Just there the string happened to break, on which herarchons rushed in to seize them, as if Minerva had thrown them out of her protection. Some of the number sat instantly down for fresh protection at the altars of the venerable goddesses: it was an unavailing resource, and they were immediately slain on the spot. Plutarch in 'Solon.'

tune's temple at Tænarus, led them aside, and slew them. And to this action they themselves impute the great earthquake which happened afterwards at Sparta.

They farther required them 'to drive away the pollution of the Chalcioecan Pallas,' the nature of which was this:—

When Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, on his being first recalled by the Spartans from his command in Hellespont, and brought to his trial before them, was acquitted of the charge of mal-administration, but was no longer intrusted with the public commission; fitting out an Hermionian trireme on his own private account, he arrived in Hellespont, without any authority from the Lacedæmonians. He gave out that he did it for the service of the Grecian war; but his intention was to carry on his negotiations with the king, which, aspiring to the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before. He had formerly conferred an obligation on the king, from which the whole of his project took its date. When after the return from Cyprus, during his first appearance there, he took Byzantium, which was possessed by the Medes, and in it some favorites and relations of the king were made his prisoners, he released them all, to ingratiate himself with the king, without the privity of the other confederates, giving it out in public that they had made their escape. He transacted this affair by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, to whose keeping he had intrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. He also despatched Gongylus to him with a letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards discovered, were these:—

'Pausanias, general of Sparta, desirous to oblige you, sends away these his prisoners of war: and by it I express my inclination, if you approve, to take your daughter in marriage, and to put Sparta and the rest of Greece into your subjection. I think I have

---

power sufficient to effectuate these points, could my scheme be communicated with you. If therefore any of these proposals receive your approbation, send down to the coast some trusty person, through whom for the future we may hold a correspondence.'

Thus much was contained in the letter; and, on the reception of it, Xerxes was delighted, and sent away Artabazus the son of Pharnacus down to the coast, with an order to take on him the government of Dascylis, having first dismissed Megabates, who was the governor. To him he intrusted a letter for Pausanias at Byzantium, with an injunction to forward it with all possible expedition, and to let him see his signet; and that, if Pausanias should charge him with any affairs, he should execute them with all possible diligence and fidelity. Artabazus being arrived, obeyed all the other injunctions with exactness, and forwarded the letter, which brought this answer:—

'Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias. The kindness done me in those persons, whom from Byzantium you delivered safe on the other side the sea, shall be placed to your account in our family, eternally recorded; and with the other contents of your letter I am delighted. Let neither night nor day relax your earnest endeavors to effectuate those points you promise me: nor stop at any expense of gold, or silver, or greatness of military force, if such aid be any where requisite. But confer boldly with Artabazus, a trusty person, whom I have sent to you, about mine and your own concerns, that they may be accomplished in the most honorable and most advantageous manner for us both.'

On the receipt of this letter Pausanias, who before had been in high credit with the Grecians, through the lustre of his command at Plataea, was elevated much *more than ever*, and could no longer adjust his de-



meanor by the modes and customs of his native try. He immediately dressed himself up in P attire, and quitting Byzantium, travelled th Thrace, attended with Persian and Egyptian g and refined his table into Persian elegance. H bition he was unable any longer to conceal, t short sketches manifested too soon what g schemes he had formed in his mind for future a plishment. He then showed himself difficult of a and let his anger loose so violently and so im minately on all men, that no one could approach. And this was not the least motive to the confes for going over to the Athenians. But the Laced nians, informed of this, recalled him the first ti the account of such behavior; and, when he w turned again in the Hermionian vessel without permission, he plainly appeared to have reas again his former practices: and when forced move from Byzantium by the opposition raised a him by the Athenians, he went not back to S but withdrawing to Colonæ of Troas, informatio given that ' he was negotiating with the barba and had fixed his residence there for very bad de On this they could no longer be patient, bu ephori despatched him a herald and the scytale;'

<sup>1</sup> The scytale is a famous instrument peculiar to the dæmonians, and used by them for the close convey orders to their ministers abroad. It was a long black and the contrivance was this: ' When the magistrate commission to any general or admiral, they took two pieces of wood exactly equal to one another; one of they kept, and the other was delivered to the command whom, when they had any thing of moment to commu they cut a long narrow scroll of parchment, and roll about their own staff, one fold close on another, they their business on it; then taking it off, despatched it a the commander, who applying it to his own staff, the exactly fell in one with another, as at the writing; as characters, which before it was wrapped up were confi

ler, 'Not to stay behind the herald: if he did, as proclaimed against him by the Spartans.' He, desirous to clear himself as much as possible from suspicion, and confident that with money he could meet any accusation, returned the second time to Sparta. The first treatment he met with there was, to be thrown into prison by order of the ephori; for they have so large an authority, even over a king. Afterwards, by some private management, he procured his enlargement, and offered to submit to trial by any who were willing to accuse him. The Spartans, indeed, had no positive evidence against him, not even his private enemies, nor the general assembly none, to support them in proceeding against a person of royal descent, and at that time invested with the regal dignity: for, being uncle to Archidamus the son of Leonidas, their king, though yet a minor, he was regent-guardian. But, by his disobedience of the laws, and his affectation of the barbarian manners, he afforded them strong reasons to suspect that he could never conform to the equality then in vogue. He called to remembrance those other passages of his life, in which he had at any time deviated from the institutions of his country; and that farther, on the occasion at Delphi, which the Grecians offered as the most part of the Persian spoils, he had formerly pretended, by his own authority, to place this inscription:—

For Persia's hosts o'erthrown, and Græcia freed,  
To Phœbus this Pausanias hath decreed,  
Who led the Grecians to the glorious deed.

ned and unintelligible, appeared very plain.' Potter's *Ætologia*, vol. ii. c. 13.

It be asked, says the scholiast, how Pausanias came to the scytale with him now, as he was abroad without the commission; the answer is, he had kept it ever since former employments.

These verses, indeed, the Lacedæmonians immediately defaced from the tripod, and placed in their stead the names of the several states which had joined in the overthrow of the barbarian, and in making this obliteration. This therefore was now recollected to the prejudice of Pausanias; and, in his present situation, it was interpreted, from the circumstance of his late behavior, as an argument that he had been equally guilty long before. They had moreover got an information that he was tampering with the helots, which in fact was true; for he promised them their liberty and the privilege of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his command, and co-operate with him in the whole of his project. But even this would not prevail: they disdained to place so much confidence in the informations given by helots, as to run into irregularities to punish him. They adhered to the custom ever observed amongst them, never to be hasty in forming a sentence never to be recalled against a citizen of Sparta, without unquestionable evidence. At length, they obtained the fullest conviction, as it is said, by means of an Argyllian, an old minion of his, and the person most in his confidence, who was to convey to Artabazus the last letters he wrote to the king. This man, alarmed by the recollection that no person sent on these errands before him had ever returned again, having already counterfeited the seal, to the end that if he was deceived in his suspicions, or Pausanias should demand them again to make any alteration, he might avoid discovery, breaks open the letters. He found by them that he was going on the errand his fears foreboded, and that his own murder was expressly enjoined. He carried on this the packet to the ephori, who were now more than ever convinced, *but still* were desirous to hear themselves, from the *mouth of Pausanias*, an acknowledgement of the truth.

They therefore contrived that this person should go to sanctuary at Tænarus as a suppliant, and refuge in a cell built double by a partition. In the inner part of this cell he hid some of the ephori; and, Pausanias coming to him and demanding the reason of his supplication, they heard distinctly all that passed. The man complained bitterly to him about the clause in the letters relating to himself, and expostulated with him about every particular: 'Why he, who had been so trusty to him during the whole course of his negotiations with the king, should now be so highly honored, as to be murdered on an equal rank with the meanest of his tools?' Pausanias confessed the truth of all that he alleged; begged him 'not to be exasperated with what at present appeared;' assured him 'he should not be hurt if he would leave his sanctuary;' and earnestly intreated him, 'with all possible speed to go the journey, and not to obstruct the schemes that were then in agitation.' The ephori, having exactly heard him, withdrew. And now, beyond a scruple convinced, they determined to apprehend him in the city. But it is reported, that at the instant fixed for his arrest, as he was walking along, and beheld the countenance of one of the ephori approaching towards him, he immediately discovered his business; and another of them out of kindness intimating the matter by a nod, he took to his heels, and fled away faster than they could pursue him. The Chalcioecan happened to be near, and into a little house within the verge of that temple he betook himself, and sat quietly down to avoid the inclemency of the outward air. They, who had lost the start, came too late in the pursuit. But afterwards they stripped the house of its roof and doors; and, watching their opportunity *when he was within*, they encompassed

him round about,<sup>1</sup> immured him within, and placing a constant guard around, kept him beset that he might perish with hunger. When he was ready to expire, and they found in how bad a state he lay within the house, they let him out of the verge yet breathing a little; and, being thus brought out, he immediately died. They next intended to cast his body into the Cæada, where they are used to throw their malefactors; but afterwards changed their minds, and put it into the ground somewhere thereabouts. But the god at Delphi warned the Lacedæmonians afterwards by an oracle 'to remove his body to the place where he died:'—and now it lies in the area before the temple, as the inscription on the pillars shows: 'and, as in what they had done they had violated the laws of sanctuary, to restore two bodies to the Chalciæcan for that one.' To this they so far conformed, as to dedicate there two statues of brass, as atonement for Pausanias.

(The Athenians, on the principle that the god himself had judged this a pollution, required of the Lacedæmonians, by way of retaliation, to clear themselves of it.)

The Lacedæmonians at that time sent ambassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles also of carrying on the same treasonable correspondence with the Medæ as Pausanias, which they had discovered from the papers which had been evidence against Pausanias, and demanded that 'he should be equally punished for it.' The Athenians complied with this demand. But as he then happened to be under the ostracism,<sup>2</sup> and residing

<sup>1</sup> Alcithæa, the mother of Pausanias, is said to have brought the first stone on this occasion: such was the spirit of the ladies at Lacedæmon.

<sup>2</sup> The ostracism was a compliment of an extraordinary kind

chiefly at Argos, though he frequently visited other parts of Peloponnesus, they sent a party along with the Lacedæmonians, who readily joined in his pursuit, with orders to seize him wherever they could find him. Themistocles, advised in time, fled out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra, to which people he had done a signal kindness.<sup>1</sup> The Corcyreans expressing their fear of giving him refuge, lest it might expose them to the resentment both of Lacedæmonians and Athenians, he was conveyed away by them to the opposite continent. Now, pursued by those who were appointed to do it, and who had by inquiry discovered his route, he was compelled by mere distress to turn in to Admetus,

paid by the people of Athens to superior merit. When a person had done them great services, and they grew apprehensive they might possibly show him too much gratitude, to the prejudice of their own liberties, they banished him for ten years. On some particular day each citizen gave in the name of a person, written on an *ostracum*, a shell, or piece of tile, whom he desired should be sent into retirement. Six thousand of these votes carried the point; and he, who had thus a legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens within ten days. The most disinterested patriot, and most successful commander received, for the most part, this public acknowledgement of their services. At length, a scoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolus, was thus honorably distinguished by the public voice. The Athenians thought afterwards they had profaned the ostracism by treating him like a Themistocles, an Aristides, or a Cimon, and therefore abolished this strange injurious privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to triumph over its best friend—public spirit. Other republics in Greece had something of the same nature amongst them. Authors vary much about the circumstances of the ostracism; I have mentioned those points only which are universally agreed.

<sup>1</sup> At the time of the Persian invasion the Corcyreans had refused to join the common cause of Greece. The Grecians herefore had afterwards a design to fall on and destroy them. But Themistocles interposed, and saved them by remonstrating that by such proceedings Greece would be plunged into greater calamities than it would have suffered under the despotic power of Xerxes.

king of the Molossians,<sup>1</sup> who was by no means his friend. It happened that Admetus was not at home; and Themistocles the suppliant addressing himself to the wife, was by her directed to take their child in his hand, and sit himself down on the hearth. Admetus returning soon after, he told them who he was, and conjured him—‘though he had formerly opposed him in a suit he had preferred to the people of Athens, not to take revenge on an exile. To make him suffer now, would be taking those advantages over a man in distress which he ought to disdain: the point of honor consisted in equals revenging themselves on equal terms: he had, it is true, stood in opposition to him, but merely in a point of interest, and not where life was at stake. But if he now gave him up,’ telling him by whom, and why he was persecuted, ‘he deprived him of the only resource he had left to preserve his life.’ Admetus, having heard him, bids him rise, together with the child, whom he held as he sat down; for this was the most pathetic form of supplication. And when, not long after, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians arrived, and pressed him earnestly to do it, he refused to give him up, and sent him under a guard, as he had declared his intention to go to the king, to the other sea, by a journey over land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to Alexander. He here met with a trading vessel bound to Ionia; and going on board, was driven by a storm into the Athenian fleet, which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his danger, he discovered himself to the master (for not one person on board suspected who he was), and told him the occasion of his flight; and, unless he would undertake his preservation, threatened ‘to inform against him, as one

<sup>1</sup> Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Themistocles.

who had been bribed to farther his escape : preserved he still might be, provided no person was suffered, during the voyage, to stir out of the vessel. If he would comply, the favor should be acknowledged with effectual gratitude.' The master of the vessel promised his service, and keeping out at sea a day and a night to windward of the fleet, he afterwards landed him at Ephesus. Themistocles, to recompense his care, made him a handsome present in money ; for there he received those sums which he had ordered secretly to be conveyed thither from his friends at Athens, and from Argos ; and, travelling upwards from thence, in company with a Persian of the maritime provinces, he got a letter to be delivered to king Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, who had lately mounted the throne, the purport of which was this :

' I Themistocles am coming to you, who of all the Grecians have done the greatest mischiefs to your family, so long as I was obliged by necessity to resist the invasion of your father. Yet the good services I did him were much more numerous, when my own preservation was secured, and his retreat became full of hazards. My former generosity calls for a requital ;' (here he inserted the message he had sent to Xerxes about the retreat from Salamis ; and, that out of regard to him, he had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, which was mere fiction ;) ' and now, able to perform great services for you, I am near at hand, having been persecuted by the Grecians for my friendship to you. I beg only a year's respite, that I may notify to you in person those points which are the subject of my journey hither.'

The king, it is said, was surprised at the spirit<sup>1</sup> of

<sup>1</sup> The boldness and intrepidity of Themistocles has been



the man, and ordered him to act as he desired. The time of respite he had thus obtained he spent in making all possible progress in the Persian language, and in learning the manners of the country. When the year was elapsed, appearing at court, he became a favorite with the king, a greater than any Greek had ever been before, as well on account of the former lustre of his life, as the hope he suggested to him of enslaving Greece; but above all, by the specimens he gave of his fine understanding: for, in Themistocles the strength of nature was most vigorously shown; and by it he was so highly distinguished above the bulk of mankind, as to deserve the greatest admira-

the subject of admiration, in throwing himself on the protection of the Persian monarch, who had fixed a price on his head. And yet he was so high in his esteem, that the night after first giving him audience, he cried aloud thrice in his sleep, 'I have got Themistocles the Athenian.' He afterwards acknowledged himself 200 talents (near 40,000*l.* sterling) in his debt: 'For so much I promised the man that brought you to me.' Themistocles soon gave him a specimen of his fine understanding. He was desired by the king to speak his mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: he answered by his interpreter, that 'discourse, like a Persian carpet, had in it a variety of figures, which never appeared to advantage unless it was quite unfolded, but were not to be apprehended when wrapped up in the piece.' By this ingenious plea he obtained a year's respite to learn the Persian language, that he might be enabled to deliver explicitly his own sentiments to the king in his own words and method. He became afterwards so great a favorite, that the most engaging promise in future times, that the Persian monarch could make to a Greek whom he had a mind to inveigle into his service, was, 'that he should live with him as Themistocles did with Artaxerxes.' And yet no attachment to his royal friend ever made him an enemy to his country; nor did his disinterested patriotism, of which never man had more, ever render him ungrateful to his benefactor. Through his bounty, he lived the remainder of his life in pomp and affluence, and was used to say humorously to his children, 'We had been undone, my children, if we *had not been undone.*'

tion. By the mere force of his natural genius, without any improvement from study, either in his youth or more advanced age, he could give the best advice on sudden emergencies with the least hesitation, and was happy in his conjectures about the events of the future. Whatever he undertook, he was able to accomplish; and wherein he was quite inexperienced, he had so prompt a discernment that he never was mistaken. In a matter of ambiguity, he foresaw with extraordinary acuteness the better and the worse side of the question. On the whole, by the force of natural genius, he was most quick at all expedients, and at the same time excellent, beyond competition, at declaring instantly the most advisable measures of acting on every occurrence. But, being seized with a fit of sickness, his life was at an end. Some indeed report, that he put an end to his own life by taking poison, when he judged it impossible to perform what he had promised the king. His monument however is at Magnesia in Asia, in the forum. Of this province he was governor through the bounty of the king, who assigned him Magnesia, which yielded him fifty talents<sup>1</sup> yearly, for his bread, Lampsacus for his wine, which place was in the greatest repute for wine, and Myus for his meat. His bones are said to have been conveyed home by his relations, in pursuance of his own desire, and to have been interred in Attica, without the privity of the Athenians: for it was against law to bury him there, as he had been outlawed for treason.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 9,687*l.* 10*s.* sterling.

<sup>2</sup> Some authors have related that his countrymen afterwards honored him with a cenotaph in the Piræus. Plutarch, however, disbelieves the fact, and thinks it merely a presumption.

Such an end had the lives of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian and Themistocles the Athenian, who in their own age made the greatest figure of any Grecians.

The Lacedæmonians, by their first embassy, had enjoined, what was as amply in turn required of them, to do as has been above recited, concerning the expulsion of the sacrilegious. But, coming a second time to the Athenians, they commanded them 'to quit the blockade of Potidæa;' and 'to permit Ægina to govern itself at its own discretion;' and, above all other points, insist on this, declaring most expressly that in this case war should not be made—'If they would revoke their decree concerning the Megareans, in which they had been prohibited from entering any harbor whatever in the dominion of Athens, and from the Attic markets.'

tion formed on the following verses of Plato the comic poet:

To thee, Themistocles, a tomb is due,  
Placed in the most conspicuous point of view;  
Merchants from every port with just acclaim  
Should shout thy honor, and confess thy fame;  
Each fleet return'd, or setting out, should join  
In owning all the naval glory thine;  
It should command, high raised, yon wat'ry plain,  
And point that fight which gave us all the main.

I cannot end this note about Themistocles without begging the reader to accept a translation of an epigram in the *Anthologia*, which appears to have been written with a spirit worthy of this illustrious Athenian:

Be Greece the monument; and crown the height  
With all the trophies of the naval fight.  
Let Persia's Mars and Xerxes swell the base;  
Such forms alone Themistocles can grace.  
Next, like a column of majestic size,  
His acts inscribed, let Salamis arise.  
Swell every part, and give the hero room,  
For nothing small should scandalise the tomb.

But the Athenians listened to none of these demands, nor would revoke the decree; but reproached the Megareans for tilling land that was sacred, land not marked out for culture, and for giving shelter to runaway slaves.

At last, the final ambassadors arrived from Lacedæmon, namely, Ramphias, and Melesippus, and Agemander, who waving all other points which they had formerly required, said thus: 'The Lacedæmonians are desirous of peace, and peace there may be, if you will permit the Grecians to govern themselves at their own discretion.'

The Athenians summoned an assembly, where every one was invited to deliver his opinion. They determined, after deliberate consultation on all the points in contest, to return one definitive answer. Several others spoke on this occasion, and were divided in their sentiments; some insisting on the necessity of a war; others, that peace should not be obstructed by that decree, which ought to be repealed. At length, Pericles the son of Xantippus standing forth, who was at that time the leading man at Athens, and a person of the greatest abilities, both for action and debate, advised them thus:

'I firmly persevere, Athenians, in the same opinion that I have ever avowed, to make no concessions to the Lacedæmonians; though at the same time sensible, that men never execute a war with that warmth of spirit through which they are first impelled to undertake it, but sink in their ardor as difficulties increase. I perceive it, however, incumbent on me to persist in the same uniform advice: and I require those amongst you who are influenced by it, as they concur in the measures, either to unite their efforts for redress if any sinister event should follow; or else, on a series

of success, to make no parade of their own discernment. It is usual enough for accidents unforeseen to baffle the best concerted schemes ; since human intentions are by nature fallible : and hence it comes to pass, that whatever falls out contrary to our expectations, we are accustomed to throw all the blame on fortune.

‘The treacherous designs of the Latædæmonians, formerly, against us, were visible to all ; nor are they, this very moment, less clear than ever : for, notwithstanding that express stipulation that, on controversies between us, we should reciprocally do and submit to justice, each party remaining in their present possessions ; yet they have never demanded justice, nor accept the offer of it from us. Their allegations against us they are determined to support by arms and not by evidence : and here they come no longer to remonstrate, but actually to give us law. They command us, to quit the blockade of Potidæa, to permit Ægina to govern itself by its own model, and to repeal the decree against the Megareans : nay, this their last and peremptory embassy authoritatively enjoins us ; to restore the Grecians to their former independence. But, let not one of you imagine that we excite a war for a trifling concern, if we refuse to repeal that decree against the Megareans ; the stress they lay on it, that, if it be repealed, a war shall not ensue, is nothing but a color : nor think there will be any ground for self-accusation, though for so trifling a concern you have recourse to arms ; since that concern, trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof and demonstration of Athenian spirit. If, for instance, you condescend to this demand, you will immediately be enjoined some other condescension of greater consequence, as if this your compliance was owing to the

prevalence of your fear; but, if at once you strenuously refuse to hearken to them, you will convince them in a manner clearly to be understood that they must treat with you for the future as with men who are their equals.

‘From the present crisis I exhort you, therefore, to form a resolution, either timely to make your submission before you begin to suffer, or, if we shall determine for war, which to me seems most expedient, without regarding the pretext of it, be it important or be it trifling, to refuse every the least concession, nor to render the tenure of what we now possess precarious and uncertain: for not only the greatest, but the most inconsiderable demand, if authoritatively enjoined by equals on their neighbors, before justice has decided the point, has the very same tendency to make them slaves. But, from the posture in which the affairs of both parties are at present, that we may risk a war with a prospect of success as fine and as inviting as our rivals can, suffer me distinctly to set the reasons before you, and be convinced of their weight:—

‘The Peloponnesians are a people who subsist by their bodily labor, without wealth either in the purses of individuals or in any public fund. Again, in wars of long continuance, or wars by sea, they are quite unpractised, since the hostilities in which they have been embroiled with one another have been short and transient, in consequence of their poverty. Such people can neither completely man out a fleet, nor frequently march land-armies abroad, abandoning the care of their domestic concerns, even whilst from these they must answer a large expense; and more than this, are excluded the benefit of the sea. Funds of money are a much surer support of war than contributions exacted by force: and men who subsist by the labor

---

of their hands are more ready to advance a service with their bodies than with their money; since the former, though exposed, they strongly presume will survive the danger; but the latter, they apprehend must be too speedily exhausted, especially if the war run out into a greater length than they expect, which will probably be the case. In a single battle, it is true, the Peloponnesians and their confederates are able to make head against united Greece; but they are not able to support a war of continuance against an enemy in all respects provided better than themselves; since by one general council they are not guided, but execute their momentary schemes in sudden and hasty efforts; since, farther, having all of them an equality of suffrage, and being of different descents, each of them is intent on the advancement of a separate interest. In such circumstances no grand design can ever be accomplished. Some of them are eager to obtain a speedy vengeance on a foe; others are chiefly intent on preserving their substance from unnecessary waste. It is long before they can meet together to consult; and then, with great precipitancy, they form their public determinations, as the largest part of their time is devoted to domestic concerns. Each thinks it impossible that the public welfare can be prejudiced by his own particular negligence, but that others are intent on watching for himself to share the benefit; and, whilst this error universally prevails amongst all the several members, the general welfare insensibly drops to ruin. But the greatest obstruction to them will be a scarcity of money; which, as they can but slowly raise, their steps must needs be dilatory; and the urgent occasions of war can never tarry.

*'As for any forts they can erect within our terri-*

their application to a navy, it is beneath us to apprehensions from thence. To effectuate war would be difficult for a people of equal strength, in a season of tranquillity: much more so when we are on the lands of an open enemy, and when we are empowered to put the same expedients in execution against them. And, if they should fix a garri-son in Attica, they might by excursions or desertions annoy some part of our territory; but what works they can raise will be insufficient to block up the coast to prevent our descents on their coasts, and to retaliate reprisals on them by our fleets, wherein we are superior: for we are better qualified for land service than they, from the experience we have gained in that of the land, and they for service at sea by their experience at sea. To learn the naval skill they will find to be by no means an easy task: for even you, who have been so long at sea, have not attained to a mastery in the science. When shall men brought up to tillage and stranger employments, whose practice farther will be ever improved by us, through the continual annoyance of our larger number of shipping will give them, any point of eclat? Against small squadrons we might indeed be sometimes adventurous, emboldened by their want of skill by multiplying their numbers, but when awed by superior force, they will of necessity desist; and so by practice interrupted the improvement of their skill will be checked, and in consequence of it their fears be increased. The naval, like the land sciences, is the effect of art. It cannot be acquired by accident, nor usefully exercised at starts; and, therefore, there is nothing which so much requires interrupted application. Farther, they should secrete the funds laid up at



Olympia and Delphi, and endeavor, by an in pay, to seduce from our service the foreigners on board our fleets; in case we were not the in strength, and they themselves and such f could intirely apply themselves to the work; might be terrible indeed. But nought would them now, whilst, what is our peculiar advan have commanders Athenian born, and seame our fleets, in larger number, and of greater all the rest of Greece together. Besides, in gerous a crisis, not one of these foreigners think of bartering an exile from his own se and a desertion to that side where the prospe tory is not near so inviting, for an enlargeme pay of few days' continuance.

'The state of the Peloponnesians I jud such, or very nearly such as I have desc whereas our own is exempt from those defe I have pointed out in them, and enjoys ot advantages far beyond their competition. G they may invade our territories by land: we make descents on theirs: and, whether is t est damage—only some part of Peloponnes Attica put to fire and sword—will admit of n rison. In the former case they will have land to repair the damage but what they mus dint of arms; whilst we have large tracts s our power, both in the islands, and on the n vast consequence indeed is the dominion of But, consider it with attention: for, were we an island, which of us would be subdued wit difficulty? And now you ought to think that sent situation is as nearly as possible the sa so, to evacuate your lands and houses here, t your defence to the sea, and to Athens itself;

exasperated against the Peloponnesians for the sake of those, to hazard a battle against superior numbers. Should we be thus victorious, we must fight it over again with another body not inferior; and should we be vanquished, at that instant we lose all our dependents, the very essence of our strength: for the moment we cease to be able to awe them by our forces they will be no longer obedient to our commands. We ought not to wail and lament for the loss of our houses and our lands, but for the lives of our people; because lands and houses can never acquire men, but are by men acquired.

‘Durst I presume on a power to persuade, I would exhort you to march out yourselves, with your own hands to execute the waste, and let the Peloponnesians see that for things of such value you will never think of compliance. I have many other inducements to hope for victory, if, intending this war alone, you will forbear the ambition of enlarging your dominions, and not plunge into voluntary superfluous hazards: for, in truth, I am more afraid of our own indiscretions than the schemes of the enemy. But the explanation of what at present I only hint at shall be reserved till due occasions offer in the course of action. Let us now dismiss the ambassadors with the following answer:

‘That we will open our markets and harbors to the Megareans, provided the Lacedæmonians, in their prohibition of foreigners, except us and our confederates: for neither was that act in us, nor will this act in them be contrary to treaty.

‘That we will suffer the states to govern themselves at their own discretion, if they were possessed of that right when the treaty was made, and so soon as ever they relax the necessity they lay on the states in their

own league of governing themselves by that model, which suits best the Lacedæmonian interest, and allow them the choice of their own polity.

‘That, farther, we are willing to submit to a judicial determination, according to treaty.

‘That a war shall not begin, but will retaliate on those that do.

‘Such an answer is agreeable to justice, and becomes the dignity of the Athenian state. But you ought to be informed, that a war unavoidably there will be; that the greater alacrity we show for it, the more shall we damp the spirits of our enemies in their attacks; and, that the greatest dangers are ever the resource of the greatest honors to communities as well as individuals. It was thus that our fathers withstood the Medes, and rushing to arms with resources far inferior to ours; nay, abandoning all their substance, by resolution more than fortune, by courage more than real strength, beat back the barbarian, and advanced this state to its present summit of grandeur. From them we ought not to degenerate, but by every effort within our ability avenge it on our foes, and deliver it down to posterity, unblemished and unimpaired.’

In this manner Pericles spoke; and the Athenians, judging that what he advised was most for their interest, decreed in conformity to his exhortation. They returned a particular answer to the Lacedæmonians, according to his directions; nay, in the very words of his motion; and, in fine, concluded, that ‘they would do nothing on command, but were ready to submit the points in contest to a judicial determination, according to treaty, on a fair and equal footing.’ On this, the ambassadors departed; and here all negotiations came to a conclusion.

Such were the pretexts and dissensions on both sides

previous to the war, and which took their first rise from the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. These however never interrupted their commercial dealings nor mutual intercourse, which still were carried on without the intervention of heralds, but not without suspicions: for such accidents manifestly tended to a rupture, and must infallibly end in war.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> As the Athenians were a free people, they made use of their liberty on all occasions to asperse, calumniate, and ridicule the great men amongst them. They were at this time exhibited on the stage by name; and Aristophanes, whose plays were acted during the Peloponnesian war, has ridiculed the contemporary statesmen and commanders with the utmost petulancy and virulence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to restrain this licentiousness of their comic poets; but it may not be amiss in the course of the notes to quote occasionally some passages from him, to show my countrymen how much writing libels differs from writing history; and that where liberty is abused, no public merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the malice of faction or the petulance of buffoons.

Our historian has laid open the true and pretended causes of the Peloponnesian war. Let us now see how affairs were represented on the stage of Athens. His comedy of the *Acharnians* was exhibited by Aristophanes at Athens in the sixth year of this war, after the death of Pericles. The decree against Megara is the groundwork of it: one *Dicaeopolis* of the borough of *Acharnæ* is the droll of the play, and amply ridicules it to a set of his neighbors:

'Do not be angry,' says he, 'if, though a beggar, I presume to talk to Athenians about affairs of state, and for once play the tragedian. It is the province of tragedy to give a just representation of things; and I am going to speak in a just manner of the very sad things indeed. Cleon will not be able to catch me this bout, for traducing my countrymen in the hearing of strangers. We are here by ourselves, and to-day is the festival of Bacchus. The strangers are not yet come, nor the tributes, nor the confederates from other states: we are here snug by ourselves, all of us true-blooded Athenians. Those odd creatures the sojourners I look on as the chaff of Athens. And now, to speak sincerely, I hate the Lacedæmonians from the bottom of my soul; and I heartily wish that Neptune, the god adored at Tænarus, would give them an earthquake, and tumble down all their houses on their heads. They have

made sad work with me ; all my vineyards are quite destroyed by the rogues. But, my dear friends and countrymen here present, why do we blame the Lacedæmonians for this ? And mind, sirs, I cast no aspersions on our own state ; I am at nobody employed in the affairs of the administration, but a parcel of sad rascals, scurvy, low, infamous scoundrels, who are eternally bringing information against a Megarean pair of paniers. If they once set eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a sucking-pig, a sprig of parsley, or a grain of salt, they swear at once they belong to Megareans, and were sold that very day. These things, however, though the general practice are of small signification. A parcel of bacchanals, deep in their cups, had stolen from Megara Simætha. The Megareans, exasperated at their loss, made reprisals by carrying off two women belonging to Aspasia. And thus this cursed war, which plagues all Greece, took its rise from these circumstances. Ay, on account of three women Olympian Pericles began to storm ; he lightened, he thundered, roused all Greece to arms ; he made new laws as fast as so many ballads, that the poor dogs of Megara must be found neither in the fields, nor the markets, nor by sea, nor by land. On this, being just ready to starve, away they go to Lacedæmon to get the decree reversed which had been made on account of three women. It would not do ; embassy after embassy had no avail, and then immediately rose all this clattering of shields.'

Calumny has a dart always left in her quiver, and in another comedy of Aristophanes we find another let fly at Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice with Phidias in secreting some of the gold issued from the public treasury for the statue of Minerva in the citadel, the workmanship of the celebrated artist. In this comedy, called *The Peace*, Mercury says : ' Ye wise husbands, attend to my words, if ye have a mind to know how things came into this sad confusion Phidias was the first cause of it by cheating the public. The Pericles helped it forwards, for fear he should share the fate of Phidias. He stood in awe of your tempers ; he was afraid of falling under your censure ; so, to prevent his own personal danger, he set the whole community in a flame, by lighting up first that little spark of the decree against Megara. He then blew up that spark into this mighty war, the smoke of which hath fetched tears from all the eyes of Greece, from Grecians on both sides.'

Pericles had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. The fine taste of the patron, and fine execution of the artist, have been universally acknowledged. An accusation, however, was preferred against Phidias, by one of his workmen, that he had secreted some gold. By the advice of Pericles he has

so artfully that it might be taken off without pre-  
the statue. The trial accordingly was made, and the  
ad to answer weight. It seems, however, that Phi-  
banished; because, as the enemies of Pericles at-  
im at the same time, for impiety in the persons of his  
Aspasia and his preceptor in philosophy, Anaxago-  
for a cheat in that of his favorite artist, he had only  
enough to save the former, by pleading earnestly for  
softening his plea with abundant tears.

Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a third  
Pericles in relation to this war. It is this: Alcibia-  
a youth, saw him in a very pensive and melancholy  
nd demanded the reason of it. Pericles told him  
ams of public money had passed through his hands,  
knew not how to make up his accounts.'—'Contrive  
plied Alcibiades, 'to give no account at all.' And in  
se of this advice he is said to have involved the state  
eloponnesian war. But is not Thucydides more to be  
d on than a whole host of writers of scandal, me-  
rivate history, and satire? If we listen to the latter,  
ver was and never will be any truth in history; there  
as, nor is there this moment any true worth or merit  
world. A buffoon can degrade a hero, a spiteful sa-  
oud every good quality in others, and the ears and  
f men will be filled with nothing but detraction and

of success, to make no parade of their own discernment. It is usual enough for accidents unforeseen to baffle the best concerted schemes ; since human intentions are by nature fallible : and hence it comes to pass, that whatever falls out contrary to our expectations, we are accustomed to throw all the blame on fortune.

‘The treacherous designs of the Lacedæmonians, formerly, against us, were visible to all ; nor are they, this very moment, less clear than ever : for, notwithstanding that express stipulation that, on controversies between us, we should reciprocally do and submit to justice, each party remaining in their present possessions ; yet they have never demanded justice, nor accept the offer of it from us. Their allegations against us they are determined to support by arms and not by evidence : and here they come no longer to remonstrate, but actually to give us law. They command us, to quit the blockade of Potidæa, to permit Ægina to govern itself by its own model, and to repeal the decree against the Megareans : nay, this their last and peremptory embassy authoritatively enjoins us ; to restore the Grecians to their former independence. But, let not one of you imagine that we excite a war for a trifling concern, if we refuse to repeal that decree against the Megareans ; the stress they lay on it, that, if it be repealed, a war shall not ensue, is nothing but a color : nor think there will be any ground for self-accusation, though for so trifling a concern you have recourse to arms ; since that concern, trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof and demonstration of Athenian spirit. If, for instance, you condescend to this demand, you will immediately be enjoined some other condescension of greater consequence, as if this your compliance was owing to the

revalence of your fear; but, if at once you strenuously refuse to hearken to them, you will convince them in a manner clearly to be understood that they must treat with you for the future as with men who are their equals.

‘From the present crisis I exhort you, therefore, to form a resolution, either timely to make your submission before you begin to suffer, or, if we shall determine for war, which to me seems most expedient, without regarding the pretext of it, be it important or it trifling, to refuse every the least concession, nor render the tenure of what we now possess precarious and uncertain: for not only the greatest, but the most inconsiderable demand, if authoritatively enjoined on equals on their neighbors, before justice has decided the point, has the very same tendency to make them slaves. But, from the posture in which the affairs of both parties are at present, that we may risk a war with a prospect of success as fine and as inviting to our rivals can, suffer me distinctly to set the reasons before you, and be convinced of their weight:—

‘The Peloponnesians are a people who subsist by their bodily labor, without wealth either in the purses of individuals or in any public fund. Again, in wars of long continuance, or wars by sea, they are quite unpractised, since the hostilities in which they have been embroiled with one another have been short and transient, in consequence of their poverty. Such people can neither completely man out a fleet, nor frequently march land-armies abroad, abandoning the care of their domestic concerns, even whilst from these they must answer a large expense; and more than this, are excluded the benefit of the sea. Funds of money are a much surer support of war than contributions exacted by force: and men who subsist by the labor



were already got in and had surprised the town, being in great consternation, and thinking the enemy more numerous than they really were, for the night prevented a view of them, came soon to a composition; and, accepting what terms they offered, made no resistance, especially as they found that violence was offered to no man. Yet, by means of the parley, they had discovered that the Thebans were few in number; and judged, should they venture an attack, they might easily overpower them: for the bulk of the Plataeans had not the least inclination to revolt from the Athenians. It was at length concluded, that this point should be attempted, after having conferred together, by digging through the partition walls of one another's houses, to avoid the suspicion which going through the streets might have occasioned. Then along the streets they ranged carriages without the oxen, to serve them instead of a rampart, and made a proper disposition for every thing necessary for immediate execution. When they had got every thing ready in the best manner they were able, watching till night began to vanish and the first dawn appear, they marched from their houses towards the Thebans, that they might fall on them before the full light should embolden their resistance, and give them equal advantages in the fight, and that they might be more intimidated by being charged in the dark, and sensible of disadvantage from their ignorance of the city. The attack was immediately begun, and both sides soon came to action. The Thebans, when they found themselves thus circumvented, threw themselves into an oval, and wherever assaulted, prevented impression. Twice or thrice they beat them back with success: but when the assaults were again with a loud noise repeated; when the very women and menial servants were shouting and

---

streaming from the houses all around, and throwing stones and tiles amongst them ; incommoded farther by the rain, which had fallen plentifully that night, they were seized with fear, and abandoning their defence, fled in confusion about the city. The greatest part of them running in the dark and the dirt, knew not any of the passages by which they could get out ; for this affair happened on the change of the moon ; and were pursued by men who, knowing them all, prevented their escape, so that many of them perished. The gates by which they had entered, and which only had been opened, one of the Platæans had barred fast by thrusting the point of a spear into the staple instead of a bolt, so that they could not possibly get out there. Thus pursued about the city, some of them got on the walls, and threw themselves over ; but most of these were killed by the fall : some of them found a gate unguarded, and a woman supplying them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in pieces unperceived ; though few only escaped by these means, for they were soon discovered. Others were separately slain in the different quarters of the city. But the greatest part, and chiefly those who had kept in a body, threw themselves into a great house contiguous to the walls, the doors of which happened to be open, imagining the doors of this house to be the city gates, and a certain passage to a place of safety. When the Platæans saw them thus shut up, they consulted together, whether they should fire the house, and burn them all in their inclosure, or reserve them for some other punishment. But at last these and all the other Thebans yet surviving, who were scattered about the city, agreed to give up their arms, and surrender themselves to the Platæans prisoners at discretion. Such was the issue of this attempt on Platæa.

The other Thebans, who ought during night to have come up with all their strength, to reinforce the first body in case they miscarried, and were still on the march, when the news of this defeat met them, advanced with all possible expedition. Plataea is distant from Thebes about seventy stadia,<sup>1</sup> and the rain which fell that night had retarded their march; for the river Asopus was so much swelled by it that it was not easily fordable. It was owing to the march in such a heavy rain and the difficulty of passing this river, that they came not up till their men were either slain or made prisoners. When the Thebans were convinced of that event, they cast their attention towards the Plataeans, who were still without: for the people of Plataea were scattered about the adjacent country with their implements of husbandry, because annoyance in time of peace was quite unexpected. They were desirous to catch some of these as exchange for their own people within the city, if any were yet living and prisoners there. On this they were fully bent; but in the midst of their project the Plataeans, who suspected the probability of some such design, and were anxious for their people yet without, despatched a herald to the Thebans, representing to them 'the injustice of the attempt already made; since treaties subsisting, they had endeavored to surprise the city;' and then warned them 'to desist from any violence to those without. If not, they positively declared they would put all the prisoners yet alive to the sword; whereas, in case they retired peaceably out of their territory, they would deliver them up unhurt.' This account the Thebans give, and say farther it was sworn to. The Plataeans disown the promise of an immediate discharge of the

<sup>1</sup> About seven English miles.

ers, which was reserved for terms to be agreed a subsequent treaty, and flatly deny that they . . . The Thebans however retired out of their territory, without committing any violence. But the means, when they had with expedition fetched into city all their effects of value that were out in the . . . , immediately put all their prisoners to the sword. . . number of those that were taken was one hundred . . . eighty. Eurymachus was amongst them, with . . . from the traitors had concerted the surprise. And . . . as done, they despatched a messenger to Athens, . . . and restored to the Thebans their dead under truce : . . . and then they regulated the affairs of the city in the manner most suitable to their present situation.

The news of the surprisal of Plataea had soon reached the Athenians, who immediately apprehended all the Boeotians then in Attica, and despatched a herald to Plataea, with orders 'to proceed no farther against the Theban prisoners till they should send their determination about them ; for they were not yet informed of their having been actually put to death. The first messenger had been sent away immediately on the irruption of the Thebans ; the second so soon as they were defeated and made prisoners : as to what happened afterwards, they were utterly in the dark. Thus ignorant of what had since been done, the Athenians despatched away their herald, who on his arrival found them all destroyed. Yet after this, the Athenians, marching a body of troops to Plataea, carried thither all necessary provisions ; left a garrison in the place ; and brought away all the hands that would be useless in a siege, with the women and children.

After this business of Plataea, and so manifest a breach of peace, the Athenians made all necessary preparations for immediate war. The Lacedæmonians

also, and their confederates, took the same measures. Nay, both sides were intent on despatching<sup>1</sup> embassies to the king,<sup>2</sup> and to several other barbarian powers wherever they had hope of forming some effectual interest for themselves; and spared no pains to win those states over to their alliance which had hitherto been independent. In the Lacedæmonian league, besides the ships already furnished out for them in Italy and Sicily, the confederates there were ordered to prepare a new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the several states, that the whole number of their shipping might amount to five hundred. They were, farther, to get a certain sum of money in readiness; but in other respects to remain quiet: and till their preparations could be completed, never to admit more than one Athenian vessel at a time within their ports. The Athenians made a careful survey of the strength of their own alliance, and sent pressing embassies to the places round about Peloponnesus, to Corcyra, to Cephalene, to the Acarnanians, and to Zacynthus; plainly seeing, that if these were in their interests, they might

<sup>1</sup> By this means the intestine quarrels of Greece were going to throw a power into the hands of the Persian monarch which he could not obtain by force. Each party could cringe to the common enemy, in order to obtain subsidies from him to enable them to distress each other. And thus the balance of power rested at last in his hands, and he became for a time supreme arbiter of Greece. Aristophanes, in his comedy of *The Acharnians*, has described these embassies and the Persian monarch too with excessive buffoonery, but quite too low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard on the Athenian ambassadors for lengthening out the time of their employ as much as possible for the lucre of the salary paid them by the state, which is there mentioned at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice or public rapine, this exorbitant salary of 15*d.* a day to an ambassador from the republic of Athens to the great king of Persia?

<sup>2</sup> *Artaxerxes Longimanus.*

attack Peloponnesus on all sides. The minds of the parties were not a little elated, but were eager and big with war: for it is natural to man, in the excitement of every important enterprise, to be unusually alert. The young men, who were so numerous in Peloponnesus, numerous also in Athens, were for want of experience quite fond of war: and all the rest of Greece stood attentively to gaze on this contention between the two rival states. Many oracles were tossed about; the poets sung abundance of predictions, amongst which some were on the point to break, and even in the states that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had been smitten with an earthquake, which it had never known before in the memory of the Greeks. It was indeed believed, that this was a prognostic thing extraordinary to happen; and all other signs of an uncommon nature whatever were sure to be ascribed to the same meaning.

The generality of Greece was indeed at this time more best affected to the Lacedæmonians, who put forward the specious pretence that 'they were going to recover the liberty of Greece.' Every one made it his private passion and his public care to give the Spartans all possible succor both in word and act; and every one thought that the business certainly flagged in those places where he himself was not present to the proceedings. So general an aversion was at this time formed against the Athenians, when they were passionately desirous to throw off their yoke, and others apprehensive of falling under their dominion. With such preparations and such dispositions, they run into the war.

States in league with either party, on the breaking-out of the war, were these:—in confederacy with

the Lacedæmonians were all Peloponnesians within the isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans; for these had treaties subsisting with both parties. But of the Achæans, the Pellenians singly were the first who went over, though they were afterwards joined by all the rest. Without Peloponnesus were the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians. Of these they were supplied with shipping by the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, Leucadians; with horse by the Bœotians, Phocians, Locrians; and the other states furnished them with foot. This was the confederacy of the Lacedæmonians. With the Athenians were the Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, the Messenians of Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, Zacynthians, and other states tributary to them in so many nations: namely, the maritime people of Caria, the Dorians<sup>1</sup> that border on the Carians, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities on the coast of Thrace, all the islands situated to the east between Peloponnesus and Crete, and all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of these, they were supplied with shipping by the Chians, Lesbians, Corcyreans; the rest supplied them with foot and with money. This was the alliance on both sides, and the ability for the war.

The Lacedæmonians, immediately after the attempt on Platæa, sent circular orders to the states both within and without Peloponnesus, to draw their quotas of aid together, and get every thing in readiness for a foreign expedition, as intending to invade Attica. When all was ready, they assembled on the day appointed, with

<sup>1</sup> These were the Dorians, who were seated in the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the scholiast.

ards of the force of every state, at the isthmus. the whole army was thus drawn together,<sup>1</sup> amus, king of the Lacedæmonians, who com- l in the expedition, convened the commanders ll the auxiliary states, with all those that were ority, and most fitting to be present, and ad- . them as follows:—

oponnesians and allies, many are the expedi- 1 which our fathers have been engaged both and without Peloponnesus. Even some of us, e more advanced in years, are by no means rienced in the business of war. Yet never be- l we take the field with a force so great as the : but, numerous and formidable in arms as we w appear, we are however marching against a powerful state. Thus is it incumbent on us to urselves not inferior in valor to our fathers, nor below the expectations of the world. The eyes Greece are fixed attentively on our motions. good-will to us, their hatred to the Athenians, hem wish for our success in all our under- . It is therefore our business, without placing at confidence in superior numbers, or trusting presumption that our enemies dare not come out us; for no reasons like these, to relax our dis- or break the regularity of our march; but, the order of every confederate body and every pri- dier ought to keep within himself the constant tion of being engaged in action. Uncertain turns of war; great events start up from a eginning, and assaults are given from indigna- ay, frequently an inferior number engaging ution has proved too hard for a more nume- arch informs us that the number amounted to sixty l men.



rous body, whom contempt of their enemy exposes to attacks for which they are not prepared. On hostile ground, it is always the duty of soldiers to be resolutely bold, and keep ready for action with proper circumspection. Thus will they be always ready to attack with spirit, and be most firmly secured against surprise.

‘We are not marching against a people who are unable to defend themselves, but excellently well qualified in every respect; so that we may certainly depend on their advancing against us to give us battle not yet perhaps in motion, so long as no enemy appears; but most assuredly so when once they see us in their territory wasting and destroying their substance. All men must kindle into wrath when common injuries are unexpectedly done them; when manifest outrage glares before them. Reflection they may indeed have lost its power, but resentment more strongly impels them to resistance. Something like this may more reasonably be looked for from the Athenians than from other people. They esteem themselves worthy to command others; and their spirit is more turned to make than to suffer depredations. Again so formidable a people are we now to march; and in the event, whatever it be, shall we acquire the greater glory or disgrace for our ancestors and ourselves. Let it therefore be the business of every man to follow his commander; observant in every point of discipline at the rules of war, and obeying with expedition the orders you receive. The finest spectacle and the strongest defence is the uniform observation of discipline in a numerous army.’

When Archidamus had finished his oration and dismissed the assembly, the first thing he did was send to Athens Melesippus a Spartan, the son of Diacritus

to try whether the Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, since they found an army on the march against them. But they would not allow him to come into the city, nor grant him a public audience: for the advice of Pericles had before this gained the general assent, that 'no herald or embassy should be received from the Lacedæmonians so long as they were in the field against them.' They sent him back therefore unheard; and ordered him 'to quit their territories that very day; that farther, the Lacedæmonians should retire within their own frontier; and then, if they had any thing to transact with them, should send their ambassadors for the purpose.' They even commissioned some person to guard Melesippus back, that he might have no conference with any person whatever. When he was brought to the borders, and received his dismissal, he parted from them with these words:—'This day is the beginning of great woes to the Grecians.' On his return to the camp, Archidamus was convinced that the Athenians were inflexible as ever; so that he immediately dislodged and advanced with his army into their territories. The Bœotians sent their quota of foot and their horse to join the Peloponnesians in this expedition, but with the rest of their forces they marched towards Platæa, and laid the country waste.

Whilst the Peloponnesians were yet assembling at the isthmus, or yet on the march, before they had entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others had been appointed to command the Athenian forces, when he saw an irruption from the Peloponnesians unavoidable, had conceived a suspicion that Archidamus, whom the hospitable<sup>1</sup> inter-

<sup>1</sup> The tie of hospitality was sacred and inviolable amongst  
THUC.

course had made his friend, from a principle of good nature willing to oblige him, would leave his lands untouched, or might be ordered to do so by the policy of the Lacedæmonians, as they had already demanded an excommunication on his account; by which means he must certainly incur the public jealousy. He declared therefore to the Athenians, in a general assembly of the people, that 'though Archidamus was his friend, he should not be so to the prejudice of the state; and that if the enemy spared his lands and houses in the general ravage, he made a free donation of them to the public: so that for any accident of that nature he ought not to fall under their censure.' He then exhorted all who were present, as he had done before, 'to prepare vigorously for war, and to withdraw all their effects from out of the country; by no means to march out against the enemy, but keep within the walls, and mind only the defence of the city: to fit out their navy, in which their strength principally consisted, and keep a tight rein over all their dependents. By the large tributes levied on those, he said, their power was chiefly to be supported; since success in war was a constant result from prudent measures

the ancients. It was a necessary exertion of humanity at first from the want of inns and lodging-houses, and was frequently improved into friendship and endearment. This between Pericles and Archidamus was merely of a private nature, between the royal family of Sparta and a principal one in the republic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public host of the Spartan state, and entertained their ambassadors and public ministers. The state of Athens had likewise in all places a public host who lodged their ministers. Yet amongst private persons it was a frank disinterested tie; when once they had eaten salt together, or sat at the same table, they regarded themselves as under mutual obligations, which small points ought not to abolish. They who swerved from this laudable custom through caprice or ingratitude were looked on as infamous, execrable persons.

entiful supplies.<sup>1</sup> He exhorted them by no means to let their spirits droop; since, besides their annual revenue, six hundred talents were annually sent them by their tributary states; and they had still in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coined.<sup>2</sup> Their primary fund was nine thousand seven hundred talents; out of which had been taken what defrayed the expense of refitting the gates of the citadel, of other public works, and the exigences of Potidæa: that, besides this, they had gold and silver uncoined, both in public and private repositories; many valuable vessels destined for religious uses and their public solemnities; and the Persian spoils, the whole value of which would not amount to less than five hundred talents.<sup>3</sup> He mentioned farther, 'the great wealth that was stored up in other temples, which they had a right to use; and if this right should be denied them, they might have recourse to the golden ornaments of the goddess herself.' He declared, 'that her image had about it to the weight of forty talents of gold without alloy; all which might be taken off from the statue: that, for the preservation of their country, it might lawfully be employed;' but added, 'that it ought afterwards to be amply replaced.' In this manner did he render them confident that their funds of money would suffice. He told them, farther, that

<sup>1</sup> The account here given shows Athens at this time to have been a very opulent state. Reduced to English money it stands thus: the tribute paid them annually amounted to 116,250*l.* sterling. The fund yet remaining in the citadel was 1,162,500*l.* sterling. They had expended lately on their public works 3,700 talents, which is equal to 716,875*l.* sterling. The weight of the gold on the statue of Minerva was forty talents, which, computing the talents only at 65*l.* troy, to avoid fractions, and the gold at 4*l.* sterling an ounce, amounts in value to 124,800*l.* sterling.

‘they had thirteen thousand men that wore heavy armor, exclusive of those that were in garrisons, and the sixteen thousand on the guard of the city;’ for so large a number, draughted from the youngest and oldest citizens and sojourners who wore the heavy armor, was employed in this service on the first invasion of their enemies: for the length of the Phalerian wall to the place where it joined the circle of the city was thirty-five stadia;<sup>1</sup> and that part of the circular wall which was guarded was forty-three in length;<sup>2</sup> but that which lay between the long wall and the Phalerian had no guard. The long walls continued down to the Piræus are forty stadia,<sup>3</sup> but the outermost of them only was guarded. The whole compass of the Piræus, including Munychia, is sixty stadia;<sup>4</sup> but then only one half of this had a guard.<sup>5</sup> He then assured them, that ‘they had, including the archers that were mounted, twelve hundred horsemen, sixteen hundred archers, and three hundred triremes fit for sea.’ So great in general, and no less in any one article were the military provisions of the Athenians, when the Peloponnesians had formed the design of invading them, and both sides began the war. These, and such like arguments, was Pericles continually employing, to convince them that they were well able to carry on a successful war.

The Athenians heard him with attention, and followed his advice. They withdrew from the country

<sup>1</sup> About three and a half English miles.

<sup>2</sup> Above four miles.

<sup>3</sup> About four English miles.

<sup>4</sup> About six English miles.

<sup>5</sup> The whole compass of the walls of Athens was 178 stadia, or above twenty-two Attic miles. But, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the Attic mile consisted of but 805 paces. Hence, the compass of Athens appears to have been about seventeen English miles.

children, their wives, all the furniture of their  
 there, pulling down with their own hands the  
 of which they were built. Their flocks and  
 laboring cattle they sent over into Eubœa and  
 adjacent islands. But this removal was a very  
 business to them, since it had been the an-  
 custom of many of the Athenians to reside at  
 in the country.

method of living had been more habitual to the  
 ians than to any other Greeks, from their first  
 encement as a people. From the time of Ce-  
 and their first series of kings down to Theseus,  
 had been inhabited in several distinct towns,  
 of which had its own archons<sup>1</sup> and its own pry-  
 n; and unless in times of danger, had seldom  
 rose to the regal authority, since justice was ad-  
 dressed in every separate borough, and each had a  
 il of its own. Sometimes they even warred  
 at one another; for instance, the Eleusinians,  
 they sided with Eumolpus against Erechtheus.  
 when the regal power devolved on Theseus, a  
 of an extensive understanding, and who knew  
 to govern, in several respects he improved the  
 territory; and besides, dissolving all the coun-  
 and magistracies of the petty boroughs,<sup>2</sup> he re-  
 d them to the metropolis, as it is at present, and  
 tuting one grand senate and prytaneum, made it  
 oint of union in which all concentrated. Their  
 e properties he left to them intire, but made

at is, magistrates of its own, and a common-hall, in  
 those magistrates performed the duties of their office  
 ministering justice, and offering sacrifices, and where  
 ad their diet at the public expense.  
 e number of the boroughs in Attica was one hundred  
 venty four.

also, and their confederates, took the same measures. Nay, both sides were intent on despatching<sup>1</sup> embassies to the king,<sup>2</sup> and to several other barbarian powers, wherever they had hope of forming some effectual interest for themselves; and spared no pains to win those states over to their alliance which had hitherto been independent. In the Lacedæmonian league, besides the ships already furnished out for them in Italy and Sicily, the confederates there were ordered to prepare a new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the several states, that the whole number of their shipping might amount to five hundred. They were, farther, to get a certain sum of money in readiness; but in other respects to remain quiet: and till their preparations could be completed, never to admit more than one Athenian vessel at a time within their ports. The Athenians made a careful survey of the strength of their own alliance, and sent pressing embassies to the places round about Peloponnesus, to Corcyra, to Cephallene, to the Acarnanians, and to Zacynthus; plainly seeing, that if these were in their interests, they might

<sup>1</sup> By this means the intestine quarrels of Greece were going to throw a power into the hands of the Persian monarch which he could not obtain by force. Each party could cringe to the common enemy, in order to obtain subsidies from him to enable them to distress each other. And thus the balance of power rested at last in his hands, and he became for a time supreme arbiter of Greece. Aristophanes, in his comedy of *The Acharnians*, has described these embassies and the Persian monarch too with excessive buffoonery, but quite too low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard on the Athenian ambassadors for lengthening out the time of their employ as much as possible for the lucre of the salary paid them by the state, which is there mentioned at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice or public rapine, this exorbitant salary of 15*½*d. a day to an ambassador from the republic of Athens to the great king of Persia?

<sup>2</sup> Artaxerxes Longimanus.

securely attack Peloponnesus on all sides. The minds of both parties were not a little elated, but were eager after and big with war: for it is natural to man, in the commencement of every important enterprise, to be more than usually alert. The young men, who were at this time numerous in Peloponnesus, numerous also at Athens, were for want of experience quite fond of the rupture: and all the rest of Greece stood attentively at gaze on this contention between the two principal states. Many oracles were tossed about; the soothsayers sung abundance of predictions, amongst those who were on the point to break, and even in the cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had been lately shook with an earthquake, which it had never been before in the memory of the Greeks. It was said, and indeed believed, that this was a prognostic of something extraordinary to happen; and all other accidents of an uncommon nature whatever were sure to be wrested to the same meaning.

The generality of Greece was indeed at this time much the best affected to the Lacedæmonians, who gave out the specious pretence that 'they were going to recover the liberty of Greece.' Every one made it both his private passion and his public care to give them all possible succor both in word and act; and every one thought that the business certainly flagged in those places where he himself was not present to invigorate proceedings. So general an aversion was there at this time formed against the Athenians, when some were passionately desirous to throw off their yoke, and others apprehensive of falling under their subjection. With such preparations and such dispositions did they run into the war.


The states in league with either party, on the breaking out of the war, were these:—in confederacy with



the Lacedæmonians were all Peloponnesians within the isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans; for these had treaties subsisting with both parties. But of the Achæans, the Pellenians singly were the first who went over, though they were afterwards joined by all the rest. Without Peloponnesus were the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians. Of these they were supplied with shipping by the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, Leucadians; with horse by the Bœotians, Phocians, Locrians; and the other states furnished them with foot. This was the confederacy of the Lacedæmonians. With the Athenians were the Chians, Lesbians, Plateans, the Messenians of Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, Zacynthians, and other states tributary to them in so many nations: namely, the maritime people of Caria, the Dorians<sup>1</sup> that border on the Carians, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities on the coast of Thrace, all the islands situated to the east between Peloponnesus and Crete, and all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of these, they were supplied with shipping by the Chians, Lesbians, Corcyreans; the rest supplied them with foot and with money. This was the alliance on both sides, and the ability for the war.

The Lacedæmonians, immediately after the attempt on Platea, sent circular orders to the states both within and without Peloponnesus, to draw their quotas of aid together, and get every thing in readiness for a foreign expedition, as intending to invade Attica. When all was ready, they assembled on the day appointed, with

<sup>1</sup> These were the Dorians, who were seated in the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the scholiast.



two-thirds of the force of every state, at the isthmus. When the whole army was thus drawn together,<sup>1</sup> Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, who commanded in the expedition, convened the commanders from all the auxiliary states, with all those that were in authority, and most fitting to be present, and addressed them as follows:—

‘Peloponnesians and allies, many are the expeditions in which our fathers have been engaged both within and without Peloponnesus. Even some of us, who are more advanced in years, are by no means unexperienced in the business of war. Yet never before did we take the field with a force so great as the present: but, numerous and formidable in arms as we may now appear, we are however marching against a most powerful state. Thus is it incumbent on us to show ourselves not inferior in valor to our fathers, nor to sink below the expectations of the world. The eyes of all Greece are fixed attentively on our motions. Their good-will to us, their hatred to the Athenians, make them wish for our success in all our undertakings. It is therefore our business, without placing too great confidence in superior numbers, or trusting to the presumption that our enemies dare not come out to fight us; for no reasons like these, to relax our discipline, or break the regularity of our march; but, the commander of every confederate body and every private soldier ought to keep within himself the constant expectation of being engaged in action. Uncertain are the turns of war; great events start up from a small beginning, and assaults are given from indignation: nay, frequently an inferior number engaging with caution has proved too hard for a more nume-

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch informs us that the number amounted to sixty thousand men.

rous body, whom contempt of their enemy exposes to attacks for which they are not prepared. On this ground, it is always the duty of soldiers to be : lutely bold, and keep ready for action with proper circumspection. Thus will they be always ready to attack with spirit, and be most firmly secured against surprise.

‘ We are not marching against a people who are unable to defend themselves, but excellently well equipped in every respect ; so that we may certainly depend on their advancing against us to give us battle not yet perhaps in motion, so long as no enemy appears ; but most assuredly so when once they are in their territory wasting and destroying their resources. All men must kindle into wrath when common injuries are unexpectedly done them ; manifest outrage glares before them. Reflection may indeed have lost its power, but resentment strongly impels them to resistance. Something like this may more reasonably be looked for from the Persians than from other people. They esteem themselves worthy to command others ; and their spirit is turned to make them than to suffer depredations. As so formidable a people are we now to march ; at the event, whatever it be, shall we acquire the glory or disgrace for our ancestors and ourselves ; it therefore be the business of every man to follow the commander ; observant in every point of discipline the rules of war, and obeying with expedition the orders you receive. The finest spectacle and the safest defence is the uniform observation of discipline in a numerous army.’

When Archidamus had finished his oration and dismissed the assembly, the first thing he did was to send to Athens Melesippus a Spartan, the son of Dia-

to try whether the Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, since they found an army on the march against them. But they would not allow him to come into the city, nor grant him a public audience: for the advice of Pericles had before this gained the general assent, that 'no herald or embassy should be received from the Lacedæmonians so long as they were in the field against them.' They sent him back therefore unheard; and ordered him 'to quit their territories that very day; that farther, the Lacedæmonians should retire within their own frontier; and then, if they had any thing to transact with them, should send their ambassadors for the purpose.' They even commissioned some person to guard Melesippus back, that he might have no conference with any person whatever. When he was brought to the borders, and received his dismissal, he parted from them with these words:— 'This day is the beginning of great woes to the Grecians.' On his return to the camp, Archidamus was convinced that the Athenians were inflexible as ever; so that he immediately dislodged and advanced with his army into their territories. The Bœotians sent their quota of foot and their horse to join the Peloponnesians in this expedition, but with the rest of their forces they marched towards Plateæa, and laid the country waste.

Whilst the Peloponnesians were yet assembling at the isthmus, or yet on the march, before they had entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others had been appointed to command the Athenian forces, when he saw an irruption from the Peloponnesians unavoidable, had conceived a suspicion that Archidamus, whom the hospitable<sup>1</sup> inter-

<sup>1</sup> The tie of hospitality was sacred and inviolable amongst  
THUC. VOL. I. K

course had made his friend, from a principle of good nature willing to oblige him, would leave his lands untouched, or might be ordered to do so by the policy of the Lacedæmonians, as they had already demanded an excommunication on his account; by which means he must certainly incur the public jealousy. He declared therefore to the Athenians, in a general assembly of the people, that 'though Archidamus was his friend, he should not be so to the prejudice of the state; and that if the enemy spared his lands and houses in the general ravage, he made a free donation of them to the public: so that for any accident of that nature he ought not to fall under their censure.' He then exhorted all who were present, as he had done before, 'to prepare vigorously for war, and to withdraw all their effects from out of the country; by no means to march out against the enemy, but keep within the walls, and mind only the defence of the city: to fit out their navy, in which their strength principally consisted, and keep a tight rein over all their dependents. By the large tributes levied on those, he said, their power was chiefly to be supported; since success in war was a constant result from prudent measures

the ancients. It was a necessary exertion of humanity at first from the want of inns and lodging-houses, and was frequently improved into friendship and endearment. This between Pericles and Archidamus was merely of a private nature, between the royal family of Sparta and a principal one in the republic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public host of the Spartan state, and entertained their ambassadors and public ministers. The state of Athens had likewise in all places a public host who lodged their ministers. Yet amongst private persons it was a frank disinterested tie; when once they had eaten salt together, or sat at the same table, they regarded themselves as under mutual obligations, which small points ought not to abolish. They who swerved from this laudable custom through caprice or ingratitude were looked on as infamous, execrable persons.

and plentiful supplies.<sup>1</sup> He exhorted them by no means to let their spirits droop; since, besides their certain revenue, six hundred talents were annually paid them by their tributary states; and they had still in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coined.' Their primary fund was nine thousand seven hundred talents; out of which had been taken what defrayed the expense of refitting the gates of the citadel, of other public works, and the exigences of Potidæa: 'That, besides this, they had gold and silver uncoined, both in public and private repositories; many valuable vases destined for religious uses and their public solemnities; and the Persian spoils, the whole value of which would not amount to less than five hundred talents.' He mentioned farther, 'the great wealth that was stored up in other temples, which they had a right to use; and if this right should be denied them, they might have recourse to the golden ornaments of the goddess herself.' He declared, 'that her image had about it to the weight of forty talents of gold without alloy; all which might be taken off from the statue: that, for the preservation of their country, it might lawfully be employed;' but added, 'that it ought afterwards to be amply replaced.' In this manner did he render them confident that their funds of money would suffice. He told them, farther, that

<sup>1</sup> The account here given shows Athens at this time to have been a very opulent state. Reduced to English money it stands thus: the tribute paid them annually amounted to 116,250*l.* sterling. The fund yet remaining in the citadel was 1,162,500*l.* sterling. They had expended lately on their public works 3,700 talents, which is equal to 716,875*l.* sterling. The weight of the gold on the statue of Minerva was forty talents, which, computing the talents only at 65*l.* troy, to avoid fractions, and the gold at 4*l.* sterling an ounce, amounts in value to 124,800*l.* sterling.

'they had thirteen thousand men that wore armor, exclusive of those that were in garrison the sixteen thousand on the guard of the city;' large a number, draughted from the youngest oldest citizens and sojourners who wore the armor, was employed in this service on the first sion of their enemies: for the length of the Ph wall to the place where it joined the circle of it was thirty-five stadia;<sup>1</sup> and that part of the ei wall which was guarded was forty-three in le but that which lay between the long wall and the lerian had no guard. The long walls continued to the Piræus are forty stadia,<sup>2</sup> but the outerw them only was guarded. The whole compass Piræus, including Munychia, is sixty stadia;<sup>4</sup> b only one half of this had a guard.<sup>5</sup> He then s them, that 'they had, including the archers th mounted, twelve hundred horsemen, sixteen h archers, and three hundred triremes fit for se great in general, and no less in any one artic the military provisions of the Athenians, w Peloponnesians had formed the design of i them, and both sides began the war. These, a like arguments, was Pericles continually emj to convince them that they were well able to c a successful war.

The Athenians heard him with attention, f lowed his advice. They withdrew from the

<sup>1</sup> About three and a half English miles.

<sup>2</sup> Above four miles.

<sup>3</sup> About four English miles.

<sup>4</sup> About six English miles.

<sup>5</sup> The whole compass of the walls of Athens was 1 or above twenty-two Attic miles. But, according t buthnot, the Attic mile consisted of but 805 paces. the compass of Athens appears to have been about English miles.

their children, their wives, all the furniture of their houses there, pulling down with their own hands the timber of which they were built. Their flocks and their laboring cattle they sent over into Eubœa and the adjacent islands. But this removal was a very grievous business to them, since it had been the ancient custom of many of the Athenians to reside at large in the country.

This method of living had been more habitual to the Athenians than to any other Greeks, from their first commencement as a people. From the time of Cecrops and their first series of kings down to Theseus, Attica had been inhabited in several distinct towns, each of which had its own archons<sup>1</sup> and its own prytaneum; and unless in times of danger, had seldom recourse to the regal authority, since justice was administered in every separate borough, and each had a council of its own. Sometimes they even warred against one another; for instance, the Eleusinians, when they sided with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. But when the regal power devolved on Theseus, a man of an extensive understanding, and who knew how to govern, in several respects he improved the whole territory; and besides, dissolving all the councils and magistracies of the petty boroughs,<sup>2</sup> he removed them to the metropolis, as it is at present, and constituting one grand senate and prytaneum, made it the point of union in which all centred. Their private properties he left to them intire, but made

<sup>1</sup> That is, magistrates of its own, and a common-hall, in which those magistrates performed the duties of their office in administering justice, and offering sacrifices, and where they had their diet at the public expense.

<sup>2</sup> The number of the boroughs in Attica was one hundred and seventy four.



them rest contented with Athens alone for their city; which, when all its subjects were now jointly contributing to its support, was quickly enlarged, and delivered so by Theseus to the succeeding kings. In memory of this, from the days of Theseus quite down to the present time, the Athenians have held an anniversary solemnity to the goddess, which they call *Synœcia* or *Cohabitation*. Before this, that which is now the citadel, and that part which lies on the south side of the citadel, was all the city. The temples built either within the citadel or without sufficiently show it: for in the south part of the city, particularly, stand the temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in *Limnæ*, in honor of whom the old bacchanalian feasts are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month *Anthesterion*:<sup>1</sup> which

<sup>1</sup> The English reader may perhaps call this a hard word, but I hope will not be frightened. The names of other Attic months will occur in the sequel, which I shall leave as I find them, because no exact correspondence has been found out between the Attic months which were lunar, and those now in use. M. Tourreil, the celebrated French translator of Demosthenes, has made it a very serious point. 'I have long doubted,' says he, 'whether in my translation I should give the months their old Greek names, or such as they have in our language. The reason that made me balance, is the impossibility of computing the months so that they shall answer exactly to our French. My first determination was to date in our own manner; I chose to be less exact, rather than frighten the greatest part of my readers by words to which they are not accustomed. For what French ears would not be appalled at the words *Thargelion*, *Boedromion*, *Elaphebolion*,' &c.? He then gives reasons for retaining Greek ones; and adds, 'I declare then, once for all, that I am far from pedantically affecting the terms of an old calendar conceived in a language barbarous to numbers of people, who, shocked at the sound, would perhaps impute to me a taste which, thank God, I have not. I protest that to my ear, no less than to *theirs*, the French name of the word would be more pleasing, and would sound better. But neither false delicacy, nor

custom is still retained to this day by the Ionians of Attic descent. All the other ancient temples are seated in the same quarter. Near it also is the fountain, now called the Enneakrounos or Nine-pipe, from the manner in which it was embellished by the tyrants;<sup>1</sup> but formerly, when all the springs were open, called Calirhoe; and which, as near at hand, they preferred on the most solemn occasions. And that ancient custom is to this day preserved, by making use of the same water in connubial and many other religious rites. And farther, it is owing to such their ancient residence in the citadel that it is eminently called by the Athenians to this very day, The city.

In the same manner above mentioned were the Athenians for a long series of time scattered about the country, in towns and communities at their own discretion. And as not only the more ancient, but even the latter Athenians, quite down to the present war, had still retained the custom of dwelling about the country with their families, the general removals into the city, after they were formed into one body, were attended with no small embarrassment; and

cious complaisance has been able to prevail with me to expose myself to reproaches, for knowingly leading others into mistake, and using words appropriated to Roman and solar months, which have no correspondence with the lunar or Attic.' He says a deal on the subject so little affecting his countrymen, that since his death they have again thrown all the Greek terms into the margin, and placed in the text the incongruous modern ones for the sake of the familiar sounds. If the English reader be as delicate he may read April or May at his option. The ablest chronologers are unable to exchange them into currency with any tolerable exactness. A great deal of learning might be also displayed about the days of the month, and the Grecian method of counting them: but as it is exceeding easy to translate these right, learning may be excused in a point where no light is wanting.

<sup>1</sup> *The Pisistratids.*

particularly now, when they had been refitting houses, and resettling themselves after the Pe invasion. It gave them a very sensible grief and cern to think, that they must forsake their habits and temples, which, from long antiquity, it had their forefathers' and their own religious care to frequent; that they must quite alter their scene of and each abandon as it were his native home. When they were come into the city, some few had been ready for their reception, or sheltered themselves their friends and relations. The greater part forced to settle in the less frequented quarters of the city, in all the buildings sacred to the gods and except those in the citadel, the Eleusinian, and other from whence they were excluded by religious awe. There was indeed a spot of ground below the citadel, called the Pelasgic, which to turn it into a dwelling-place, had not only been thought profane but was expressly forbid by the close of a line from the Pythian oracle, which said,

—Best is Pelasgic empty.

Yet this sudden urgent necessity constrained them to convert it to such a use. To me, I own, that seems to have carried a different meaning from that which they gave it: for the calamities of Athens did flow from the profane habitation of this place, but the war which laid them under a necessity of entering it in such a manner. The oracle makes no mention of the war, but only hints that its being at that time inhabited would be attended with public ruin. Many of them, farther, were forced to shelter themselves within the turrets of the walls, or where they could find a vacant corner. The city was not able to receive so large a conflux of people. But

wards the long walls, and a great part of the Piræus, were portioned out to them for little dwellings. At the same time they were busied in the military preparations, gathering together the confederate forces, and fitting out a fleet of one hundred ships to infest Peloponnesus. In affairs of such great importance were the Athenians engaged.

The Peloponnesian army, advancing forwards, came up first to Oenoe, through which they designed to break into Attica. Encamping before it, they made ready their engines and all other necessities for battering the walls. For Oenoe, being a frontier town between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about, since the Athenians were used, on the breaking out of war, to throw a garrison into it. The enemy made great preparations for assaulting it, and by this and other means spent no little time before it.

This delay was the occasion of drawing very heavy censures on Archidamus. He had before this been thought too dilatory in gathering together the confederate army, and too much attached to the Athenians, because he never declared warmly for the war. But after the army was drawn together, his long stay at the isthmus, and the slow marches he had from thence, exposed him to calumny, which was still heightened by the length of the siege of Oenoe; for, in this interval of delay, the Athenians had without molestation withdrawn all their effects from the country, though it was the general opinion that, had the Peloponnesians advanced with expedition, they might undoubtedly have seized them, were it not for these dilatory proceedings of Archidamus. Under such a weight of resentment did Archidamus still lie with his army before Oenoe. His remissness was said to be owing to his presumption, that the Athenians, if their terri-

tory was spared, would make some concessions, that they dreaded nothing more than to see it destroyed. But after their assault on Oenoe, and successive miscarriage of all the methods employed to take it, the Athenians still resolutely refraining the least show of submission, they broke up the camp and marched into Attica, in the height of summer when the harvest was ripe, about eighty days after the Thebans had miscarried in the surprise of Plataea. They were still commanded by Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and his army formed their camp began their devastations. The first of all ravaged Eleusis and the plain of Thria. Near Rheiti they encountered and put to flight a party of Athenian horse. Then they advanced farther into the country through Cecropia, leaving mount Ægaleus on their right, till they came to Acharnæ, the greatest of all those which are called the boroughs of Attica. They sat down before it, and having fortified their camp, continued a long time there, laying all the adjacent country waste.

The design of Archidamus in stopping thus before Acharnæ, keeping there his army ready for battle, without marching down there this first campaign into the plains, is said to be this. He presumed that the Athenians, who flourished at that time in a numerous youth and who never before had been so well prepared for war, would probably march out against him, and would not sit quiet whilst their lands were ravaged before their eyes. But when he had advanced into Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia without any assistance, he had a mind to try whether laying siege to Acharnæ would provoke them to come out. The place seemed farther to him a convenient spot for a long encampment. Besides, he could not persue

himself that the Acharnians, so considerable a body amongst the citizens of Athens, for three thousand of them now wore the heavy armor, could see with patience their own properties ruined by hostile devastation, without inciting all their fellow-citizens to rush out to battle. And if the Athenians would not come out against them this campaign, he might another campaign with greater security extend his devastation even to the very walls of Athens. He thought it not likely that the Acharnians, when all their lands had been ruined in this manner, would cheerfully run into hazards to prevent the losses of others,<sup>1</sup> and that hence much dissension might be kindled up amongst

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes wrote his comedy of *The Acharnians* on this plan, and abundantly ridiculed the public conduct as injurious to the citizens of Athens. Though it was not brought on the stage till the sixth year of the war, it amply shows us how the Acharnians resented their being thus exposed to the ravage of the enemy; and how the wits, that lived on the public passions, helped still more to exasperate them, and misrepresented the measures of the ablest politicians, and who perfectly well understood, and aimed at the general welfare of the whole community, as weak, corrupt, and mischievous. No care to redress, and no commiseration for the Acharnians, as *Dicæopolis* hints, who was one of that borough. 'And what, it will be said, can this possibly be helped? Be helped, do you say? why not? Tell me, if you can. Suppose only that a Lacedæmonian had stood across in his skiff to *Seriphus*, and after killing a favorite lap-dog, got off again safe: Would ye now in this case sit still? Quite the contrary. You would immediately be putting out to sea with three hundred sail of ships: Athens would roar with the tumult of soldiers; the captains of vessels would be shouting, pay delivering, and our gold flying about. What a bustle would there be in the long portico! what distributing of provisions, skins, thongs, casks full of olives, onions in nets, &c. &c.; the decks would be crowded with seamen. What a dashing of oars, music sounding, boatswains bawling! nothing but hurry and confusion. Such, I am well assured, would then be the case.'

them. Of these imaginary schemes was Archidamus full, whilst he lay before Acharnæ.

The Athenians, so long as the enemy remained about Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia, conceived some hopes that they would advance no farther. They put one another in mind that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, when fourteen years before this war he invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians, came only as far as to Eleusis and Thrias, and then retreated without penetrating any farther: that, on this account he had been banished Sparta, because it looked as if he had been bribed to such an unseasonable retreat. But when they saw the enemy advanced to Acharnæ, which was distant but sixty stadia<sup>1</sup> from Athens, they thought their incursions were no longer to be endured. It appeared, as it reasonably might, a heavy grievance, to have all their inland thus ravaged within their sight: a scene like this the younger sort never had beheld, nor the elder but once—in the Persian war. The bulk of the people, but especially the younger part, were for sallying out and fighting, and not to stand tamely looking on the insult. Numbers of them assembled together in a tumultuous manner, which was the rise of great confusion, some loudly demanding to march out against the enemy, and others restraining them from it. The soothsayers gave out all manner of predictions, which every hearer interpreted by the key of his own passions. The Acharnians, regarding themselves as no contemptible part of the Athenian body, because their lands had been wasted, in a most earnest manner insisted on a sally. The whole city was in a ferment,

<sup>1</sup> About six English miles.

and all their resentment centred on Pericles. They quite forgot the prudent conduct he had formerly planned out for them. They reproached him as a general that durst not head them against their enemies, and regarded him as author of all the miseries which their city endured.

Pericles seeing their minds thus chagrined by the present state of their affairs, and in consequence of this intent on unadvisable measures, but assured within himself of the prudence of his own conduct in thus restraining them from action, called no general assembly of the people, nor held any public consultation, lest passion, which was more alive than judgment, should throw them into indiscretions. He kept strict guard in the city, and endeavored as much as possible to preserve the public quiet. Yet he was always sending out small parties of horse, to prevent any damage that might be done near the city, by adventurous stragglers from the army. By this means, there happened once at Phrygiæ a skirmish between one troop of the Athenian horse, accompanied by some Thessalians, and the horsemen of Bœotia, in which the Athenians and Thessalians maintained their ground, till some heavy-armed foot reinforced the Bœotian horse. Then they were forced to turn about, and some few both Thessalians and Athenians were slain. However, they fetched off their bodies the same day without the enemy's leave, and the next day the Peloponnesians erected a trophy.—The aid sent now by the Thessalians was in consequence of an ancient alliance between them and the Athenians. These auxiliaries consisted of Larisseans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, Peirasians, Gyrtonians, Phereæans. Those from Larissa were commanded by Polymedes and Aristonous, each heading those of his own faction;



those from Pharsalus by Menon; and those from the rest of the cities had their respective commanders.

The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians made show of coming out against them, broke up from Acharnæ, and laid waste some other of the Athenian boroughs, which lay between the mountains Parneth and Brilissus.

During the time of these incursions, the Athenians sent out the hundred ships they had already equipped and which had on board a thousand heavy-armed soldiers and four hundred archers, to infest the coast of Peloponnesus. The commanders in the expedition were Carcinus, son of Xenotimus, Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigeneas. Under their orders the fleet so furnished out weighed anchor and sailed away.

The Peloponnesians, continuing in Attica till provisions began to fail them, retired not by the same route they came in, but marched away through Boeotia and passing by Oropus, they wasted the tract of ground called Piraïce, which was occupied by the Oropians, who were subject to Athens. On their return into Peloponnesus, the army was dispersed into their several cities.

After their departure, the Athenians settled proper stations for their guards both by land and sea in the same disposition as they were to continue to the end of the war. They also made a decree, that a thousand talents should be taken from the public treasure in the citadel, and laid by itself; that this sum should not be touched, but the expense of the war be defrayed from the remainder; and, that if any man moved or voted for converting this money to any other use than the necessary defence of the city, in case an enemy attacked it by sea, he should suffer the pena-

of death.' Beside this, they selected every year an hundred of their best triremes, with the due number of able commanders. These also they made it capital to use on any other occasion than that extremity for which the reserve of money was destined.

The Athenians on board the fleet of one hundred sail on the coasts of Peloponnesus, being joined by the Corcyreans, in fifty ships, and by some other of their confederates in those parts, hovered for a time and infested the coast, and at last made a descent, and assaulted Methone, a town of Laconia, whose walls were but weak and poorly manned. It happened that Brasidas,<sup>1</sup> the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had then the command of a garrison near Methone. He was sensible of the danger it was in, and set forwards with one hundred heavy-armed to its relief. The Athenian army was then scattered about the country, and their attention directed only to the walls; by which means, making a quick march through the midst of their quarters, he threw himself into Methone, and with the loss of but a few who were intercepted in the passage, effectually secured the town. For this bold exploit he was the first man, of all who signalised themselves in this war, that received the public commendation at

<sup>1</sup> Here the name of Brasidas first occurs, and I must beg the reader to note him as one who is to make no ordinary figure in the sequel. Trained up through the regular and severe discipline of Sparta, he was brave, vigilant, and active. He was second to none of his countrymen in those good qualities which did honor to the Spartans; and was free from all the blemishes which their peculiarity of education was apt to throw on them, such as haughtiness of carriage, ferocity of temper, and an arrogance which studied no deference or condescension to others. He serves his country much by his valor and military conduct, and more by his gentle, humane, and engaging behavior. In a word, the distinguishing excellences both of the Spartan and Athenian characters seem to have been united in this Brasidas.

Sparta. On this the Athenians re-embarked and set away, and coming up to Pheia, a town of Elis, they ravaged the country for two days together. A body of picked men of the lower Elis, with some of Eleans that were got together from the adjacent country, endeavored to stop their devastations, but came to a skirmish, were defeated by them. But as they were arising, and their ships being exposed to danger on open coast, they went immediately on board, and sailing round the cape of Ichthys, got into the harbor of Pheia. The Messenians in the mean time, and others who had not been able to gain their ships, marched over land and got possession of the place. Soon after the ships, being now come about, sailed into the harbor, took them on board, and quitting that place, put out again to sea. By this time a great number of Eleans was drawn together to succor it; but the Athenians had sailed away to other parts of the coast where they carried on their depredations.

About the same time, the Athenians had sent a fleet of thirty sail to infest the coast about Locris, and at the same time to guard Eubœa. This fleet was commanded by Cleopompus, the son of Clinias, who, making several descents, plundered many maritime places, and took Thronium. He carried from thence some hostages, and at Alope defeated a body of Locrians who were marching to its relief.

The same summer, the Athenians transported from Ægina all the inhabitants, not only the men, but the children and the women, reproaching them as the principal authors of the present war: and judging they might securely keep possession of Ægina, which was so near to Peloponnesus, if they peopled it with a colony of their own, with this view, not long after they fixed some of their own people in possession

it. The Lacedæmonians received the Æginetæ on their expulsion, and assigned them Thyrræa for their place of residence, and the country about it for their subsistence, not only on account of their own enmity to the Athenians, but the particular obligations they lay under to the Æginetæ for the succor they had given them in the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the helots. The district of Thyrræa lies between Argia and Laconia, declining quite down to the sea. Here some of them fixed their residence, but the rest were dispersed into other parts of Greece.

The same summer, on the first day of the lunar month, at which time alone it can possibly fall out, there was an eclipse of the sun in the afternoon. The sun looked for a time like the crescent of the moon, and some stars appeared, but the full orb shone out afterwards in all its lustre.

The same summer also, the Athenians, who had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nymphodorus, the son of Pythes of Abdera, whose sister was married to Sitalces, and who had a great influence over him, made him their public friend, and invited him to Athens. They hoped by this to gain over Sitalces, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, to their alliance. This Teres, father of Sitalces, was the first who made the kingdom of Odrysæ the largest in all Thrace: for the greater part of the Thracians are free, and governed by their own laws. But this Teres was not in the least related to Tereus, who married from Athens Procne, the daughter of Pandion, nor did they both belong to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulia, a city of that province which is now called Phocis, and which in his time was inhabited by Thracians. Here it was that the women executed the tragical business of Itys; and many poets who make mention of the nightingale,

THUC.

VOL. I.

L

do it by the name of the Daulian bird. And it is more probable that Pandion married his daughter to a person at this lesser distance from him, from the view of mutual advantage, than to one seated at Odrysæ, which is many days' journey farther off. But Teres, whose name is not the same with Tereus, was the first king of Odrysæ, and compassed the regal power by violence. This man's son Sitalces the Athenians admitted into their alliance, hoping he might gain over to their side the cities of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriving at Athens finished the alliance with Sitalces, and made his son Sadocus an Athenian. He also undertook to bring the war now in Thrace to an end, and to persuade Sitalces to send to the Athenians a body of Thracian horsemen and targeteers. He also reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians by procuring for him the restitution of Therme: immediately after which Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio in the expedition against the Chalcideans. Thus was Sitalces, the son of Teres, a Thracian king, and Perdiccas,<sup>1</sup> the son of Alexander, a Macedonian king, brought into the Athenian league.

The Athenians, in the fleet of one hundred sail, still continuing their cruise on the coast of Peloponnesus, took Solium, a fort belonging to the Corinthians, and delivered the place with the district of land belonging

<sup>1</sup> Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a part of Greece, and both king and people were regarded as barbarians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, in order to assist at the Olympic games. And Perdiccas now himself, whose successor, Alexander the Great, not many years after, was leader of Greece and conqueror of Asia, was at this time balancing between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, important to either merely as a neighbor to their colonies in Thrace. The Greek generals *will be sometimes seen in this history to use the monarch of Macedonia very cavalierly.*

to it to the Palirensians, exclusively of other Acarnanians. They took also by storm Astacus; of which Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly away, and added the town to their own association. Sailing from hence to the island Cephallene, they reduced it without a battle. Cephallene lies towards Acarnania and Leucas, and has four cities; the Pallensians, Cranians, Samæans, Pronæans. Not long after this the fleet sailed back to Athens.

In the autumn of this summer the Athenians with all their forces, citizens and sojourners, made an incursion into the territories of Megara, under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus. Those also who had been cruising about Peloponnesus in the fleet of one hundred sail (for they were now at Ægina), finding on their return that all their fellow-citizens had marched in the general expedition against Megara, followed them with the fleet, and came up to them. By this means the army of the Athenians became the largest they had ever at any time got together; the city being now in its most flourishing state, and as yet uninfected with the plague: for there were of Athenian citizens only no less than ten thousand heavy-armed, exclusive of the three thousand who were now at Potidæa: the sojourners of Athens who marched out along with them were not fewer than three thousand heavy-armed: they had, besides, a very large number of light-armed soldiers. They laid waste the greatest part of the country, and then returned to Athens. Every succeeding year of the war the Athenians constantly repeated these incursions into the territories of Megara; sometimes with their cavalry, and sometimes with all their united force, till at last they made themselves masters of Nisæa.

*In the close of the summer Atalanta, an island lying*

near the Locrians of Opus, till now uninhabited, was fortified and garrisoned by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of Opus, and other parts of Locris, from annoying Eubœa. These were the transactions of the summer, after the departure of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

The winter following, Evarchus the Acarnanian, who had a great desire to recover Astacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to carry him thither, with a fleet of forty ships, and a force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and endeavor to re-establish him. He himself also hired some auxiliaries for the same purpose. This armament was commanded by Euphymadas, son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of Chrysis; who sailing thither executed their business. They had a mind to endeavor the reduction of some others of the maritime towns of Acarnania, but miscarrying in every attempt they made, they returned home: but in their passage touching at Cephallene, and debarking on the lands of the Cranians, they were treacherously inveigled into a conference, where the Cranians falling suddenly on them, killed some of their men. It was not without difficulty that they drew the others safely off, and gained their own ports.

But the same winter the Athenians, in conformity to the established custom of their country, solemnised a public funeral for those who had been first killed in this war, in the manner as follows:—

The bones of the slain are brought to a tabernacle erected for the purpose three days before; and all are at liberty to deck out the remains of their friends at their own discretion. But when the grand procession *is made*, the cypress coffins are drawn on carriages, *one for every tribe*; in each of which are separately

contained the bones of all who belonged to that tribe. One sumptuous bier is carried along empty for those that are lost, whose bodies could not be found amongst the slain. All who are willing, both citizens and strangers, attend the solemnity; and the women who were related to the deceased stand near the sepulchre groaning and lamenting. They deposit the remains in the public sepulchre, which stands in the finest suburb of the city; for it has been the constant custom here to bury all who fell in war, except those at Marathon, whose extraordinary valor they judged proper to honor with a sepulchre on the field of battle. As soon as they are interred some one selected for the office by the public voice, and ever a person in great esteem for his understanding, and of high dignity amongst them, pronounces over them the decent panegyric: and this done, they depart. Through all the war, as the occasions recurred, this method was constantly observed. But over these, the first victims of it, Pericles son of Xantippus was appointed to speak. So, when the proper time was come, walking from the sepulchre, and mounting a lofty pulpit erected for the purpose, from whence he might be heard more distinctly by the company, he thus began:—

‘Many of those who have spoken before me on these occasions have commended the author of that law which we are now obeying for having instituted an oration to the honor of those who sacrifice their lives in fighting for their country. For my part, I think it sufficient for men who have approved their virtue in action, by action to be honored for it, by such as you see the public gratitude now performing about this funeral; and, that the virtues of many ought not to be endangered by the management of any one person, *when their credit must precariously depend on his*



oration, which may be good and may be bad. Difficult indeed it is, judiciously to handle a subject, where even probable truth will hardly gain assent. The hearer, enlightened by a long acquaintance, and warm in his affection, may quickly pronounce every thing unfavorably expressed, in respect to what he wishes and what he knows, whilst the stranger pronounces all exaggerated, through envy of those deeds which he is conscious are above his own achievement: for the praises bestowed on others are then only to be endured when men imagine they can do those feats they hear to have been done; they envy what they cannot equal, and immediately pronounce it false. Yet, as this solemnity has received its sanction from the authority of our ancestors, it is my duty also to obey the law, and to endeavor to procure, as far as I am able, the good-will and approbation of all my audience.

‘I shall therefore begin first with our forefathers, since both justice and decency require we should on this occasion bestow on them an honorable remembrance. In this our country they kept themselves always firmly settled, and through their valor handed it down free to every since succeeding generation. Worthy indeed of praise are they, and yet more worthy are our immediate fathers; since, enlarging their own inheritance into the extensive empire which we now possess, they bequeathed that their work of toil to us their sons. Yet even these successes, we ourselves here present, we who are yet in the strength and vigor of our days, have nobly improved; and have made such provisions for this our Athens, that now it is all-sufficient in itself to answer every exigence of war and of peace. I mean not here to recite those martial *exploits* by which these ends were accomplished, or the

resolute defences we ourselves and our fathers have made against the formidable invasions of barbarians and Greeks; your own knowledge of these will excuse the long detail. But, by what methods we have risen to this height of glory and power: by what polity and by what conduct we are thus aggrandised, I shall first endeavor to show; and then proceed to the praise of the deceased. These, in my opinion, can be no impertinent topics on this occasion; the discussion of them must be beneficial to this numerous company of Athenians and of strangers.

‘ We are happy in a form of government which cannot envy the laws of our neighbors: for it has served as a model to others, but is original at Athens. And this our form, as committed not to the few, but to the whole body of the people, is called a democracy. How different soever in a private capacity, we all enjoy the same general equality our laws are fitted to preserve, and superior honors just as we excel. The public administration is not confined to a particular family, but is attainable only by merit. Poverty is not a hindrance, since whoever is able to serve his country meets with no obstacle to preferment from his first obscurity. The offices of the state we go through without obstructions from one another; and live together in the mutual endearments of private life without suspicions; not angry with a neighbor for following the bent of his own humor, nor putting on that countenance of discontent which pains though it cannot punish: so that in private life we converse without diffidence or damage, whilst we dare not on any account offend against the public, through the reverence we bear to the magistrates and the laws, chiefly to those enacted for redress of the injured, and to those unwritten, a breach of which is allowed disgrace. Our

---

laws have farther provided for the mind most frequent intermissions of care, by the appointment of public recreations and sacrifices<sup>1</sup> throughout the year, elegantly performed with a peculiar pomp; the delight of which is a charm which puts melancholy flight. The grandeur of this our Athens causes produce of the whole earth to be imported here, which we reap a familiar enjoyment, not more of delicacies of our own growth than of those of other nations.

' In the affairs of war we excel those of our enemies who adhere to methods opposite to our own, for we lay open Athens to general resort, nor do we drive any stranger from us whom either improvement or curiosity has brought amongst us, lest any enemy should hurt us by seeing what is never concealed. We place not so great a confidence in the preparations and artifices of war as in the native warmth of our spirit impelling us to action. In point of education, youth of some people are inured by a course of laborious exercise, to support toil and exercise men; but we, notwithstanding our easy and elegant way of life, face all the dangers of war as intrepid as they. This may be proved by facts, since the Cædæmonians never invade our territories, barely their own, but with the united strength of all the confederates. But, when we invade the dominions of our neighbors, for the most part we conquer without difficulty, in an enemy's country, those who in defence of their own habitations. The strength of our whole force no enemy yet has ever experienced.

<sup>1</sup> Beside the vast number of festivals, which were celebrated at Athens with pompous processions, costly sacrifices, and sometimes public games, the presidents in course of *up sacrifices* every morning constantly for the public well-being.

because it is divided by our naval expeditions, or engaged in the different quarters of our service by land. But if any where they engage and defeat a small party of our forces, they boastingly give it out a total defeat; and if they are beaten, they were certainly overpowered by our united strength. What, though from a state of inactivity rather than laborious exercise, or with a natural rather than an acquired valor, we learn to encounter danger? this good at least we receive from it, that we never droop under the apprehension of possible misfortunes, and when we hazard the danger, are found no less courageous than those who are continually inured to it. In these respects our whole community deserves justly to be admired, and in many we have yet to mention.

‘In our manner of living we show an elegance tempered with frugality, and we cultivate philosophy without enervating the mind. We display our wealth in the season of beneficence, and not in the vanity of discourse. A confession of poverty is disgrace to no man; no effort to avoid it is disgrace indeed. There is visibly in the same persons an attention to their own private concerns and those of the public; and in others engaged in the labors of life, there is a competent skill in the affairs of government: for we are the only people who think him that does not meddle in state affairs not indolent, but good for nothing. And yet, we pass the soundest judgments, and are quick at catching the right apprehensions of things, not thinking that words are prejudicial to nations, but rather the not being duly prepared by previous debate, before we are obliged to proceed to execution. Herein consists our distinguishing excellence, that in the hour of action we show the greatest courage, and yet debate beforehand the expediency of our measures.

The courage of others is the result of ignorance; liberation makes them cowards. And those doubtedly must be owned to have the greatest who, most acutely sensible of the miseries of war the sweets of peace, are not hence in the least terred from facing danger.

‘ In acts of beneficence, farther, we differ from many. We preserve friends, not by receiving but conferring obligations: for he who does a kindness has the advantage over him, who by the law of gratitude becomes a debtor to his benefactor. The son obliged is compelled to act the more insipid, conscious that a return of kindness is merely a payment, and not an obligation. And we alone are sparingly beneficent to others, not so much from interested motives, as for the credit of pure liberality. I sum up what yet remains by only adding, that Athens in general is the school of Greece; and every single Athenian amongst us is excellently formed by his personal qualifications for all the various scenes of active life, acting with a most graceful demeanor, and a most ready habit of dispatch.

‘ That I have not on this occasion made use of pomp of words, but the truth of facts, that height which by such a conduct this state has risen, is an undeniable proof. For we are now the only people in the world who are found by experience to be greater than in report; the only people who, repelling attacks of an invading enemy, exempt their deities from the blush of indignation, and to their tribute yields no discontent, as if subject to men unworthy to command. That we deserve our power, we require no evidence to manifest. We have great and solid proofs of this, which intitle us to the admiration of the present and of future ages. We want no Ho

to be the herald of our praise; no poet to deck off a history with the charms of verse, where the opinion of exploits must suffer by a strict relation. Every sea has been opened by our fleets, and every land has been penetrated by our armies, which have every where left behind them eternal monuments of our enmity and our friendship.

‘In the just defence of such a state these victims of their own valor, scorning the ruin threatened to it, have valiantly fought and bravely died. And every one of those who survive is ready, I am persuaded, to sacrifice life in such a cause. And for this reason have I enlarged so much on national points, to give the clearest proof that in the present war we have more at stake than men whose public advantages are not so valuable, and to illustrate by actual evidence, how great a commendation is due to them who are now my subjects, and the greatest part of which they have already received. For the encomiums with which I have celebrated the state have been earned for it by the bravery of these, and of men like these. And such compliments might be thought too high and exaggerated, if passed on any Grecians but them alone. The fatal period, to which these gallant souls are now reduced, is the surest evidence of their merit, an evidence begun in their lives and completed in their deaths: for it is a debt of justice to pay superior honors to men who have devoted their lives in fighting for their country, though inferior to others in every virtue but that of valor. Their last service effaces all former demerits, it extends to the public; their private demeanors reached only to a few. Yet, not one of these was at all induced to shrink from danger through fondness of those delights which the peaceful affluent life bestows; not one was the less lavish of his life,

through that flattering hope attendant on want, that poverty at length might be exchanged for affluence. One passion there was in their minds much stronger than these; the desire of vengeance on their enemies. Regarding this as the most honorable prize of dangers, they boldly rushed towards the mark, to glut revenge, and then to satisfy those secondary passions. The uncertain event they had already secured in hope: what their eyes showed plainly must be done they trusted their own valor to accomplish, thinking it more glorious to defend themselves and die in the attempt, than to yield and live. From the reproach of cowardice indeed they fled, but presented their bodies to the shock of battle; when, insensible of fear, but triumphing in hope, in the doubtful charge they instantly dropped, and thus discharged the duty which brave men owe to their country.

‘As for you, who now survive them, it is your business to pray for a better fate; but to think it your duty also to preserve the same spirit and warmth of courage against your enemies; not judging of the expediency of this from a mere harangue, where any man indulging a flow of words may tell you, what you yourselves know as well as he, how many advantages there are in fighting valiantly against your enemies; but rather, making the daily increasing grandeur of this community the object of your thoughts, and growing quite enamored of it. And when it really appears great to your apprehensions, think again, that this grandeur was acquired by brave and valiant men; by men who knew their duty, and in the moments of action were sensible of shame; who, whenever their attempts were unsuccessful, thought it dishonor their country could stand in need of any thing their valor could do for it, and so made it the most glorious pre-

sent. Bestowing thus their lives on the public, they have every one received a praise that will never decay, a sepulchre that will always be most illustrious; not that in which their bones lie mouldering, but that in which their fame is preserved, to be on every occasion, when honor is the employ of either word or act, eternally remembered. This whole earth is the sepulchre of illustrious men; nor is it the inscriptions on the columns in their native soil alone that shows their merit, but the memorial of them, better than all inscriptions, in every foreign nation, repositied more durably in universal remembrance, than on their own tomb. From this very moment, emulating these noble patterns, placing your happiness in liberty, and liberty in valor, be prepared to encounter all the dangers of war: for, to be lavish of life is not so noble in those whom misfortunes have reduced to misery and despair, as in men who hazard the loss of a comfortable subsistence, and the enjoyment of all the blessings this world affords, by an unsuccessful enterprise. Adversity, after a series of ease and affluence, sinks deeper into the heart of a man of spirit than the stroke of death insensibly received in the vigor of life and public hope.

‘ For this reason, the parents of those who are now gone, whoever of them may be attending here, I do not bewail, I shall rather comfort. It is well known to what unhappy accidents they were liable from the moment of their birth; and, that happiness belongs to men who have reached the most glorious period of life, as these now have who are to you the source of sorrow; these, whose life has received its ample measure, happy in its continuance, and equally happy in its conclusion. I know it in truth a difficult task to fix comfort in those breasts, which will have frequent



remembrances in seeing the happiness of others, of what they once themselves enjoyed. And sorrow flows not from the absence of those good things we have never yet experienced, but from the loss of those to which we have been accustomed. They who are not yet by age exempted from issue should be comforted in the hope of having more. The children yet to be born will be a private benefit to some, in causing them to forget such as no longer are, and will be a double benefit to their country, in preventing its desolation, and providing for its security: for those persons cannot in common justice be regarded as members of equal value to the public who have no children to expose to danger for its safety. But you, whose age is already far advanced, compute the greater share of happiness your longer time has afforded for so much gain, persuaded in yourselves the remainder will be but short, and enlighten that space by the glory gained by these. It is greatness of soul alone that never grows old: nor is it wealth that delights in the latter stage of life, as some give out, so much as honor.

‘To you, the sons and brothers of the deceased, whatever number of you are here, a field of hardy contention is opened: for him, who no longer is, every one is ready to commend, so that to whatever height you push your deserts, you will scarce ever be thought to equal, but to be somewhat inferior to these. Envy will exert itself against a competitor whilst life remains; but when death stops the competition affection will applaud without restraint.

‘If after this it be expected from me to say any thing to you, who are now reduced to a state of widowhood, about female virtue, I shall express it all in one short admonition. It is your greatest glory not to be

deficient in the virtue peculiar to your sex, and to give the men as little handle as possible to talk of your behavior, whether well or ill.

‘I have now discharged the province allotted me by the laws, and said what I thought most pertinent to this assembly. Our departed friends have by facts been already honored. Their children from this day till they arrive at manhood shall be educated at the public expense of the state,<sup>1</sup> which has appointed so beneficial a meed for these and all future relicts of the public contests: for wherever the greatest rewards are proposed for virtue, there the best of patriots are ever to be found. Now, let every one respectively indulge the decent grief for his departed friends, and then retire.’

Such was the manner of the public funeral solemnised this winter, and with the end of which the first year of this war also ended.

**YEAR II.**—In the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and allies with two-thirds of their forces made an incursion, as before, into Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and, having formed their camp, ravaged the country.

They had not been many days in Attica before a sickness<sup>2</sup> began first to appear amongst the Athenians,

<sup>1</sup> The law was, that they should be instructed at the public expense, and when come to age, presented with a complete suit of armor, and honored with the first seats in all public places.

<sup>2</sup> The historian in the funeral oration has given us a very exalted idea of the Athenian state, and the distinguishing excellences of that humane and polite people. The plague, which now broke out, enables him to contrast his pieces, and give his history a most agreeable variety. It is now going to

such as was reported to have raged before this in other parts, as about Lemnos and other places. Yet a plague so great as this, and so dreadful a calamity, in human memory could not be paralleled. The physicians at first could administer no relief through utter ignorance; nay, they died the fastest, the closer their attendance on the sick, and all human art was totally unavailing. Whatever supplications were offered in the temples, whatever recourse to oracles and religious

be exceeding solemn, serious, and pathetic. It is as an historian and not as a physician that he gives us the relation of it; a relation, which in general has been esteemed an elaborate and complete performance. He professes to give an accurate detail of it. The accuracy has generally been allowed, but it has been blamed as too minute. Lucretius, however, has transferred all the circumstances mentioned by Thucydides into his poem, l. vi., enlarging still more minutely on them; and yet, this is the greatest ornament, and certainly the least exceptionable part of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, affected to write with the precision of a philosopher; and Thucydides, the historian, always composed with the spirit of a poet. Hippocrates has left some cases of the plague, which he has recited as a physician; but not one of them is dated at Athens. Thucydides has mentioned nothing of his practising there, much less of his practising with success. He says, on the contrary, that 'all human art was totally unavailing;' and his follower, Lucretius, that '*Mussabat tacito medicina timore.*' The letters of Hippocrates, which mention this affair, are certainly spurious: the facts they would establish are without any grounds, as Le Clerc has proved to conviction in his '*Histoire de la Médecine,*' l. iii. They make the plague to have broken out first in Europe, and to have spread from thence into the dominions of the king of Persia. This is quite contrary to the account of Thucydides, and to the experience of every age. All plagues and infectious distempers have had their rise in Africa. Need I say more than that Dr. Mead has proved it? But whether his account of this plague at Athens be duly succinct, not too minute, serious, affecting; and, whether Thucydides has well managed the opportunity it gave him to moralise like a man of virtue and good sense, every reader will judge for himself. The translator has chiefly endeavored to preserve that solemn *air*, which he thought the prime distinction of the original.

rites, all were insignificant; at last, expedients of this nature they totally relinquished, overpowered by calamity. It broke out first, as it is said, in that part of Ethiopia which borders on Egypt; it afterwards spread into Egypt and Libya, and into great part of the king's dominions, and from thence it on a sudden fell on the city of the Athenians. The contagion showed itself first in the Piræus, which occasioned a report that the Peloponnesians had caused poison to be thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no fountains there. After this it spread into the upper city, and then the mortality very much increased. Let every one, physician or not, freely declare his own sentiments about it; let him assign any credible account of its rise, or the causes strong enough in his opinion to introduce so terrible a scene. I shall only relate what it actually was; and as, from an information in all its symptoms, none may be quite at a loss about it, if ever it should happen again, I shall give an exact detail of them; having been sick of it myself, and seen many others afflicted with it.

This very year, as is universally allowed, had been more than any other remarkably free from common disorders; or whatever diseases had seized the body, they ended at length in this. But those who enjoyed the most perfect health were suddenly, without any apparent cause, seized at first with head-aches extremely violent, with inflammations, and fiery redness in the eyes. Within, the throat and tongue began instantly to be red as blood; the breath was drawn with difficulty, and had a noisome smell. The symptoms that succeeded these were sneezing and hoarseness; and not long after the malady descended to the breast, with a violent cough: but when once settled in the sto-

mach, it excited vomitings, in which was thrown up all that matter physicians call discharges of bile, attended with excessive torture. A great part of the infected were subject to such violent hiccups without any discharge, as brought on them a strong convulsion; to some but of a short, to others of a very long continuance. The body, to the outward touch, was neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, but reddish, livid, marked all over with little pustules and sores. Yet inwardly it was scorched with such excessive heat, that it could not bear the lightest covering or the finest linen on it, but must be left quite naked. They longed for nothing so much as to be plunging into cold water; and many of those who were not properly attended threw themselves into wells, hurried by a thirst not to be extinguished; and whether they drank much or little, their torment still continued the same. The restlessness of their bodies, and an utter inability of composing themselves by sleep, never abated for a moment. And the body, so long as the distemper continued in its height, had no visible waste, but withstood its rage to a miracle; so that most of them perished within nine or seven days, by the heat that scorched their vitals, though their strength was not exhausted; or, if they continued longer, the distemper fell into the belly, causing violent ulcerations in the bowels, accompanied with an incessant flux, by which many, reduced to an excessive weakness, were carried off: for the malady beginning in the head, and settling first there, sunk afterwards gradually down the whole body. And whoever got safe through all its most dangerous stages, yet the extremities of their bodies still retained the marks of its violence: for it shot down into their fingers and toes; by losing *which they escaped with life.* Some there were who

lost their eyes; and some who being quite recovered, had at once totally lost all memory, and quite forgot not only their most intimate friends, but even their own selves. For as this distemper was in general virulent beyond expression, and its every part more grievous than yet had fallen to the lot of human nature, so, in one particular instance, it appeared to be none of the natural infirmities of man, since the birds and beasts that prey on human flesh either never approached the dead bodies, of which many lay about uninterred, or certainly perished if they ever tasted.<sup>1</sup> One proof of this is the total disappearance then of such birds; for not one was to be seen, either in any other place, or about any one of the carcasses. But the dogs, because of their familiarity with man, afforded a more notorious proof of this event.

The nature of this pestilential disorder was in general, for I have purposely omitted its many varied appearances, or the circumstances particular to some of the infected in contradiction to others, such as has been described. None of the common maladies incident to human nature prevailed at that time; or whatever disorder any where appeared, it ended in this.

<sup>1</sup> This passage is translated close to the letter of the original. It was intended by the author to show the excessive malignancy of the plague, as the very flesh of the dead bodies was so fatally pestilential to carnivorous animals: 'Either they never tasted; or, if they tasted, died.' One proof of this is presumptive, arising from the disappearance of all birds of prey. The second was certain, and an object of sensible observation. Every body could see that dogs, those familiar animals who live with and accompany men abroad, either never tasted; or, if hunger at any time forced them to it, they certainly lost their lives. Lucretius literally translates the circumstance itself, but has enlarged in the proofs, and intimates that the distemper raged amongst those animals even without eating the flesh of the dead, and was general to every living species.

Some died merely for want of care ; and some, with all the care that could possibly be taken ; nor was any one medicine discovered, from whence could be promised any certain relief, since that which gave ease to one was prejudicial to another. Whatever difference there was in bodies in point of strength, or in point of weakness, it availed nothing ; all were equally swept away before it, in spite of regular diet and studied prescriptions. Yet the most affecting circumstances of this calamity were, that dejection of mind which constantly attended the first attack ; for the mind sinking at once into despair, they the sooner gave themselves up without a struggle ; and that mutual tenderness in taking care of one another, which communicated the infection, and made them drop like sheep. This latter case caused the mortality to be so great : for if fear withheld them from going near one another, they died for want of help ; so that many houses became quite desolate for want of needful attendance : and if they ventured, they were gone. This was most frequently the case of the kind and compassionate. Such persons were ashamed, out of a selfish concern for themselves, intirely to abandon their friends, when their menial servants, no longer able to endure the groans and lamentations of the dying, had been compelled to fly from such a weight of calamity. But those especially who had safely gone through it took pity on the dying and the sick, because they knew by experience what it really was, and were now secure in themselves ; for it never seized any one a second time so as to be mortal. Such were looked on as quite happy by others ; and were themselves at first overjoyed in their late escape, and the groundless hope that hereafter no distemper would prove fatal to them. *Beside this reigning calamity, the general removal*

from the country into the city was a heavy grievance, more particularly to those who had been necessitated to come hither: for as they had no houses, but dwelt all the summer season in booths, where there was scarce room to breathe, the pestilence destroyed with the utmost disorder; so that they lay together in heaps, the dying on the dead, and the dead on the dying. Some were tumbling one over another in the public streets, or lay expiring round about every fountain, whither they had crept to assuage their immoderate thirst. The temples, in which they had erected tents for their reception, were full of the bodies of those who had expired there: for in a calamity so outrageously violent, and universal despair, things sacred and holy had quite lost their distinction. Nay, all regulations observed before in matters of sepulture were quite confounded, since every one buried wherever he could find a place. Some, whose sepulchres were already filled by the numbers which had perished in their own families, were shamefully compelled to seize those of others. They surprised on a sudden the piles which others had built for their own friends, and burned their dead on them; and some, whilst one body was burning on a pile, tossed another body they had dragged hither on it, and went their way.

Thus did the pestilence give the first rise to those iniquitous acts which prevailed more and more at Athens: for every one was now more easily induced openly to do what for decency they did only covertly before. They saw the strange mutability of outward condition, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth pouring suddenly on the indigent and necessitous; so that they thought it prudent to catch hold of speedy enjoyments and quick gusts of pleasure; persuaded that *their bodies* and their wealth might be their own



merely for the day. Not any one continued resolute enough to form any honest or generous design, when so uncertain whether he should live to effect it. Whatever he knew could improve the pleasure or satisfaction of the present moment, that he determined to be honor and interest. Reverence of the gods or the laws of society laid no restraint on them; either judging that piety and impiety were things quite indifferent, since they saw that all men perished alike; or throwing away every apprehension of being called to account for their enormities, since justice might be prevented by death; or rather, as the heaviest of judgments to which man could be doomed was already hanging over their heads, snatching this interval of life for pleasure, before it fell.

With such a weight of calamity were the Athenians at this time on all sides oppressed. Their city was one scene of death, and the adjacent country of ruin and devastation. In this their affliction they called to mind, as was likely they should, the following prediction, which persons of the greatest age informed them had been formerly made:—

Two horrid judgments will at once befall,  
A Doric war without, a plague within your wall.

There had indeed been a dispute before, whether their ancestors in this prediction read λοιμος, a 'plague,' or λιμος, a 'famine.' Yet in their present circumstances, all with probability agreed that λοιμος, a 'plague,' was the right: for they adapted the interpretation to what they now suffered. But in my sentiments, should they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and a famine happen at the same time, they will have recourse with equal probability to the other interpretation. It was farther remembered by those who *knew of the oracle* given to the Lacedæmonians, that

when they inquired of the god, 'whether they should engage in this war,' his answer was, that 'if they carried it on with all their strength, they should be victorious, and he himself would fight on their side;' and therefore they concluded that what now befell was the completion of the oracle. The pestilence broke out immediately on the irruption of the Peloponnesians, and never extended itself to Peloponnesus, a circumstance which ought to be related. It raged the most, and for the longest time, in Athens; but afterwards spread into the other towns, especially the most populous: and this is an exact account of the plague.

The Peloponnesians, after they had ravaged the inland parts, extended their devastations to those which are called the coast, as far as Mount Laurium,<sup>1</sup> where the Athenians had silver mines. And here they first ravaged the part which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards that which lies towards Eubœa and Andros. But Pericles, who was then in the command, persisted in the same opinion as before in the former incursion, that 'the Athenians ought not to march out against them.' Yet, whilst the enemy was up in the country, before they had advanced as far as the coast, he had equipped a fleet of one hundred ships to invade Peloponnesus; and when every thing was ready he put to sea.<sup>2</sup> On board these ships he had embarked

<sup>1</sup> The silver mines at Laurium originally belonged to private persons, but were united to the public domain by Themistocles. A great number of slaves were employed in working them, and the produce paid amply for all the labor bestowed on them. Whether the state was much enriched by them is a question; the undertakers and proprietors of the slaves who wrought them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by Xenophon in his treatise of revenue.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch relates in the life of Pericles, that on this occasion, when all was ready, 'when the forces were shipped, and Pericles himself was just got on board his trireme,'

four thousand heavy-armed Athenians ; and in vessels for transporting horse, now first fitted up for this service out of old ships, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and the Lesbians joined in the expedition with fifty sail. At the very time this fleet went to sea from Athens they left the Peloponnesians on the coast of Attica. When they were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, they ravaged great part of the country about it ; and making an assault on the city itself, had some hopes of taking it, but did not succeed. Leaving Epidaurus, they ravaged the country about Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione : all these places are situated on the sea-coast of Peloponnesus. But sailing hence, they came before Prasîæ, a fort of Laconia, situated on the sea, around which they laid the country waste ; and having taken the fort by assault, demolished it. After these performances they returned home, and found the Peloponnesians no longer in Attica, but retired within their own dominions.

The whole space of time that the Peloponnesians were on the lands of the Athenians, and the Athenians employed in their sea expedition, the plague was making havoc both in the troops of the Athenians, and within the city. This occasioned a report that the Peloponnesians for fear of the infection, as having been in-

sun was eclipsed. It soon grew so dark, that all men were astonished at so dreadful a prodigy. Pericles, seeing his own pilot quite terrified and confounded, threw a cloak over his face, and wrapping him up in it, asked, ' Whether he saw any thing dreadful, or any thing that portended danger ? ' The pilot answering in the negative ; ' What difference, then, ' he went on, ' between this affair and that, unless that which has darkened the sun is bigger than a cloak ? ' Pericles had easily learned of his preceptor Anaxagoras how to account for eclipses. But whether Plutarch has placed this incident in *right time*, is a question : for Thucydides, who is exact in *these things*, mentions no eclipse of the sun this summer.

formed by deserters that it raged in the city, and been witness themselves of their frequent interments, retired out of their territory with some precipitation. Yet they persevered in this incursion longer than they had ever done before, and made the whole country one continued devastation; for the time of their continuance in Attica was about forty days.

The same summer, Agnon, the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, the son of Clinias, joined in the command with Pericles, setting themselves at the head of the force, which he had employed before, carried them without loss of time against the Chalcideans of Thrace. But when they were come up to Potidæa, which was still besieged, they played their engines of battery against, and left no method unattempted to take it. But the success in this attempt did not answer expectation, nor indeed was the event in any respect the least proportioned to their preparations: for the plague followed them even hither, and making grievous havoc among the Athenians, destroyed the army; so that even those soldiers that had been there before, and had from the beginning of the siege been in perfect health, caught the infection from the troops brought thither by Agnon. Phormio, and the body of sixteen hundred men under his command, had before this quitted Chalcidice, so that Agnon sailed back with the ships to Athens, of his four thousand men the plague having swept away one thousand and fifty in about forty days: but the soldiers who were there before were left to carry on the siege of Potidæa.

After the second incursion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians, whose lands were now a second time laid waste, who felt the double affliction of pestilence and war, had intirely changed their sentiments of things. The blame was universally thrown on Peri-

cles, as if at his instigation they had engaged in this war, and by him had been plunged in all these calamities. They desired with impatience to make up the breach with the Lacedæmonians; but though they despatched an embassy for this purpose, no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievously distressed, and no method of resource occurring to their minds, their resentments fell still heavier on Pericles. He, seeing them quite dispirited with their present misfortunes, and intent on such projects as he had reason to expect they would, called a general assembly of the people, which, by still continuing in the command of the army, he was authorised to do. He had a mind to encourage them, to soothe the hot resentments fermenting in their breasts, and bring them into a more calm and confident temper. He presented himself before them, and spoke as follows:—

‘ I fully expected, I freely own it, to become the object of your resentments. I am not ignorant of the causes of it; and for this purpose have convened this assembly, to expostulate with, nay even to reprimand you, if without any reason you make me the mark of your displeasure, or cowardly sink under the weight of your misfortunes: for it is my firm opinion that by the full health and vigor of a state the happiness of its constituents is better secured, than when each separate member is thriving whilst the public welfare totters. Be the situation of any private person prosperous and fine as his heart can wish—if his country be ruined, he himself must necessarily be involved in that ruin. But he that is unfortunate in a flourishing community may soon catch hold of expedients of redress. When therefore your country is able to support the misfortunes of its every member, and yet each of those *members must needs* be enveloped in the ruin of his

country, why will you not join and unite your efforts to prevent that ruin—and not (as you are now going to do, because confounded with your domestic misfortunes) basely desert the public safety, and cast the most unjust of censures on me who advised this war, on your own selves also who approved this advice? What! I am the man that must singly stand the storm of your anger! I am indeed the man who I am confident is not inferior to any one amongst you in knowing what ought to be known, and in speaking what ought to be spoken, who sincerely loves his country, and is superior to all the sordid views of interest: for he who thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate his own thoughts, is just as insignificant as if he could not think at all. He that enjoys both these faculties in perfection, and yet is an enemy to his country, will in like manner never say any thing for his country's good: or, though he love his country, and be not proof against corruption, he may prostitute every thing to his own avarice. If therefore you judged my qualifications in all these respects to be in some moderate degree superior to those of other men, and were thus drawn into a war by my advice, there can certainly be no reason why I should be accused of having done you wrong. Those indeed who are already in the fast possession of all the ends attainable by war must make a foolish choice if they run to arms: but, if once under a necessity, either through tame submission to be enslaved by a neighbor power, or by a brave resistance to get the master over them—he who flies danger in such a case, is much more worthy of reproach than he who meets it with bold defiance.

‘I indeed am the man I was, and of the mind I was. It is you whose resolutions have wavered; you who, whilst unhurt, through my persuasion resolved

on war, and repent so soon as you feel its strokes; who measure the soundness of my advice by the weakness of your own judgments, and therefore condemn it, because the present disasters have so intirely engaged the whole of your attention, that you have none left to perceive the high importance of it to the public. Cruel indeed is that reverse of fortune which has so suddenly afflicted you, dejecting your minds and dispiriting your former resolutions! Accidents sudden and unforeseen, and so opposite to that event, you might reasonably have expected, enslave the mind; which has been your case in all the late contingencies, and more particularly so in this grievous pestilence. Yet men who are the constituents of such a mighty state, and whose manners have been by education formed for its support, ought never to want that inward fortitude which can stem the greatest of afflictions, nor by self-desertion utterly to efface their native dignity. The world will always have equal reason to condemn the person who sinks from a height of glory by his own pusillanimity, and to hate the person who impudently pretends to what he never can deserve. It must be therefore your duty to suppress this too keen a sensibility of your own private losses, and with united fortitude to act in the defence of the public safety. Let us therefore bravely undergo the toils of this war; and if the toil increases, let our resolution increase with it. And let these, added to all those other proofs of my integrity I have exhibited on other occasions, suffice to convince you that your present censures and suspicions of me are rash and groundless.

‘ I shall now lay before you a point, which, so far as I can judge, you have as yet never properly considered, nor have I in any former discourse insisted

on—‘the means within your reach, of rising to supreme dominion.’ Nor should I meddle even now with a point,<sup>1</sup> pompous beyond poetic visions, did I not see you beyond measure fearful and dejected. You think you are only masters of your own dependents; but I loudly aver that you are greater masters now both at land and sea, those necessary spheres for carrying on the services of life, than any other power; and may be greater yet, if so inclined. There is not now a king, there is not any nation in the universal world able to withstand that navy, which at this juncture you can launch out to sea. Why is not this extensive power regarded in balancing the loss of your houses and lands, those intolerable damages which you think you have suffered? It is not so reasonable to grieve and despond under such petty losses, as to despise from the thought that they are merely the trappings and embellishments of wealth; to fix the firm remembrance within us, that liberty, in defence of which we are ready to hazard our all, will easily give us those trifles again; and that by tamely submitting to our enemies, the possession of all we have will be taken from us. We ought not in either of these respects to degenerate from our fathers. By toil

<sup>1</sup> Pericles here is about to convince the Athenians that they may rise to supreme dominion in consequence of their naval superiority. It was his ambition to execute the grand extensive plan which was formed originally by Themistocles. And the words in which he introduces this topic are so full of energy, that they bear hard on a translator. He calls it a point—*Κομψωδέστεραν εχοντι την προσποιησιν*. My first attempts at them were very faint and imperfect. I was soon convinced of it by the greatest genius of the age, who did me the honor to read over this speech in manuscript, and who, as he thinks and speaks like Pericles, could not endure that any of his words should be depreciated. I hope now I have expressed all the ideas which the original words include. Mr. Hobbes has intirely dropped them in his translation.



and toil alone they gained these valuable acquisitions, defended themselves in the possession, and bequeathed the precious inheritance to us. And to lose the advantages we have possessed will be much more disgraceful than to have miscarried in their pursuit. If we ought to encounter our enemies not with valour only, but with confidence of success. Valour starts even in a coward, if he once prevail through luck or ignorance; but such a confidence must be in every mind, which is seriously convinced of its own superiority, as is now our case. Nay, even when the matter is equal, the certainty of what must be done arises from an inward bravery, adds the greater security and courage. Confidence then is not built on hope which acts only in uncertainty, but on the sedate determination of what it is able to perform, an assurance which is more guarded against disappointment.

‘It is farther your duty to support the public character (as in it to a man you pride yourselves) in which its extensive rule invests our community, either not to fly from toils, or never to aim at glory. Think not you have only one point at stake, the alternative of slavery instead of freedom; but think of the utter loss of sovereignty, and the danger of vengeance for all the offences you have given in practice of it. To resign it is not in your power; of this let him be assured, who resigns through fear and hopes to earn indemnity by exerting it no longer. In your hands it has run out into a kind of tyranny. To take it up seems indeed unjust, but to lay it down is exceeding dangerous. And if such dastardly men could persuade others, they would soon bring the state to utter ruin, or indeed any other, where they were members, and enjoyed the chief administration of affairs: for the undisturbed and quiet life will

of a short continuance without the interposition of a vigilant activity. Slavery is never to be endured by a state that once has governed : such a situation can be tolerable only to that which has ever been dependent.

‘ Suffer not yourselves therefore to be seduced by men of such mean and grovelling tempers, nor level your resentments at me ; since, though I advised the war, it was not begun without your approbation, if the enemy has invaded you in such a manner as you could not but expect from your own resolutions never to be dependent. What though beyond our apprehensions we have suffered the sad visitation of pestilence ? Such misfortunes no human foresight will be able to prevent, though I know that even this has in some measure served to sharpen your aversion to me. But if this be just, I claim as my lawful right the glory of all those happy contingencies which may ever befall you beyond your expectation. The evils inflicted by heaven must be borne with patient resignation ; and the evils by enemies with manly fortitude. Such rational behavior has hitherto been habitual in Athens ; let it not now be reversed by you ; by you, who know to what a pitch of excellence this state has risen in the esteem of the world, by not yielding to adversity, but by braving all the horrors of war, and pouring forth its blood in the glorious cause, has reached the highest summit of power, and ever since retained it. The memory of this, time itself will never be able to efface, even though we may suffer it to droop and perish in our hands ; as what is human must decline. Our memory I say, who, though Grecians ourselves, gave laws to all other Grecians, stood the shock of most formidable wars, resisted them all when combined against us, conquered them all when separately engaged, and maintained ourselves in pos-

session of the most flourishing and most powerful state in the world. These things let the indolent and sluggish soul condemn, but these let the active and industrious strive to emulate, for these they who cannot attain will envy.

‘To be censured and maligned for a time has been the fate of all those whose merit has raised them above the common level ; but wise and judicious is the man who, enjoying the superiority, despises the envy. An aversion so conceived will never last. His merit soon breaks forth in all its splendor, and his glory is afterwards handed down to posterity never to be forgotten. You, who have so clear a prospect before you, both of what will be some time glorious, and of what at present is not disgraceful, recollect your own worth, and secure both. Sink not so low as to petition terms from the Lacedæmonians ; nor let them imagine that you feel the weight of your present misfortunes. The man whose resolution never sinks before it, but strives by a brave opposition to repel calamity, such, whether in a public or private capacity, must be acknowledged to be the worthiest man.’

By arguments like these did Pericles endeavor to mollify the resentments of the Athenians against himself, and to divert their minds from their public calamities. In regard to the public, they seemed to be satisfied with all that he had urged ; they desisted from soliciting an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, and were more hearty than ever for continuing the war. Yet, in their own private concerns, they were grievously dejected under their present misfortunes. The poor citizens, who had but little, could not bear with patience the loss of that little. The rich and the great regretted the loss of their estates, *with their country-seats and splendid furniture ; but,*

worst of all, that instead of peace they had the sad alternative of war. However, neither poor nor rich abated their displeasure to Pericles till they had laid on him a pecuniary fine.<sup>1</sup> And yet, no long time after, so unsteady are the humors of the people, they elected him general again, and intrusted him with the administration of affairs. The keen sense they had at first of their own private losses soon grew blunt and un-affecting; and they could not but allow him the most capable person to provide for all the urgent necessities of the public: for the supreme authority he enjoyed in times of peace he had exercised with great moderation; he was vigilant and active for the good of the community, which never made so great a figure as under his administration; and after war broke out, it is plain he best knew the reach of its ability to carry it on. He lived two years and six months from its commencement; and after his death,<sup>2</sup> his judicious

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in the life of Pericles, says, authors are not agreed about the quantity of the fine at this time laid on Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue who incited the people to fine him is also said by some to have been Cleon, with whose genius and character the reader will soon become acquainted.

<sup>2</sup> As the historian is here going to take his leave of Pericles, he adjoins a true representation of his patriot spirit, his great abilities, his judicious foresight, and successful administration. And here, the reader may be informed of some points, which Thucydides either thought needless when he wrote, or foreign to his subject. Pericles had two sons by his former wife. The eldest of them proved a great vexation to his father, who was unable to support him in his expensive way of living. Pericles had no large estate, and he was not richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all out in adorning his Athens, and was rewarded for it by giving so many magnificent and lasting proofs of his fine taste in painting, sculpture, and building: for the city of Rome received not so much decoration from her foundation till the time of the Cæsars as Athens did from Pericles alone. Yet economy was his passion at home, as that of his son Xantippus was

foresight in regard to this war was more and more acknowledged ; for he had assured them they could not fail of success, provided they would not meddle by land, but apply themselves solely to their navy, without being solicitous to enlarge their territories in this war, or exposing Athens itself to danger. But they had recourse to schemes quite opposite to these ; nay, even to some that had no connexion at all with this

luxury. This son however was taken off by the plague, as was afterwards a sister of Pericles, most of his intimates and relations, and his other son Paralus. This last was the heaviest blow ; he felt it deeply : and all Athens did all that lay in their power to comfort him, since, contrary to a law of Pericles' own making, they enrolled his son Pericles, whom he had by Aspasia, an Athenian of the full blood. At length he was seized himself by the plague ; and, after languishing a long time in a manner different to most others, died of it. In his last moments he showed to a friend who was visiting him a charm which the women had hung about his neck, as if he was sick indeed when he could submit to such foolery. When several of them were sitting round his bed, and, thinking he did not hear them, were enumerating the great exploits of his life, the shining incidents of his administration, his victories, and the nine trophies he had erected, he interrupted them with these words : ' I wonder you lay stress on such actions, in which fortune claims a share along with me, and which many others have performed as well as myself, and yet pass over the highest glory, and most valuable part of my character, that no citizen of Athens ever put on mourning through me.' The wonderful man, though engaged for forty years in business, and constantly attacked by every furious, seditious, and turbulent Athenian, had never amidst all his power given way to the spirit of revenge. For this, as Plutarch finely observes, he in some measure deserved the lofty title of Olympian, too arrogant in any other light for man to wear ; since gentleness of manners, and the habits of mercy and forgiveness, raise men to the nearest resemblance of the gods. Plutarch adds that the Athenians never regretted any man so much, and with so much reason. If the reader be willing to hear any more of Aspasia, the same writer tells us that after the death of Pericles she married one Lysicles, a low and obscure man, and a dealer in cattle, whom however *she improved into an Athenian of the first class.*

war, wherein private ambition or private interest pushed them to such management as was highly prejudicial to themselves and their allies. Whenever these politic schemes succeeded, private persons carried off all the honor and advantage: whenever they miscarried, the hardships of the war fell more severely on the state. The reason was this: Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, and whose integrity was undoubtedly proof against corruption, kept the people in order by a gentle management, and was not so much directed by them as their principal director. He had not worked himself into power by indirect methods, and therefore was not obliged to soothe and humor their caprices, but could contradict and disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. Whenever he saw them bent on projects injurious or unreasonable, he terrified them so by the force of his eloquence, that he made them tremble and desist; and when they were disquieted by groundless apprehensions, he animated them afresh into brave resolution. The state under him, though styled a democracy, was in fact a monarchy. His successors moved on a level with one another, and yet every one affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the people, and so to neglect the concerns of the public. This was the source of many grievous errors, as must unavoidably be the case in a great community and possessed of large dominion; but in particular of the expedition to Sicily, the ill conduct of which did not appear so flagrantly in relation to those against whom it was undertaken, as to the authors and movers of it, who knew not how to make the proper provision for those who were employed in it: for, engaged in their own private contests for power with the people, they had not sufficient attention to the army abroad, and at home were embroiled in mutual altercations. Yet, notwithstand-

ing the miscarriage in Sicily, in which they lost their army, with the greater part of their fleet, and the sedition which instantly broke out in Athens, they bravely resisted for three years together, not only their first enemies in the war, but the Sicilians also in conjunction with them; the greater part of their dependents revolted from them; and at length Cyrus, the king's son, who, favoring the Peloponnesians, supplied them with money for the service of their fleet; nor could at last be conquered, till, by their own intestine feuds, they were utterly disabled from resisting longer. So much better than any other person was Pericles acquainted with their strength when he marked out such a conduct to them as would infallibly have enabled the Athenian state to have continued the war longer than the Peloponnesians could possibly have done.

The Lacedæmonians, in junction with their allies, the same summer fitted out a fleet of one hundred ships against the island Zacynthus, which lies over-against Elis. They are a colony of the Achæans of Peloponnesus, and were then in league with the Athenians. On board this fleet were a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians; and Cnemus the Spartan commanded in the expedition. Making a descent on the island, they ravaged great part of the country; but finding the intire reduction of it impracticable, they re-embarked and returned home.

In the close of the same summer Aristeus the Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, Protodemus, and Timagoras of Tegea, ambassadors from the Lacedæmonians, and Polis the Argive, without any public character, travelling into Asia, to engage the Persian king to supply them with men and money for carrying on the war, on their journey stop first in Thrace, and address themselves to *Sitalces* the son of *Teres*. They had a mind to try if

they could prevail on him to quit the Athenian alliance; to march to the relief of Potidæa, now besieged by the Athenians; to desist for the future from giving the latter any assistance; and to obtain from him a safe conduct through his territory, for the continuance of their journey beyond the Hellespont, to Pharnaces son of Pharnabazus, who would afterwards conduct them in safety to the royal court. Learchus, the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades, the son of Philemon, happening at that time to be with Sitalces, as an embassy from Athens, persuaded the son of Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of Athens, to seize and deliver them up to them, that they might not go forward to the king, to the prejudice of that community of which he was a member. He, hearkening to their advice, arrests them just as they were going on shipboard to cross the Hellespont, after they had travelled through Thrace to the spot marked for their embarkation. He executed this by means of some trusty persons despatched purposely after them, along with Learchus and Ameiniades, and expressly ordered to deliver them up to the latter. They, so soon as they had got them in their power, carried them to Athens. On their arrival there the Athenians, standing in great fear of Aristæus, lest on escape he might do them farther mischief, since before this he had been the author of all the projects to their prejudice, both at Potidæa and in Thrace, put them to death on the very day of their arrival, unjudged and suing in vain to be heard, and cast them into pits. This cruel usage of them they justified from the example of the Lacedæmonians, who had in the same manner put to death and cast into pits the Athenian merchants and those of their allies whom they had seized in the trading vessels on the coasts of Peloponnesus: for, in the begin-



ning of the war, the Lacedæmonians had put to death as enemies all those whom they could take at sea; not those only who belonged to the states in alliance with the Athenians, but even such as were of the yet neutral communities.

About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciots, in conjunction with many of the barbarians whom they had excited to take up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and made excursions over all its dependent territory. Their enmity against the Argives took its original from hence. This Argos was first built, and this province of Amphilochia first planted, by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaræus, immediately after the Trojan war; who, on his return home, being dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the other Argos, founded this city in the gulf of Ambracia and gave it the same name with the place of his nativity. It soon became the largest city of Amphilochia and the inhabitants were most powerful of any thereabouts. Yet many generations after, being sunk by misfortunes, they prevailed on the Ambraciots bordering on Amphilochia to unite with them. This community of residence brought them to their present use of one common language, the Greek: but the rest of the Amphilochians are still barbarians. Yet in process of time, the Ambraciots drove the Argives from amongst them, and kept possession of the city by themselves. On this event, the Amphilochians threw themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians and both together implored the succor of the Athenians, who sent thirty ships to their assistance, under the command of Phormio. On Phormio's arrival they took Argos by storm; made all the Ambraciots slaves and then both the Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled themselves together in the city. To these

cidents was first owing the league offensive and defensive between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The chief cause of the inveteracy which the Ambraciots bore to the Argives was their having made them in this manner slaves; and which afterwards impelled them, in the confusion of this war, to form this invasion, with the junction of the Chaonians and some other neighboring barbarians. Advancing up to Argos, they were intire masters of the whole territory, but in vain endeavored to take the town by assault; on which they again returned home, and dispersed to their respective nations. Such were the transactions of the summer.

On the first approach of winter the Athenians sent out twenty ships to cruise on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of Phormio; who fixing his station before Naupactus, kept so strict a guard, that nothing durst pass in or out from Corinth and the gulf of Crissa. Six other ships they sent to Caria and Lycia, under the command of Melesander, to levy contributions there, and to stop the excursions of the Peloponnesian privateers, harboring in those parts, from molesting the course of their trading vessels from Phacelis, Phœnicia, and the adjacent continent. Melesander, with the Athenian and confederate force he had on board his ships, landed in Lycia, and was defeated in the first battle, in which he lost part of his army and his own life.

The same winter the Potidæans, as they were no longer able to hold out the siege, and as, besides, the irruptions of the Peloponnesians into Attica had not induced the Athenians to raise it, their provisions being quite spent, and amongst other calamities to which their extremities had reduced them, having been forced to feed on one another, they held a parley about

their surrender with the Athenian officers, who commanded in the siege,<sup>1</sup> Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristoclide, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus. They, sensible of the hardships their troops suffered by long lying abroad in the winter season, and that the carrying on of the siege had already cost Athens two thousand talents,<sup>2</sup> granted them a composition. The terms agreed on were these: 'That they should quit the place with their wives, their children, and auxiliaries; every man with one suit of clothing, but the women with two; and with a certain sum of money to defray the expense of their departure.' By virtue of this composition they went away to Chalcis, where every one shifted for himself. But the Athenians called their generals to account for their conduct, because they had signed this composition without their privity (for they thought it in their

<sup>1</sup> In this siege of Potidæa two persons served amongst the heavy-armed as private soldiers, one of whom was the glory of human nature; and the other the glory and bane of his country: I mean the divine Socrates, and, at this time, young Alcibiades. Plutarch, in the life of Alcibiades, says, they lay in the same tent, and fought always side by side. Once, in a sharp skirmish, both of them distinguished themselves above all their fellow-soldiers. Alcibiades at length was wounded and dropped; Socrates stood over and defended him, and saved both him and his arms from the enemy. Socrates therefore had the justest right to the public reward, as the person who had behaved best in this action; but when the generals, on account of Alcibiades' quality, showed a great desire to confer honor on him, Socrates, willing also to increase his ardor for gallant actions, turned witness in his favor, and procured him the wreath and the public present of a complete suit of armor. Socrates coveted no recompense for brave exploits but the consciousness of having performed them, and young Alcibiades was to be nursed up to virtue. He was capable of every degree either of virtue or vice: and Socrates always endeavored to encourage him in the former, and give his eager and enterprising soul the just direction.

<sup>2</sup> 387,500*l.* sterling.

power to have made them surrender at discretion), and afterwards sent to Potidæa some of their people, whom they settled in a colony there. These things were done this winter; and so ended the second year of this war, the history of which has been compiled by Thucydides.

**YEAR III.**—Early the next summer, the Peloponnesians and their allies, omitting the incursion as before into Attica, marched their forces against Platæa. Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded, who having encamped his army, was preparing to ravage the adjacent country. He was interrupted by an embassy from the Platæans, who addressed themselves to him in the following manner:

‘The war, O Archidamus and Lacedæmonians, you are now levying on Platæa is a flagrant breach of common justice, a blemish on your honor and that of your fathers. Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian, son of Cleombrotus, when, aided by those Grecians, who cheerfully exposed themselves with him to the dangers of that battle which was fought on our land, he had delivered Greece from Persian slavery; at a public sacrifice to Jupiter the Deliverer, solemnised by him on that occasion in the public forum of Platæa, called all the confederates together, and there conferred these privileges on the Platæans: ‘That they should have free possession of the city and territory belonging to it, to be governed at their own discretion; that no one should ever unjustly make war on them, or endeavor to enslave them; and in case of such attempts, all the confederates then present should avenge it to the utmost of their power.’ Such grateful returns *did your fathers* make us in recompense of our *valor, and the zeal we excited in the common danger*

Yet their generosity you are now reversing—you, with the Thebans our inveterate foes, are come hither to enslave us. But by the gods who were then witnesses to the oath they swore, by all the tutelary deities both of your own and of our community, we adjure you to do no damage to Platæan ground, nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and leave us in that state of independence which Pausanias justly established for us.' To these words of the Platæans Archidamus made this reply:

‘What you have urged, ye men of Platæa, is just and reasonable, if it be found agreeable to your actions. Let the declarations of Pausanias be observed; be free and independent yourselves, and at the same time vindicate their own freedom to others; to those who, after participation of the same common dangers, made that oath in your favor, and yet are now enslaved by the Athenians. To rescue them and others from that slavery have our preparations been made, this war has been undertaken. You who know what liberty is, and are such advocates for it, do you abide firmly by your oaths; at least, as we heretofore advised you, keep at quiet, enjoying only what is properly your own; side with neither party; receive both in the way of friendship, in the way of enmity neither. To a conduct like this we never shall object.’

When the Platæan ambassadors had heard this reply of Archidamus they returned into the city, and communicating what had passed to the body of the citizens, they carried back in answer to him, ‘That they could not possibly comply with his proposals, without the consent of the Athenians, because their wives and children were in their power: that they were apprehensive a compliance might endanger their *whole community*, since in such a case either the *Athenians* might not confirm the neutrality, or the

Thebans, who were comprehended in the same neutral oath to the two principal powers, might again attempt to seize their city.' Archidamus, to remove their apprehensions, spoke as follows: 'Deliver up your city and your houses to us Lacedæmonians; let us know the bounds of your territory and the exact number of your trees, and make as true a calculation as you possibly can of all that belongs to you. Depart yourselves, and reside wherever you please so long as the war continues; at the end of it we will restore every thing again. In the mean time we will make the best use of every thing intrusted to us, and pay you an annual equivalent for your subsistence.' On hearing this, they again returned into the city, and the whole body of the people assisting at a general consultation, they returned for answer, 'That they desired only to communicate the proposals to the Athenians, and then with their approbation would accept them. In the mean time they begged a suspension of arms, and to have their lands spared from depredation.' He granted them a truce for the time requisite to receive an answer, and forbore ravaging the country.

The ambassadors of Platæa, having been at Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, return again with this answer to their city: 'The Athenians say, that in no preceding time, ever since we entered into confederacy with them, did they ever suffer us in any respect to be injured: that neither will they neglect us now, but send us a powerful aid. And you they solemnly adjure, by the oaths which your fathers have sworn, to admit no change or innovation in the league subsisting between you and them.' When the ambassadors had thus delivered the answer of the Athenians, after some consultation the Platæans resolved, '*never to desert them; to bear any devastation of their lands;*

may, if such must be the case, to behold it with patience, and to suffer any extremities to which their enemies might reduce them; that, farther, no person should stir out of the city, but an answer be given from the walls, 'That it was impossible for them to accept the terms proposed by the Lacedæmonians.'

This was no sooner heard than Archidamus the king made this solemn appeal to all their tutelary heroes and gods: 'Ye gods and heroes,' said he, 'who protect this region of Platæa, bear witness to us, that it was not till after a violation of oaths already sworn that we have marched into this country, where our fathers through the blessings you sent down on their prayers overcame the Medes, and which you the made that fortunate field whereon the arms of Greece were crowned with victory; and that whatever we shall here undertake, our every step shall be agreeable to justice. We have offered many honorable conditions to them, which are all rejected. Grant therefore our supplications, that the first transgressors of justice may receive their punishment, and that those who fight with equity may obtain revenge.' After this solemn address to the gods, he roused up his army into action.

He first of all formed an inclosure round about them with the trees they had felled, so that no one could go out of the city. In the next place, they raised a mount of earth before the place, hoping that it could not long hold out a siege against the efforts of so large an army. Having felled a quantity of timber on Mount Cithæron, with it they framed the mount on either side, that thus cased it might perform the service of a wall, and that the earth might be kept from mouldering away too fast. On it they heaped a quantity of matter, both stones and earth, and whatever

else would cement together and increase the bulk. This work employed them for seventy days and nights without intermission, all being alternately employed in it, so that one part of the army was carrying it on, whilst the other took the necessary refreshments of food and sleep. Those Lacedæmonians who had the command over the hired troops of the other states had the care of the work, and obliged them all to assist in carrying it on. The Platæans, seeing this mount raised to a great height, built a counterwork of wood, close to that part of the city wall against which this mount of earth was thrown up, and strengthened the inside of it with bricks, which they got for this use by pulling down the adjacent houses. The wooden case was designed to keep it firm together, and prevent the whole pile from being weakened by its height. They farther covered it over with sheep-skins and hides of beasts, to defend the workmen from missive weapons, and to preserve the wood from being fired by the enemy. This work within was raised to a great height, and the mount was raised with equal expedition without. On this, the Platæans had recourse to another device. They broke a hole through the wall, close to which the mount was raised, and drew the earth away from under it into the city. But this being discovered by the Peloponnesians, they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds and stuffed with clay, which being of a firm consistence, could not be dug away like earth. By this they were excluded, and so desisted for a while from their former practice. Yet digging a subterraneous passage from out of the city, which they so luckily continued that it undermined the mount, they again withdrew the earth from under it. This practice long escaped the discovery of the besiegers, who still heaping on matter, yet the



work grew rather less, as the earth was drawn away from the bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. However, still apprehensive, that as they were few in number, they should not be able long to hold out against such numerous besiegers, they had recourse to another project. They desisted from carrying on the great pile which was to counterwork the mount, and beginning at each end of it where the wall was low, they run another wall in the form of a crescent along the inside of the city, that if the great wall should be taken this might afterwards hold out, might lay the enemy under a necessity of throwing up a fresh mount against it, and that thus the farther they advanced the difficulties of the siege might be doubled, and be carried on with increase of danger.

When their mount was completed the Peloponnesians played away their battering engines against the wall; and one of them they worked so dextrously from the mount against the great pile within, that they shook it very much, and threw the Platæans into consternation. Others they applied in different parts against the wall, the force of which was broken by the Platæans, who threw ropes around them: they also tied large beams together, with long chains of iron at both ends of the beams, by which they hung downwards from two other transverse beams inclined and extended beyond the wall; these they drew along obliquely, and against whatever part they saw the engines of battery to be aimed they let go the beams with a full swing of the chains, and so dropped them down directly on it, which by the weight of the stroke broke off the beak of the battering machine. On this the Peloponnesians, finding all their engines useless, and their mount effectually counterworked by the fortification within, concluded it a business of no little

ard to take the place amidst so many obstacles, prepared to draw a circumvallation about it. But first they were willing to try whether it were possible to set the town on fire, and burn it down, it was not large, by help of a brisk gale of wind; they cast their thoughts towards every expedient taking it without a large expense and a tedious ckade. Procuring for this purpose a quantity of ots, they tossed them from their own mount into void space between the wall and the inner fortification. As many hands were employed in this business, they had soon filled it up, and then proceeded tooss more of them into the other parts of the city ng beyond, as far as they could by the advantage ich the eminence gave them. On these they threw y balls made of sulphur and pitch, which caught fagots, and soon kindled such a flame as before s time no one had ever seen kindled by the art of n. It has indeed sometimes happened, that wood wing on mountains has been so heated by the attri of the winds, that without any other cause it has ken out into fire and flame. But this was exceeding ce; and the Platæans, who had baffled all other rts, were very narrowly delivered from perishing its fury; for it cleared the city to a great distance nd about, so that no Platæan durst approach it: and he wind had happened to have blown along with it, the enemy hoped, they must all unavoidably have ished. It is now reported, that a heavy rain falling a sudden, attended with claps of thunder, extinshed the flames, and put an end to this imminent iger.

The Peloponnesians; on the failure of this project, rched away part of their army; but, continuing the ainder there, raised a wall of circumvallation quite

round the city, the troops of every confederate state executing a determinate part of the work. Both inside and outside of this wall was a ditch, and by first digging these they had got materials for brick. The work being completed about the rising of Aroturus they left some of their own men to guard half of the wall, the other half being left to the care of the Bottians; then marched away with the main army, and dismissed the auxiliary forces to their respective cities. The Plateans had already sent away to Athens the wives, their children, their old people, and all the useless crowd of inhabitants. There were only left in the town during this siege four hundred Platean men, eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to prepare their food. This was the whole number of them when the siege was first formed; nor was there any other person within the wall, either slave or free. And in this manner was the city of Plataea besieged and formed.

The same summer, and about the time that the army appeared before Plataea, the Athenians, with a body of their own people, consisting of two thousand heavily armed, and two hundred horsemen, invaded the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottians. The corn was in the ear when this army was led against them under the command of Xenophon, the son of Euripides, and two colleagues. Coming up to Spartolus, a town of Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn, and hoped to gain possession of the place by the management of a faction they had within. But a contrary party, having sent in good time to Olynthus, had procured for thence an aid of heavy-armed and other forces for their protection. These even made a sally out

<sup>1</sup> Beginning of September.

Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to a battle under the walls of the town. The heavy-armed Chalcideans, with some of their auxiliaries, were defeated by the Athenians, and retired into Spartolus. The horse and light-armed Chalcideans got the better of the horse and light-armed Athenians; but they had with them a small number of targeteers from the province called Crusis. On the first joining of battle other targeteers came to their assistance from Olynthus. The light-armed of Spartolus seeing this reinforcement just come up, and reflecting that they had received no loss before, with reanimated courage again charged the Athenians, in conjunction with the Chalcidean horse, and the fresh reinforcement. The Athenians retired to the two companies which they had left to guard the baggage. Here they drew up again; and whenever they thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back; when they retreated from the charge, the enemy pressed on and infested them with missive weapons. The Chalcidean horse rode up where they thought they could break them; and falling in without fear of a repulse, put the Athenians to flight, and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians fled for refuge to Potidæa; and afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetch off their dead, returned with their shattered army to Athens. In this action they lost four hundred and thirty men, and all their commanders. The Chalcideans and Bottiæans erected a trophy; and, having taken proper care of their dead, separated to their own cities.

Not long after this, in the same summer, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the total reduction of Acarnania, and to compass a general defection there from the Athenians, prevailed on the Lacedæmonians to supply them with shipping from their confederate cities, and to send a thousand heavy-armed

THUC.

VOL. I.

O

into Acarnania. They told them that, 'if they would join them with a land and a naval force at the same time, it would be impossible for the Acarnanians to succor one another by sea; that hence they might easily get all Acarnania into their power, from whence they might become masters of Zacynthus and Cephalene, and a stop would then be made to the Athenian cruises on the coasts of Peloponnesus; nay, that there was even a hope of reducing Naupactus.' This scheme was pleasing to the Lacedæmonians, who ordered Cnemus, yet their admiral, to sail thither with a few ships, having on board the heavy-armed; and circulated orders to their confederates to fit out their ships, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. The Corinthians were those who showed most zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own; and the shipping of Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places, was prepared with all possible expedition; but that of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, was already at Leucas, and waiting for the rest. Cnemus and the thousand heavy-armed performed their voyage undiscovered by Phormio, who commanded the Athenian fleet of twenty sail, stationed round Naupactus, and immediately landed his men for the destined service. Besides the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him, he was now joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, of the Grecians; of the barbarians, by a thousand Chaonians not subject to a regal government, but commanded by Photius and Nicanor, men of those families which had a right to command by annual election. With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who also had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the Molossians and Atintanians. The Paravæans were headed by their own king Oroëdus, *who had also the command of a thousand Orestians,*

of Antiochus, which served with his troops by mission of Antiochus. Perdiccas sent also a 1 Macedonians, of which the Athenians were ; but these were not yet come up. these forces Cnemus began his march, without the arrival of the ships from Corinth ; and through Argia, they destroyed Limnæa, a vil- fortified. They marched next for Stratus, the city of Acarnania ; judging that if they first s, all other places would readily submit. The ians, finding a large army broken in amongst r land, and more enemies coming to attack sea, gave up all view of succoring one another, and separately on their own defence. They sent tion to Phormio, and requested him to come eir relief. He sent them word, 'he could not leave Naupactus without a guard, when a s ready to sail from Corinth.' The Pelopon- and their allies, dividing themselves into three advanced towards the city of the Stratians, esign to appear before it, and if it did not sur- it once, to storm it without loss of time. The ns and the rest of the barbarians marched in dle ; to the right were the Leucadians, Anac- and their auxiliaries ; to the left Cnemus with pponnesians, and the Ambraciots ; each body at a distance from the rest, that sometimes they it of one another's sight. The Grecians, in arch, kept firm within ranks, and guarded all otions, till they came up to the spot fit for their ment. But the Chaonians, confident of their very, and valuing themselves as the most mar- ple in that part of the world, could not bear y of encamping, but with the rest of the bar-

barians rushing eagerly forwards, thought to take the town at a shout, and carry all the honor. The Strations, finding them thus advanced, thought, that could they master them thus detached, the Grecians would become more averse to attack them. With this view, they placed ambuscades in the approaches of the city; and when the enemy was near, rushed up at once from the places of ambush, and out of the city, charging them on all sides. The Chaonians were thrown into consternation, and many of them were slain. The rest of the barbarians, when they saw them give way, durst not keep their ground, but fled immediately. Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any thing of this engagement, so hastily had those advanced, and were supposed to have done it only to encamp with greater expedition: but when the barbarians came running back to them in disorderly rout, they received them into shelter; and all closing firm together, stood quiet the rest of the day. The Strations durst not directly assault them, because the other Acarnanians were not yet come up to their assistance, but were continually slinging at them from a distance; thus harassing them abundantly, but unable, without better weapons, to make them dislodge: the Acarnanians only could have attacked them with effectual vigor.

By the favor of a dark night Cnemus withdrew his army by a quick march to the river Anapus, which is eighty stadia<sup>1</sup> distant from Stratus. The next day he obtained a truce to fetch off the dead: and the Oeniadæ coming up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went to take refuge amongst them, before the Acarnanians could draw their succors together; and from thence

<sup>1</sup> About eight miles.

the forces which composed his army marched to their own homes : but the Stratians erected a trophy on account of their victory over the barbarians.

The fleet of Corinth and the other confederate states that was to sail from the gulf of Crissa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from succoring those within the land, never arrived : for, about the time of the action at Stratus, they had been compelled to fight the Athenian squadron of twenty ships, stationed at Naupactus, under the command of Phormio. Phormio had watched their coming out of the gulf, intending to attack as soon as ever they got out to sea. The Corinthians and their allies sailed out indeed, yet not so well prepared to fight by sea as to forward the land expedition on Acarnania. They never imagined that the Athenians, with their twenty ships, durst presume to attack them who had forty-seven : yet when they saw them steering the same course on the opposite shore, they kept first along their own coast, and afterwards from Patræ of Achaia stretched over to the opposite side, in order to make for Acarnania. But now again they descried them standing directly against them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and found they had observed their anchoring the night before. Thus were they compelled to come to an engagement in the midst of the open sea.<sup>1</sup> The ships of every state were under the com-

<sup>1</sup> Phormio was watching to catch them in the open sea, as Thucydides says above. They were now out of the gulf, stretching across the sea, in the midst of which Phormio came up to them, and engaged. The sea without the capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Crissa is indeed a narrow sea, but then it was open sea in regard to the gulf within the capes, and gave Phormio all the advantages which more expert seamen knew how to use. As the Peloponnesian fleet stood out from Patræ in Achaia, and the Athenian from Chalcis in Ætolia, the situation of those two places easily guides



mand of those who had been appointed by their principals : over the Corinthians were Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians drew up their ships in form of a circle, as large as they possibly could, without leaving open a passage for the ships of the enemy. The heads of the ships stood to sea, the sterns were turned inwards. Within were ranged the small vessels that attended the fleet, and five ships that were prime sailers, which were to start out at narrow passages, wherever the enemy should begin the attack. The Athenians, drawing up their ships in a line, and sailing quite round them, brushed along by them in their passage, and making successive feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a smaller compass. Phormio had beforehand given strict orders not to engage without the signal ; for he hoped the enemy could not long preserve that order of battle like a land army, but that the ships must fall foul one on another, and the small vessels within give them no little embarrassment ; that farther, the wind would blow out of the gulf, as was usual every morning ; in expectation of which he continued to sail round about them, and then they could not possibly keep firm in their stations for any time. He thought, farther, that the time of engagement was intirely in his own power, as his ships were the best sailers, and that it was most advisable to begin at such a juncture. As soon as that wind began to rise, and the greater ships, now contracted into a narrow circle, were disordered both by the wind and the smaller vessels within, one falling foul on another, the poles were applied to push them off again. Amidst

to the place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of honor by this action, which Plutarch in his piece about the 'glory of the Athenians' reckons up amongst the most remarkable exploits related by our historian.

the noise caused by this confusion, calling out to take care, and cursing one another, they could no longer hear the orders of their commanders or their masters ; and the sea beginning to run so high as to render useless the oars of inexperienced mariners, as they were, they left the unmanageable ships to the pilots' art. Exactly at this juncture Phormio gave the signal. The Athenians engaged, and at the first shock sunk one of the admiral-ships, and several more afterwards in the different parts of the engagement. They pursued their success with so much fury, that amidst the general disorder not one durst think of resisting, but all with the greatest precipitation fled towards Patræ and Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians pursued, and took twelve of their ships ; and having slaughtered most of the crews, drew off to Molychrium ; and having erected a trophy on the promontory, and consecrated a ship to Neptune, returned to their station at Naupactus.

The Peloponnesians, without loss of time, crept along the coast with the remnant of their fleet saved at Patræ and Dyme, to Cyllene, a dock belonging to the Eleans ; whither, after the battle of Stratus, arrived also from Leucas, Cnemus and the ships of that station, which ought to have been joined by these other. The Lacedæmonians sent thither Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lysiphron, to assist Cnemus in his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready for a more successful engagement, and not to leave the dominion of the sea to such a small number of ships : for their late defeat appeared to them quite unaccountable, especially as this was the first trial they had of an engagement at sea ; nor could they think it so much owing to a want of skill in naval affairs as to a want of courage ; never balancing the long experience of the Athenians with their own short application to these matters. These persons therefore

they sent away in anger; who, coming to Cnemus, issued their circular orders to the states for new quotas of shipping, and refitted what was already there for another engagement. Phormio also sent messengers to Athens with an account of these preparations, and to report the victory they had already gained; requesting a farther reinforcement of as many ships as they could expeditiously despatch, since he was in daily expectation of another fight.

Twenty ships were the number they agreed to send him; but they ordered him who was to conduct them to touch by the way at Crete: for Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of the Athenians, had persuaded them to appear before Cydonia; assuring them that this place, which had been an enemy to them, should soon be their own. This he insinuated merely to gratify the Polychnitæ, who bordered on the Cydonians. The commander therefore with these ships went to Crete, and joining the Polychnitæ, ravaged the territory of the Cydonians; by which, together with adverse winds and weather unfit for sea, no little time was unseasonably wasted away.

The Peloponnesians at Cyllene, during the time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in Crete, having got every thing in readiness for another engagement, sailed along the coast of Panormus of Achaia, where the land forces of the Peloponnesians were gone to forward their attempts. Phormio, likewise, with the twenty ships which had fought the former battle, sailed up to Cape Molychrium, and lay at anchor just without it. This cape belonged to the Athenian alliance, but the other cape over against it belonged to the Peloponnesians.<sup>1</sup> The arm of the sea which divides them is

<sup>1</sup> The cape on the Peloponnesian side was called Rhium,

about seven stadia<sup>1</sup> over; and this is the mouth of the gulf of Crissa. The Peloponnesians, with a fleet of seventy-seven ships, rode also at anchor under the cape of Achaia, which is not far distant from Panormus, where their land forces lay. When they had here a sight of the Athenians, both parties lay for six or seven days over against each other, intent on the needful preparations for engaging. The scheme on each side was this: the Peloponnesians, struck with their former defeat, would not sail from without their capes into the open sea: the Athenians would not enter into the straits, judging it would be an advantage to the enemy to fight in a narrow compass. At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, desirous to come soon to an engagement, before the Athenian squadron should receive a reinforcement, called first their soldiers together, and seeing some of them not yet recovered from the terror occasioned by the former defeat, and by no means eager to fight again, endeavored to animate and rouse up their courage by the following harangue:—

‘If the former engagement, ye men of Peloponnesus, affects any of you with sad apprehensions about the event of another, know that it by no means affords you any reasonable ground for such desponding thoughts. That was owing, as you well know, to a deficiency in all needful preparations; for you were not then fitted out for service of sea, but for the service of land. We then were distressed in several respects by the adverse turns of fortune; and in some, we, who fought for the first time at sea, ran into errors through want of skill. It thus happened that we were

or the Rhium of Achaia; the opposite cape Antirrhium, or Molychrium.

<sup>1</sup> About three quarters of a mile.

defeated, but not through any cowardice of our own. There can be no reason for men, who were not conquered by superior courage, but who can explicitly account for the means of their defeat, to let their spirits be sunk by a calamity merely accidental ; but they ought to reflect, that though fortune may disconcert human enterprises, yet that men can never be deserted by their own valor ; and where true valor is, they ought not to catch a plea from want of experience to palliate what signs of cowardice they betray. Inferior skill in you is by no means a balance for your peculiar valor. The expertness of your enemies, which you so much dread, if it be accompanied with valor, will indeed direct them in a performance of their duty, amidst all the hazards of war ; but if it wants true valor, those hazards will be too hard for all human art : for fear banishes the remembrance of what ought to be done ; and art without strength is quite unavailing. Place therefore your own superior valor in the balance against their superior skill, and remove the apprehensions flowing from your defeat by the recollection that you were not prepared to fight. You have now the advantage of a larger number of ships, and an opportunity of fighting on your own coasts, in sight of a land army of your own. Victory is generally obtained by those who are most in number and best provided. So that, on close examination, no reason appears why we should dread the event. Our former miscarriages make not against us ; nay, the past commission of them will instruct us now. Let every master, therefore, and every mariner, act his part with manly resolution ; let each take care to perform his duty, nor quit the post to which he is appointed. We shall take care to order the engagement in no worse a manner than our predecessors have done ; and shall leave no man any reason

to excuse his cowardice: yet if any one will be a coward, he shall certainly receive the punishment he deserves; but the valiant shall be honored with rewards proportioned to their merit.'

In such terms did their commanders animate the Peloponnesians. But Phormio, who began to apprehend a depression of spirits in his own men, since he plainly saw, that by keeping their ships close together they were afraid of the numerous ships of the enemy, had a mind by calling them together to reinspire them with courage, and give them an exhortation suitable to their present condition. He had hitherto in all his discourses insisted, and induced them to give him credit, that 'no number of ships could be got together large enough to make head against them.' And his seamen had long since been elated with this presumption, that 'as they were Athenians, they ought not to avoid any fleet of the Peloponnesians, however numerous.' But, when he saw them intimidated by the formidable objects before their eyes, he thought it high time to endeavor to revive their sinking courage. The Athenians being gathered round him, he harangued them thus:—

'I have observed, my fellow-soldiers, that the number of your enemies has struck you with fear. I have therefore called you together, as I cannot bear to see you terrified with what is by no means dreadful. These enemies of yours, whom you have already conquered, who in nowise think themselves a match for you, have got together a great number of ships and a superior force. In the next place they come confidently to attack you with the vain presumption that valor is only peculiar to themselves. Their confidence is occasioned by their skill in the service of the land. Their frequent successes there induce them to suppose that

they must also for certainty be victorious at sea. If they have any reason to presume so far on their excellence at land, you have more to form presumptions in your own favor, since in natural courage they are not in the least superior to us, and if larger degrees of skill give either side an advantage, we have hence an argument to be more confident of success. The Lacedæmonians, now at the head of their league, merely to preserve their own reputation, have dragged numbers hither to fight against their will; otherwise, they durst never have attempted to engage us a second time, after receiving so signal a defeat. Frighten not yourselves with extravagant suspicions of their courage; but rather strike a panic into them; a panic, for which they have more ample reason, as you have already gained a victory over them, and as they are certain you would not give them another opportunity to fight, unless you had some grand design to execute. An enemy, that like them exceeds in number, in action depend more on their strength than on their conduct. They who are far inferior in strength of numbers, and dare, though uncompelled, to fight, must do it through the prevalence of some extensive views. This they cannot but know, and hence dread more this our diminutive than they would an equal force. Large armies defeated, through defect of skill, or sometimes through defect of courage, by an inferior force, are cases that have often happened. Yet neither of these defects can be imputed to us. For my own part, I shall not willingly hazard the event within the gulf, nor will I sail into it. For I am not ignorant that want of sea room is very improper for a few ships that sail best and are best managed, against a number which those on board them know not how to govern. *In such a situation no one can pour down to an attack*

in the proper manner for want of having a clear view of the enemy : nor, if he is forced to sheer off, can he do it with safety. There is no room to break through, or to tack at pleasure, which is the business of ships that are better sailers ; but the fight must of necessity be the same with a battle at land, and in this case the greater number of ships must have the advantage. I shall take the greatest care I am able to prevent these inconveniences. And you I expect to stand regularly to your posts on board every ship. Receive your orders with alacrity, especially as we lie so near our enemy ; and above all things when we come to action, observe the rules of discipline without hurry and noise ; for these are matters of great importance in every scene of war, and of not the least in a naval engagement ; and charge your enemies with a spirit worthy of your former achievements. Great indeed are the points you are now to decide ; the hopes of the Peloponnesians of making a figure at sea are now either to be totally demolished, or the power of the sea must become precarious to the Athenians, even near their own homes. Once more I call to your remembrance, that great part of these enemies you have already conquered ; and the courage of enemies once conquered is seldom equal to what it was, when unconscious of defeat.'

In this manner Phormio encouraged his men. But the Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athenians would not sail into the gulf and straits, had a mind to compel them to it against their inclinations. At break of day they began to move, their ships being ranged in lines consisting of four, and stood along their own coasts within the gulf, the right wing leading the course in the same order as they had lain at



anchor. In this wing they had ranged twenty of their best sailers, with a view that if Phormio should imagine they had a design on Naupactus, and he himself should hasten to its succor, the Athenians might not be able to outsail them and escape their outermost squadron, which composed the right wing, but be surrounded on all sides. He, just as they expected, being alarmed for that place, which he knew was defenceless, no sooner saw them under sail, than against his will, and in no little hurry, he got on board, and sailed along his own coast, the land forces of the Messenians marching along the adjacent shore to be ready with their assistance. The Peloponnesians seeing them move along in a line, ship after ship, and that they were now within the gulf and near the shore, which was what they chiefly wanted; on a signal given, at once altered their course, pouring down directly on the Athenians, all as fast as their ships could advance, in full expectation of intercepting the whole fleet. Eleven of the Athenian ships, which were ahead of the rest, being too quick for the wing of the Peloponnesians, and the shifting of their course towards the open sea, ran safely off. Yet intercepting all the rest, they ran them aground, and so disabled them. The Athenians on board, who could not escape by swimming, were slaughtered to a man. Some of these empty ships they got off again and carried away in tow; and one they had already taken with the whole crew on board. The Messenians got down to the succor of some of them. They waded with their arms through the water, and climbing on board and fighting from the decks, saved some which were already in tow. In this manner did the Peloponnesians defeat and destroy the Athenian ships.

Their twenty ships which were of the right wing gave chase to the eleven Athenians, which, on the shifting of the course, had run off amain. But all these, excepting one ship, outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus. Having gained their harbor, they tacked about under the temple of Apollo, and stood ready to defend themselves, in case the enemy should make an attempt on them so near the shore. Soon after, they appeared sailing along and singing their pæan, as having gained a victory. One ship belonging to Leucas was shot far ahead of the rest, giving chase to that only ship of the Athenians which was left behind. It then happened that a trading vessel was lying out at anchor before the harbor. The Athenian ship came up first with this vessel, and sailing round her, ran directly against the Leucadian that was chasing, and instantly sunk her. By this accident, so sudden and unexpected, the Peloponnesians were thrown into consternation; and having besides followed the chase without any regular order, as secure of victory, some of the ships now dropping their oars, stopped farther motion. This was an unlucky expedient when so near the enemy; but their design was to wait for the greater number of ships that were yet behind. Some of them, being ignorant of the coast, ran on the shelves, and were stranded. When the Athenians saw them suffer these distresses their courage began to revive. Shouting out aloud with one voice, they encouraged one another to attack. The miscarriages, of which they were this moment sensible, and their irrecoverable disorder, prevented the others from making any long resistance. And they soon were forced to run back again towards the station off Panormus, from whence they came. The Athenians chasing them thither, took the six ships

that were most behind, and recovered their own, which were in the enemy's hands, by having been run ashore, and afterwards brought off in tow. Some men besides they killed, and made some prisoners.

On board the Leucadian, which was sunk near the trading vessel, was Timocrates the Lacedæmonian, who, when the ship received the stroke that sunk her, immediately slew himself,<sup>1</sup> and floated afterwards into the harbor of Naupactus. The Athenians, returning thither again, erected a trophy near the place from whence they had pursued this victory. They took up their dead, and the shattered pieces of their ships, whatever they found on their own coasts, and by a truce gave permission to the Peloponnesians to fetch off theirs.

The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, in token of a victory gained by forcing ashore and damaging some of the enemy's ships. The ship they took they consecrated on the Rhium of Achaia, near the trophy. Yet, after this, being in some dread of the reinforcement expected from Athens, all of them, except the Leucadians, sailed away by favor of the night into the gulf of Crissa and Corinth. The Athenians, in the twenty ships from Crete, that ought to have been up with Phormio before the engagement, not long

<sup>1</sup> We have here a notable proof of the peculiar spirit and genius of the Spartans. They regarded the land as their own element, in which they were superior to the rest of the world. And yet now they were convinced, that without practice at sea, they should never be able to pull down the power of Athens. Their first attempts were awkward and unsuccessful. The art showed by the Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and sinking a ship at one stroke, put them all to a stand; and it seems made so sudden and strong an impression on Timocrates, whose passion it was to die fighting, and with wounds all before, that he could not endure the thought of perishing in a whole skin, and therefore snatched the moment, and killed himself for fear he should be drowned.

after the above retreat of the other ships, arrived at Naupactus. And here this summer ended.

Before the separation of the fleet that withdrew into Corinth and the gulf of Crissa, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, by the advice of the Megareans, formed a design, in the beginning of this winter, to make an attempt on the Piræus, the haven of the Athenians. It was not guarded or secured in the usual manner; nor was this judged requisite, as the naval power of Athens was become so extensive. Their project was, that every mariner, carrying with him an oar, a cushion, and a leathern thong, should march over-land from Corinth, to the sea on which Athens is situated, and that making the best of their way to Megara, and drawing out the forty ships that lay there in the Nisæan dock, they should immediately stand in for the Piræus: for there was not so much as one ship appointed to its guard; nor was there the least suspicion at Athens that the enemy would attempt in this manner to surprise them: for, openly, and in a regular train, they durst not attempt it; nor could a project which required deliberate procedure have escaped discovery. But no sooner had they resolved on, than they set out to execute the present scheme. Arriving in the night, they drew the ships out of the Nisæan dock; but instead of making directly for the Piræus, as they at first intended, dismayed with the danger of the attempt, and, as it is said, forced by a contrary wind to steer another course, they went over to that promontory of Salamis which faces Megara. On this promontory was a fort, and three ships were stationed below to prevent all importation and exportation at Megara. This fort they assaulted, and carried the three ships,

THUC.

VOL. I.

v

though empty, away with them. Other parts of Salamis they plundered, as the inhabitants never dream of this invasion.

The lights,<sup>1</sup> that signify the approach of enemies were however held up and waved towards Athens which caused as great a consternation there as was known during all the series of the war. Those in the city imagined the enemy to be already within the Piræus. Those in the Piræus concluded the city of the Salaminians to be taken, and that the enemy was or not within their port, which indeed they might easily have been, had they not been hindered by their own fears, and a contrary wind. At break of day the Athenians ran down in general concourse to the Piræus. They got their ships afloat, and leaping board with the utmost expedition and uncommon tumult, sailed away for Salamis, but left what few forces they had to guard the Piræus. When the Peloponnesians had notice of the approach of this succor having now overrun great part of Salamis, and taken many prisoners and a large booty, beside the thirty ships stationed at Budorus, they made the best of their way back to Nisæa. They were afraid of trusting too much to their ships, which having been long laid up were become leaky. After thus getting back to Megara, they returned again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians, finding they were gone from Salamis, sailed home again. But ever after this they guarded the

<sup>1</sup> These, according to the scholiast, were lighted torches which persons on the walls reared aloft in the air, to notify to neighboring and confederate places that they discerned the approach of enemies, in order to put them on their guard. The same thing was also done at the approach of friends, to notify what succor was at hand. In the latter case they held the lights steady and unmoved; in the former they waved them to and fro, as an indication of fear.

reus in a stricter manner, barring up the mouth of the haven, and omitting no method of securing it actually for the future.

About the same time, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces, the Odrysian, son of Teres, a Thracian king, marched an army against Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans ordering on Thrace, to enforce the execution of two engagements, one made to, and the other by, himself:

Perdiccas, who had entered into some engagement with him, for reconciling him to the Athenians when he was formerly pressed hard with war, and for not retaining his brother Philip, then at enmity with him, to the throne, had not yet performed that engagement.

And he himself was under an engagement to the Athenians, since the late alliance, offensive and defensive, made between them, that he would finish the war for them against the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both these accounts he undertook the present expedition; carrying along with him Amyntas the son of Philip, to bestow on him the kingdom of Macedonia, with the Athenian ambassadors commissioned to attend him on this occasion, and Agnon an Athenian general; though the Athenians had obliged themselves by treaty to accompany the expedition with a fleet by sea, and a numerous land army.

Beginning the march himself from Odrysæ, he summoned to attend him first, all his Thracian subjects who lived within the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope, from the Hellespont and Euxine sea; next, the Getæ beyond Mount Hæmus, and as many other nations as lay between the river Ister and along quite down to the Euxine. The Getæ, and the nations so situated, border on the Scythians, wearing the same

habiliments of war, and all like them drawing on horseback. He procured also to join him the free Thracians that lived on the mountain made use of scimeters, who are distinguished by the name of Dians, and dwell most of them about the river Strymon. Some of these he took into pay, but many of them voluntarily attended. He had levies also amongst the Agrianians, Læans, and the other tribes of Pæonia subject to himself. These were the people in his dominions, reaching up to the mountains of Pæonia and the river Strymon deriving its source from Mount Scomius, was the boundary of the empire from those Pæonians who still are free. To the south the Triballians, who are also a free people, the boundary is formed by the Trerians and Tilatæans. To the north live to the north of Mount Scomius, and reach as far as the river Oscius, which rises out of the mountain with the Nestus and the Hebrus, a barren mountain adjoining to the Rhodope.

The kingdom of Odrysæ is of this large extent to the coast, reaching from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the river Ister in the Euxine sea. The shortest cut round its coast requires four days and nights for a trading vessel, of the round-built kind, directly before the wind. A good walker will require eleven days in going the nearest way by land from Abdera to the Ister: so large was its extent along the coast. But towards the continent, to go along the coast to Byzantium to the Læans and the Strymon, for it does it run upwards from the sea, would cost a tedious walker thirteen days' continued journey: yearly tribute exacted from this tract of barbarians and his cities in Greece, by Seuthes, who, suc-

Sitalces in these dominions, very much improved the revenue, amounting to four hundred talents of silver,<sup>1</sup> though it might be paid either in silver or gold. The presents constantly made to him, either of gold or silver, were not less in value; besides gifts of vestments, both figured and plain, and all kinds of furniture; which were not only made to him, but to all his officers and the noble Odrysians. The custom observed by them, and general to all the Thracians, of 'receiving rather than bestowing,' was contrary to that which prevails in the Persian court, where it was a greater crime to be asked and to deny than to ask and be denied. Yet, as their power was great, this practice continued long in vogue amongst them; for nothing could be obtained by him who brought no present: and this afforded a large increase of power to his kingdom. It had the greatest revenue, and was in other respects the most flourishing of all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf of Ionia and the Euxine sea: but in military strength and numerous armies, it was the second, though at a great distance from the Scythians: for there is no one nation in Europe, nor even in Asia, that in these points can in any degree be a match for them; or when standing singly, nation against nation, is able to make head against the Scythians, united and in good harmony with one another. Yet, at the same time, in every point of conduct, and management of all the necessary affairs of life, they fall vastly short of other people.

Sitalces, therefore, who was king of so large a country, got his army together; and, when every thing was ready, marched against Macedonia. He first of all passed through his own dominions; then over Cercine,

<sup>1</sup> 78,940*l.* sterling.



a desert mountain, the boundary between the and Pæonians. He went over it by a passage by cutting down the wood, made formerly his an expedition against the Pæonians. In their from Odrysæ over this mountain they left the nians on their right; but on their left the Sint Mædians. On their descent from it, they at Doberus, a city of Pæonia. He lost none of in the march, but by sickness; notwithstanding it was very much increased: for many of Thracians came daily in without invitation, lowed for the sake of plunder; so that the whole ber is said at last to have amounted to a hundred fifty thousand. Of these, the greater part were but about a third of them were horse. The share of the horse was provided by the Odrysians next to them by the Getæ. Of the foot, the Thracians that came from about Mount Rhodope, the scimeters, were the most valiant: all the rest lowed were a mixed crowd, formidable only in number. All these therefore were got together at Doberus, and preparing to break into the lower Pæonia, subject to Perdiccas, under the ridge of the mountains: for in the general name of Macedonia comprised the Lyncestians and Helimiotians, and nations lying upwards, allied to and dependent on each other, yet governed as distinct kingdoms. The union over the maritime Macedonia was first effected by Alexander, father of Perdiccas, and his father the Temenidæ, who derived their original from These, by a successful war, had driven the Thracians out of Pieria; who afterwards fixed their residence at Phagres under Mount Pangæus, on the other side of Strymon, and at other places; for which reason that tract of ground lying under Pangæus towards

still called the gulf of Pieria. From the region led Bottiæa they also expelled the Bottiæans, who live on the confines of the Chalcideans. And then, they seized in Pæonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of land running along from the mountains down to Pella and the sea; and got possession of that which is called Mygdonia, lying between the Axios and the Strymon, by driving away the Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of what is now called Eordia (of whom the greatest part were destroyed, but a small number dwell now about Physca); and out of Pæonia the Almopians. These Macedonians also conquered other nations, of which they are still in possession; as, Anthemus, Grestonia, and Bisaltia, a large part of the territories belonging to the other Macedonians. But this whole tract of country has the general name of Macedonia; and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces effected this invasion.

The Macedonians, unable to make head against the numerous army by which they were invaded, retired to the walled and fortified places of the country, of which at this time there were not many. But Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, succeeding his father in the kingdom, built those fortresses which are now there, opened roads, and made many other regulations both in a military way about horses and arms, and in other public matters, more than all the eight preceding kings together. The Thracian army from Doberus broke into that part of the country which was formerly in the possession of Philip. They took Eidomene by storm; and got Gortynia, Atalante, and some other places by composition, which were readily brought to submit, out of their regard for Amyntas, whose son Philip now appeared amongst them. They also laid

siege to Europus, but were not able to reduce it. afterwards advanced into the other Macedonia, to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Within these did not advance into Bottiæa and Pieria; but to Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never once thought of being able to make war against them with their foot; but, sending for help from their allies in the upper Macedonia, where the advantage of ground a few could encounter many, they made frequent attacks on the Thracian army. They made so strong an impression, that nothing could resist such excellent horsemen and completely armed: for this reason, the enemy in the end thought about with their numerous forces, and thus it exceeding hazardous for them to fight against manifold odds of numbers; so that at last they were forced to give over these skirmishes, judging it prudent to run any hazards against so large an inequality of strength.

Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, informed him the motives of the war; and, as the Athenians were not yet come up with their fleet, because of his punctuality to the engagement between them, and had only sent him presents and ambassadors, he detached part of his army against the Macedonians and Bottiæans; where, by driving them from their fortresses, he ravaged the country. During his stay in these parts the southern Thessalians, Macedonians, and other people subject to the Thessalians and the Grecians as far as Thermopylæ, grew apprehensive that his army might be turned against them and prepared for their defence. Under the same apprehensions were the northern Thracians beyond Strymon that inhabit the plains, the Pæonian, Odontians, the Drons, and the Derseans, w

all of them free and independent. He farther gave occasion for a rumor that spread amongst the Grecians, enemies to Athens, that his army, brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance with them, would invade them all in their turns. Yet, without advancing any farther, he was at one and the same time continuing his ravage on Chalcidica, and Bottiæa, and Macedonia. But unable to execute any of those points for which he formed this invasion, when his army began to want provisions, and to suffer by the rigor of the winter's cold, he was persuaded by Seuthes, the son of Sparadoxus, and his own cousin-german, who had a greater influence over him than any other person, to march back again with the utmost expedition. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, and a large dower with her. Thus persuaded, after a stay on the whole of but thirty days, and eight of these in Chalcidica, he retired precipitately into his own dominions. Perdiccas, according to promise, soon after gave his sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And to this end came this grand expedition of Sitalces.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sitalces, and his son Sadocus, who, as Thucydides relates above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not escaped the buffoonery of Aristophanes, in his comedy of *The Acharnians*, act i. sc. 4: *Crier*. Ambassador to Sitalces, come into court. *Ambass.* Here. *Dicæopolis*. Oh! here's another knave summoned to make his appearance. *Ambass.* We should not have stayed so long in Thrace— *Dicæopolis*. I believe you, unless you had been well paid for it. *Ambass.* Had not a great snow fallen and covered all the country, and all the rivers at the same time been frozen over. When Theognis was contending here for glory we were drinking all the time with Sitalces. He is an honest heart, and loves Athenians dearly. In good truth, he is doatingly fond of you all: he is for ever writing on the walls, 'O rare Athenians!' And his son, whom we made an Athenian, longs mightily for some of your

The same winter, the Athenians at Naupactus, after the separation of the Peloponnesian fleet, coasting from thence under the command of Phormio, appeared before Astacus. Making there a descent, they pierced into the midland parts of Acarnania, with four hundred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the fleet, and four hundred Messenians; and expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, the disaffected part of the inhabitants; and having re-established at Coronta Cynes, the son of Theolytus, embarked again on board their ships. They judged it not advisable, in the winter season, to undertake any thing against the Oeniadæ, the only people of Acarnania who had persisted in continual hostilities against them: for the river Achelous, that takes its rise from Mount Pindus, and runs through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agræans, and the Amphilochians, and all the plains of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and discharging itself into the sea near the Oeniadæ, renders all the adjacent country one continued morass, and by a stagnation of water makes it impracticable for an army in the winter season. Most of the isles of the Echinades lie over against the Oeniadæ, not greatly distant from the mouth of the Achelous; in-somuch that the river, being great, causes a continual afflux of sand, and by it some of these islands are already joined to the main-land; and it is expected that all the rest in a short time will be so too: for the current will be large and rapid, and brings down with it great quantities of sand. The isles stand thick;

dainty sausages, and has pressed his father to succor his dear countrymen. He, at a solemn sacrifice, swore he would; and has got such a numerous army at his heels, that the Athenians cry out, 'What a vast swarm of gnats is coming along here!'

And thus the winter ended, and with it the third year of the war, the history of which has been compiled by Thucydides.

## BOOK III.

YEAR IV. B. C. 428.—IN the succeeding summer the Peloponnesians and allies, when the corn was grown, made an incursion into Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and having fixed their camp, ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry at all convenient places skirmished with them as usual, and the greater number of the light-armed from advanced before the heavy-armed, and infesting the passage to the city. Having continued here till their provisions began to fail, they were disbanded, and returned to their respective cities.

On this irruption of the Peloponnesians, Lesbians immediately revolted from the Athenians, except Methymne. They were well inclined to such a step when the war broke out, but were discountenanced by the Lacedæmonians, and now were necessitated by their revolt sooner than they intended. They had not been glad to have deferred it till they had completed the works they were about for securing their harbor, perfecting their walls, and the ships the stocks—till they had received what they wanted from Pontus, both archers, and corn, and whatever they had already sent for thither.

The reason was—the people of Tenedos their friendship with them, those of Methymne, and even persons of Mitylene, underhand, who in a clandestine manner had received the hospitable protection at Athens, sent the Athenians advice—‘That they are compelling all Lesbos to go into Mitylene, and are getting

thing in readiness for a revolt by the aid of the Lacedæmonians and their kindred Boeotians; and if timely prevention be not given Lesbos will be lost.'

The Athenians, at present miserably distressed by the plague, and a war now grown very brisk and vigorous, knew that the accession of Lesbos to their enemies, possessed as it was of a naval force and fresh in strength, must be a terrible blow, and would not listen at first to the accusations sent, chiefly from the earnestness of their own wishes that they might be groundless. But when they had in vain despatched an embassy to the Mityleneans to put a stop to the forced resort of the Lesbians thither, and their other preparations, their fears were increased, and they became intent on some expedient of timely prevention; and order thither on a sudden forty sail that lay ready fitted out for a cruise on Peloponnesus. Cleïppides, son of Deinias, with two colleagues, had the command of this fleet. Information had been given them that the festival of Apollo Maloeis was soon to be celebrated without the city, at which solemnity the whole people of Mitylene are obliged to assist. It was therefore hoped that they might surprise them on this occasion, and by one sudden assault complete the work. Should it so fall out, it would be a happy turn; but, if this miscarried, they were to order the Mityleneans to deliver up their shipping and demolish their works, and in case they refused to make instant war.

With these instructions the fleet went to sea. And the Athenians seized ten triremes belonging to the Mityleneans, which happened at that time to be lying in their ports as an auxiliary quota in pursuance of treaty, and cast into prison all their crews. But a certain person passing over from Athens to Eubœa, and hastening by land to Geræstus, finds a vessel there



ready to put off, on board of which he got a quick passage to Mitylene, and on the third day after his setting out from Athens gave notice to the Mityleneans that such a fleet was coming to surprise them. On this they adjourned their festival, and patching up their half-finished walls and harbors as well as they could, stood ready on their guard. Not long after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the alarm had been given, the commanders notified to them the injunctions they brought; with which, as the Mityleneans refused to comply, they ranged themselves for action.

The Mityleneans, unprepared as they were, and thus suddenly necessitated to make some resistance, advanced on board their ships a little beyond the mouth of their harbor, as willing to engage. But being forced to retreat on the approach of the Athenian fleet, they begged a parley with the commanders, from a view, if it were possible on easy conditions, to rid themselves of that fleet for the present. And the Athenian commanders readily accorded, from the apprehension they had not sufficient strength to support the war against all Lesbos.

Hostilities having thus ceased for a time, the Mityleneans despatched their agents to Athens, and amongst the number one of those persons who had sent intelligence of their motions, but had now repented of the step, to procure if possible the recall of the fleet, by assurances that they were not bent on any innovations. But in the mean time, undiscovered by the Athenian fleet, which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to the north of the city, they sent away a trireme to carry an embassy to Lacedæmon; for they had no room to believe they should succeed in their negotiations at Athens. This embassy, after a laborious and dangerous voyage, arriving at Lacedæmon,

began to solicit a speedy succor. And when their agents returned from Athens, totally unsuccessful, the Mityleneans and all the rest of Lesbos, excepting Methymne, prepared for war. This last place sent in aid to the Athenians, as did also the Imbrians and Lemnians, and some few other of their allies.

The Mityleneans once indeed made a general sally with all their people against the station of the Athenians. Hereon a battle ensued, after which the Mityleneans, though by no means worsted, yet durst not continue all night in the field, but, diffident of their own strength, retreated behind their walls. After this they kept themselves quiet, unwilling to run any more hazards, till they had got some additional strength from Peloponnesus, and were in other respects better provided. By this time Meleas, a Lacedæmonian, and Hermæondas, a Theban, arrived among them, who had been despatched on some business before the revolt, and unable to compass their return before the Athenian fleet came up, had now in a trireme got in undiscovered since the battle. It was the advice of these to despatch another trireme and embassy in company with them, which was accordingly done. But the Athenians, as the Mityleneans remained in so quiet a posture, became more full of spirits than before, and sent summons of aid to their confederates, who came with more than ordinary alacrity, as they saw such an appearance of weakness on the side of the Lesbians. Having now formed a station on the south side of the city, they fortified by a wall two camps, which invested the place on both sides, whilst their shipping was so stationed as to shut up both the harbors. By this means the communication by sea was quite cut off from the Mityleneans. Of the land indeed the Mityleneans and other Lesbians, who had now flocked to their aid,

were for the most part masters. The quantity which the Athenians had occupied by their camps was but inconsiderable, as the station of their shipping and their market was held chiefly at Malea: and in this posture stood the war against Mitylene.

About the same time this summer the Athenians sent out thirty sail of ships against Peloponnesus, under the command of Asopius the son of Phormio, in pursuance of some solicitations they had received from the Acarnanians to send them either a son or some relation of Phormio to command in those parts. These ships sailing along the coasts of Laconia, ravaged all the maritime places. After this Asopius sent back the greatest part of his ships to Athens, but with a reserve of twelve proceeded himself to Naxos; and raising afterwards the whole force of the Acarnanians, he led them against the Oeniade. With his ships he sailed up the Achelous, and the army marching by land laid the country waste. But when this was found ineffectual, he dismissed the land force, and stretching over himself to Leucas, and having made a descent on Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat, by those of the adjacent country, who ran together for mutual aid, supported by a small party that lay there for guards, with the loss of his own life, and a part of his army. After this, the Athenians stayed only to take up their dead, by favor of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and then steered homewards.

The ambassadors of Mitylene, who were sent in the first ship, having been ordered by the Lacedæmonians to repair to Olympia, that their applications might be addressed, and resolutions formed about them, in the grand resort of their whole alliance, arrived at that place. It was that Olympiad in which Doricus the

hodian was a second time victor.<sup>1</sup> So, when the solemnity was ended, and an audience was granted them, they spoke as follows:<sup>2</sup>

‘Ye men of Lacedæmon, and you their confederates, we are sensible of that method of procedure which has hitherto prevailed amongst the Grecians. Revolters, whilst a war is on foot, and deserters from a former alliance, they readily receive, and so long as their own interest is farthered by it, abundantly caress them: yet, judging them traitors to their former friends, they regard them as persons who ought not to be trusted. To judge in this manner is certainly right and proper, where those who revolt, and those from whom they break asunder, happen to be equal to one another in turn of principle, in benevolent affection, and well matched together in expedients of re-

<sup>1</sup> Olympiad 88.

<sup>2</sup> In this manner for private ends, and through party feuds, as a most noble and sacred institution abused. All Grecians in general paid their attendance at the Olympic games; and were obliged by all the ties of honor and religion to suspend their animosities and quarrels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the present instance, they are going to contrive the means of annoying one another, so soon as that solemnity is over, which was calculated to teach them union and concord, and a ready attachment to the interests of Greece their common mother. The policy however of the present proceeding is remarkable. The Athenians who assisted at the games could suspect nothing from the presence of the Mityleneans, who were equally bound in duty to attend. The Lacedæmonians and allies had thus an opportunity of assembling together to receive complaints, and to encourage revolts from Athens, without danger of suspicions or a detection of their counsels till they were ripe for execution. ‘The Lacedæmonians,’ is a remark which will afterwards occur in this history, among one another, and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country, gave ample proofs of their honor and virtue. But in regard to the rest of mankind, they reputed as honorable the things which pleased them, and as just the things which promoted their interest.’

dress and military strength, and no just reason of revolt subsists. But the case is quite different between us and the Athenians. And we ought not to be treated with censure and reproach, from the appearance of having deserted them in extremities, after having been honorably regarded by them in the season of tranquillity. This our conduct to justify and approve, especially as we come to request your alliance, our words shall first be employed, as we know that friendship can be of no long continuance in private life, nor public associations have any stability, unless both sides engage with an opinion of reciprocal good faith, and are uniform in principle and manners: for out of dissonancy of temper diversities of conduct continually result.

‘An alliance, it is true, was formerly made between us and the Athenians, when you withdrew yourselves from the Median war, and they stayed behind you to complete what was yet to be done. We grant it: we made an alliance with the Athenians, not to enslave the rest of Greece to Athenians, but to deliver Greece from the barbarian yoke. And whilst they led us on in just equality, so long with alacrity we followed their guidance. But when once we perceived that they relaxed in their zeal against the Mede, and were in earnest in riveting slavery on allies, we then began to be alarmed. It was impossible, where so many parties were to be consulted, to unite together in one body of defence; and thus all the allies fell into slavery, except ourselves and the Chians. We, indeed, left in the enjoyment of our own laws, and of nominal freedom, continued still to follow them to war; but, from the specimens we had hitherto seen of their behavior, we could no longer regard these *Athenians* as trusty and faithful leaders: for it was *not in the least* probable, that after enslaving those

who were comprehended in the same treaty with ourselves, they would refrain from treating such as yet were free in the same tyrannic manner whenever opportunity served. Had we all indeed been left in the free exercise of our own laws, we should then have had the strongest proof that the Athenians acted on honest uninnovating principles. But now, when they have laid their yoke on the greater number, though they still continue to treat us as their equals, yet undoubtedly it highly grates them; and they cannot long endure, when such numbers crouch beneath their power, that our state alone should stand up and claim equality. No; it cannot be! for the more their power has swelled in bulk and strength, by so much are we become more desolate. The only secure pledge of a lasting alliance is that mutual awe which keeps the contracting parties in proper balance: for then, if any be disposed to make encroachments, he finds he cannot act on advantage, and is effectually deterred. Our preservation hitherto has not been owing to their honesty but their cunning. Their scheme has been gradually to advance their empire by all the specious colorings of justice, by the road of policy rather than of strength. And thus we have been reserved to justify their violence, and to be quoted as a proof, that unless those whom they have enslaved had deserved their fate, a state on an equal footing with themselves would never have marched in conjunction with them to execute their vengeance. By the same strain of policy, their first step was to lead out those that were strongest against the weaker parties; designing to finish with them, when left destitute of any outward resource, by the prior reduction of the rest. Whereas, if they had begun with us, the confederate body remaining yet possessed of its strength, and able to make a stand,

their enslaving project could not have equaled. They were besides under some apprehension of our naval force, lest uniting with yours or a state, such an accession might have endangered the whole of their plan. Some respite also was afforded from the respect we have ever shown to the community, and to the series of magistrates who presided amongst them. We knew however that we could not long hold out had not this war come to our relief. We saw our own fate in the eyes of others which had been made of others.

‘What friendship, therefore, what assurance of liberty could subsist, when, receiving each other the open countenance, suspicion lay lurking between them, in war apprehensive of our power, they paid their court; and we, from the same passion, paid our court to them in the season of tranquillity. The bond of union, which mutual good-will creates in others, was in us kept fast by fear: for through the prevalence of fear, and not of friendship, we have long persisted in alliance: and whichever side first had first emboldened, that side would first begin encroachments on the other. Whoever before charges us with injustice for revolting, they were only meditating our ruin, and because we actually felt the miseries designed us, that they charged us without a reason: for had our situation been such that we could have formed equal alliance to their prejudice and disconcerted all their plans, what necessity did we lie under to resign our laws and receive their law? But, as the power of punishing was ever within their reach, we ought to have laid hold of every proper expedient to ward off the blow.

‘Such are the reasons, ye men of Lacedæmon

their confederates, such the grievances which in-  
 our revolt; reasons so clear, that all who hear  
 must justify our conduct; grievances so heavy,  
 was time to be alarmed, and look for some ex-  
 of safety. We long since showed our inclina-  
 find this expedient, when during the peace we  
 you to negotiate a revolt, but, by you rejected,  
 obstructed in our scheme. And now, no sooner  
 the Bœotians invite, than we without a pause  
 the call. Now we have determined to make a  
 revolt; one from the Grecians, no longer in-  
 t with the Athenians to force the load of op-  
 on on them, but with you to vindicate their free-  
 another from the Athenians, that we may not in  
 in of affairs be undone by them, but timely vin-  
 our own safety.

ur revolt, we grant it, has been too precipitate  
 prepared; but this lays the stronger obligation  
 a to admit us to alliance, with the utmost expe-  
 to send us succors, that you may show your  
 eas to redress the oppressed, and at the same  
 t annoy your foes. Such a juncture for this was  
 known before. What with the plague and the  
 tant expense of the war, the Athenians are quite  
 sted. Their fleet is divided; some to cruise on  
 coasts, others to make head against us. It is not  
 ble they can have now the competent reserve of  
 ng should you invade them a second time this  
 er both by land and sea; so that, either they  
 e unable thus divided to make head against you,  
 singly attack them, or the union of us both they  
 ot be able to face.

t no one amongst you imagine that this will be  
 gering your own domestic welfare for the sake  
 signers, with whom you have no connexion: for



though Lesbos lies apparently at a great distance from you, yet the conveniences of it will lie near at hand for your service: for the war will not be made in Attica, as such a one supposes, but in those parts whence Attica derives its support. Their revenue arises from the tribute paid by their dependents; and that revenue will be increased if they can accomplish the reduction of us: for then not a soul will dare to revolt, and their own will be enlarged by the addition of our strength, and more grievous burdens will be laid on us, as being the last who have put on their yoke. On the other hand, if with proper alacrity you undertake our support, you will gain over a state possessed of a considerable navy, that acquisition you so greatly want; and you will more easily be enabled to demolish the Athenians by withdrawing their dependents from them: for then every one of that number will with assurance and confidence revolt; and you yourselves be cleared of the bad imputation you at present lie under, of rejecting those who fly to you for protection. If added to this, you manifest your views to re-establish the general freedom, you will so considerably strengthen the sinews of war, that all resistance will be unavailing.

‘Reverencing therefore as you ought these hopes which Greece has conceived of you; reverencing farther Olympian Jove, in whose temple we now stand, like supplicants distressed and suing for redress; grant to the Mityleneans the honor of your alliance, and undertake their protection. Reject not the intreaties of men, who have now indeed their lives and properties exposed to dangers merely their own, but whose deliverance from their present plunge will reflect security and advantage on all; and who, if you continue deaf to their intreaties, must drop into such a ruin as will

at length involve you all. At this crisis show yourselves to be the men which the voice of Greece united in your praise and our dreadful situation require you to be.'

In this manner the Mityleneans urged their plea; and the Lacedæmonians and confederates, having listened with attention, and owned themselves convinced, admitted the Lesbians into their alliance, and decreed an incursion into Attica. To put this in execution, orders were issued to the confederates then present expeditiously to march with two-thirds of their force to the isthmus. The Lacedæmonians themselves arrived there first, and got machines ready at the isthmus to convey their ships over-land from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they might invade them at the same time both by land and sea. They indeed were eager and intent on the enterprise; but the other confederates were very slow in assembling together, as they were busy in getting in their harvest, and began to be sadly tired of the war.

When the Athenians found that such preparations were made against them, as an avowed insult of their imagined weakness, they had a mind to convince their foes that such imaginations were erroneous, and that they were well able, without countermanding their fleet from before Lesbos, to make head against any force that could come from Peloponnesus. Accordingly they manned out a hundred ships; obliging all, as well sojourners as citizens, those excepted of the first and second class,<sup>1</sup> to go on board. Showing them-

<sup>1</sup> The original is, 'except those who were worth five hundred medimni, and the horsemen or knights.' The Athenians were ranged into classes by Solon. Plutarch has described the manner in the life of Solon, as thus translated in Potter's *Antiquities of Greece*, v. i. p. 14.

'Solon, finding the people variously affected, some inclined

selves first before the isthmus in great parade, they displayed their force, and then made descents at pleasure all along the coast. The Lacedæmonians, seeing them thus strong beyond what they had imagined, concluded that the Lesbians had purposely amused them with fictions; and being perplexed how to act, as their confederates were not yet come up to join them, and as information was brought them that the first Athenian squadron, consisting of thirty sail, was laying

to a monarchy, others to an oligarchy, others to a democracy, the rich men powerful and haughty, the poor men groaning under the burden of their oppression, endeavored as far as possible to compose all their differences, to ease their grievances, and give all reasonable persons satisfaction. In the prosecution of this design he divided the Athenians into four ranks, according to every man's estate; those who were worth five hundred medimni of liquid and dry commodities he placed in the first rank, calling them pentacosimedimni. The next were the horsemen, or ippeis, being such as were of ability to furnish out a horse, or were worth three hundred medimni. The third class consisted of those that had two hundred medimni, who were called zeugitæ. In the last he placed all the rest, called them thetes, and allowed them not to be capable of bearing any office in the government, only gave them a liberty to give their votes in all public assemblies; which, though at the first it appeared inconsiderable, was afterwards found to be a very important privilege; for it being permitted every man after the determination of the magistrates to make an appeal to the people assembled in convocation, hereby it came to pass that causes of the greatest weight and moment were brought before them. And thus he continued the power and magistracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet neither exposed the inferior people to their cruelty and oppression, nor wholly deprived them of having a share in the government. And of this quality he himself makes mention in this manner :

What power was fit I did on all bestow,  
Nor raised the poor too high, nor press'd too low ;  
The rich that ruled, and every office bore,  
Confined by laws, they could not press the poor :  
Both parties I secured from lawless might,  
So none prevail'd upon another's right. —CREECH.

waste the territory round about their city, they retired to their own homes.

Afterwards they set about the equipment of a fleet to be sent to Lesbos; and ordered the confederate cities to send in their contingents, the whole amounting to forty sail; and farther, appointed Alcidas to be admiral-in-chief, who was ready to put himself at the head of the expedition. The Athenians departed off the coast with their hundred sail, when they saw their enemies had retreated.

During the time this fleet was out at sea, though the Athenians at the commencement of the war had as large if not a larger number of ships, yet they never had their whole navy so completely fitted out for service and with so much pomp as now. One hundred of their ships were stationed for guards round Attica, and Eubœa, and Salamis; and another hundred were coasting all along Peloponnesus, beside those that were at Potidæa, and in other parts; insomuch, that the whole number employed this summer amounted to two hundred and fifty sail. The expense of this, with that of Potidæa, quite exhausted their treasure: for the pay of the heavy-armed who were stationed at Potidæa was two drachmas a day, each of them receiving a drachma<sup>1</sup> for himself and another for his servant. The number of the first body sent thither was three thousand, and not fewer than those were employed during the whole siege: but the sixteen hundred who came with Phormio were ordered away before its conclusion. The whole fleet also had the same pay. In this manner was their public treasure now for the first time exhausted; and such a navy, the largest they ever had, completely manned.

<sup>1</sup> Seven pence three farthings.

The Mityleneans, during the time the Lacedæmonians lay at the isthmus, with a body of their own and auxiliaries marched by land against Methymne, expecting to have it betrayed to them. Having assaulted the place, and being disappointed in their expectations, they marched back by way of Antissa, and Pyra, and Eressus. In each of these places they halted for a while, to settle affairs in as firm order as possible, and to strengthen their walls, and then without loss of time returned to Mitylene.

On their departure, the Methymneans marched out against Antissa. The Antisseans with a party of auxiliaries sallying out to meet them, gave them a terrible blow, so that many of them were left dead on the spot, and those who escaped made the best of their way back.

The Athenians, advised of these incidents, and that farther the Mityleneans were quite masters of the country, and that their own soldiers were not numerous enough to bridle their excursions, about the beginning of autumn sent a reinforcement of a thousand heavy-armed of their own people, commanded by Paches, the son of Epicurus. These having rowed themselves the transports which brought them, arrived; and built a single wall in circle quite round Mitylene, and on the proper spots of ground strengthened it by erecting forts. Thus was Mitylene strongly besieged on all sides, both by sea and land;—and by this time it began to be winter.

But the Athenians, wanting money to carry on the siege, determined now to tax themselves, and by their first contribution raised<sup>1</sup> two hundred talents for the

<sup>1</sup> It was a voluntary contribution: the original term implies it. The manner was no doubt the same as was observed in succeeding times, when the necessities of the state called

present service;<sup>1</sup> and at the same time despatched twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four colleagues to levy money abroad. He, intent on raising contributions, made a visit for the purpose to several places; and, having landed at Myus in Caria, intending to pierce through the plain of Mæander as far as the hill of Sandius, was attacked on his route by the Carians and Anæitans, where himself and a great part of his army perished.

This winter the Platæans—for they were still blocked up by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians—finding themselves much distressed by the failure of their provisions, giving up all hope of succor from the Athenians, and quite destitute of all other means of preservation, formed a project now in concert with those Athenians who were shut up with them in the blockade, ‘first of all to march out of the town in company, and to compass their escape if possible, over the works of the enemy.’ The authors of this project were Thæanetus, the son of Timedes, a soothsayer, and Eumolpidas, the son of Diamachus, who was one of their commanders. But afterwards, half of the number, affrighted by the greatness of the danger, refused to have a share in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to the number of about two hundred and twenty, resolutely adhered to attempt an escape in the following manner :—

for an extraordinary supply. On such occasions, the presidents of the assembly laid before the Athenians the present want of money, and exhorted them with cheerfulness and generosity to contribute towards the national support. Such as were willing rose up in turn, saying, ‘I contribute so much,’ and naming the sum. Such as, though rich, were niggardly and strangers to all public spirit, sat silent on these occasions, or as fast as they could stole out of the assembly.

<sup>1</sup> 38,750*l*.

They made ladders in equal height to the end of the wall. The measure of this they learned from the side of brick, where the side of the wall facing them was not covered over with plaster. Several persons were appointed to count the rows at the same time; and as they might probably be wrong, but the greatest number would agree in the just computation; especially as they counted them several times over, and were not far from the sides at no great distance, since the part marked for the design was plainly within their view. By this method, having guessed the measure of a brick from its thickness, they found out what must be the height for the ladders.

The work of the Peloponnesians was of the following structure:—It was composed of two circular walls, one towards Plataea, and the other outward, to prevent any attack from Athens. These walls were at a distance of sixteen feet one from the other: and in the intermediate space of sixteen feet was built into a wall lodgements for the guards. These, however, standing thick together, gave to the whole work the appearance of one thick intire wall, with battlements on both sides. At every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the same breadth with the whole work, reaching from the side of the inward wall to that of the outward; and as there was no passage by the sides of a turret, the communication lay open through the middle of them all. By night, when the weather was calm, they quitted the battlements, and sheltering themselves in the turrets, as near at hand and close to the overhead, where they continued their watch. This was the form of the work by which the Plataeans inclosed on every side.


The enterprising body, when every thing was laid, laying hold of the opportunity of a night tempo

with wind and rain, and farther at a dark moon, marched out of the place. The persons who had been authors of the project were now the conductors. And first, they passed the ditch which surrounded the town; then they approached quite up to the wall of the enemy, undiscovered by the guards. The darkness of the night prevented their being seen, and the noise they made in approaching was quite drowned in the loudness of the storm. They advanced also at a great distance from one another, to prevent any discovery from the mutual clashing of their arms. They were farther armed in the most compact manner, and wore a covering only on the left foot, for the sake of treading firmly in the mud. At one of the intermediate spaces between the turrets they had got under the battlements, knowing they were not manned. The bearers of the ladders went first, and applied them to the wall. Then twelve light-armed, with only a dagger and a breastplate, scaled, led by Ammeas, the son of Choraëbus, who was the first that mounted. His followers, in two parties of six each, mounted next on each side of the turrets. Then other light-armed with javelins succeeded them. Behind came others holding the bucklers of those above them, thus to facilitate their ascent, and to be ready to deliver them into their hands, should they be obliged to charge. When the greater part of the number was mounted the watchmen within the turrets perceived it: for one of the Platæans, in fastening his hold, had thrown down a tile from off the battlements, which made a noise in the fall; and immediately was shouted an alarm. The whole camp came running towards the wall; yet unable to discover the reason of this alarm, so dark was the night, and violent the storm. At this crisis the Platæans who were left behind in the city sallied



forth, and assaulted the work of the Peloponnesians, in the part opposite to that where their friends were attempting to pass, from them to divert as much as possible the attention of the enemy. Great was the confusion of the enemy yet abiding in their posts, for not one durst leave his station to run to the place of alarm, but all were greatly perplexed to guess at its meaning. At last the body of three hundred, appointed for a reserve of succor on any emergency, marched without the work to the place of alarm. Now the lighted torches, denoting enemies, were held up towards Thebes. On the other side, the Platæans in the city held up at the same time from the wall many of those torches already prepared for this very purpose, that the signals given of the approach of foes might be mistaken by their enemies the Thebans, who judging the affair to be quite otherwise than it really was, might refrain from sending any succor, till their friends who had sallied might have effectuated their escape, and gained a place of security.

In the mean time those of the Platæans, who having mounted first, and by killing the guards had got possession of the turrets on either hand, posted themselves there to secure the passage, and to prevent any manner of obstruction from thence. Applying farther their ladder to those turrets from the top of the wall, and causing many of their number to mount, those now on the turrets kept off the enemies, running to obstruct them both above and below, by discharging their darts; whilst the majority, rearing many ladders at the same time, and throwing down the battlements, got clean over at the intermediate space between the turrets. Every one, in the order he got over to the outward side, drew up on the inner brink of the ditch, *and from thence*, with their darts and javelins, kept



ff those who were flocking towards the work to hinder their passage. When all the rest were landed on the outside of the work, those on the turrets coming down last of all, and with difficulty, got also to the ditch. By this time the reserve of three hundred was come up to oppose them, by the light of torches. The Plataeans by this means, being in the dark, had a clear view of them, and, from their stand on the brink of the ditch, aimed a shower of darts and javelins at those parts of their bodies which had no armor. The Plataeans were all obscured, as the glimmering of lights made them less easy to be distinguished; so that the last of their body got over the ditch, though not without great difficulty and toil: for the water in it was frozen, not into ice hard enough to bear, but into a watery congelation, the effect not of the northern but eastern blasts. The wind blowing hard, had caused so much snow to fall that night, that the water was welled to a height not to be forded without some difficulty. However, the violence of the storm was the greatest fartherance of their escape.

The pass over the ditch being thus completed, the Plataeans went forward in a body, and took the road to Thebes, leaving on their right the temple of Juno built by Androcrates. They judged it would never be supposed that they had taken a route which led directly towards their enemies; and they saw at the same time the Peloponnesians pursuing with torches along the road to Athens, by Cithæron and the Heads of the Oak.<sup>1</sup> For six or seven stadia<sup>2</sup> they continued their route towards Thebes; but then turning short, they took the road to the mountains of Erythræ and Iysiæ; and having gained the mountains, two hun-

<sup>1</sup> Dryoscephalæ.

<sup>2</sup> Above half a mile.

dred and twelve of the number completed their escape to Athens. Some of them, indeed, turned back into the city, without once attempting to get over; and one archer was taken prisoner at the outward ditch.

The Peloponnesians desisted from their fruitless pursuit, and returned to their posts. But the Plataeans within the city, ignorant of the real event, and giving ear to the assurances of those who turned back, that 'they were all to a man cut off,' despatched a herald, as soon as it was day, to demand a truce for fetching off the dead; but learning hence the true state of the affair, they remained well satisfied. And in this manner these men of Plataea, by thus forcing a passage, wrought their own preservation.

About the end of this winter Salæthus the Lacedæmonian was despatched in a trireme from Lacedæmon to Mitylene; who being landed at Pyrrha, went from thence by land, and having passed the Athenian circumvallation by favor of a breach made in it by a torrent of water, got undiscovered into Mitylene. His commission was, to tell the governors of the place, that 'at the same time an incursion will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty sail be sent to their relief, according to promise; that he himself was despatched beforehand to assure them of these, and to take all proper care of other points.' On this the Mityleneans resumed their spirits, and grew more averse to any composition with the Athenians.

The winter was now past, and in this manner ended the fourth year of the war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history.

YEAR V.—In the beginning of the ensuing summer, after that the Peloponnesians had despatched Alcidas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two ships under his

command, to the relief of Mitylene, with the most pressing orders, they and their confederates invaded Attica. Their design was, by this diversion, to give the Athenians so much employ on all sides, that they might be unable to give any obstruction to their squadron bound for Mitylene. This present invasion was led by Cleomenes, who was his father's brother, in the right of Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax the king, but yet in his minority. They now utterly destroyed those parts of Attica that had been ravaged already. Whatever again began to flourish, and whatever had been spared in former incursions, now fell before their fury. And this excursion, next to the second, was the sharpest they ever made on the Athenians: for, having continued their stay so long as to give time to their squadron to arrive at Lesbos, and send them news of their success, they had leisure to extend their devastations over almost all the country. But when all their expectations ended in disappointment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew, and were disbanded to their respective cities.

In the mean time the Mityleneans, when they saw nothing of the squadron from Peloponnesus, which was loitering in the course, and their provisions began to fail, were necessitated to capitulate with the Athenians on this occasion: Salæthus, who had also himself given up all hopes of relief, caused the populace, who before were light-armed, to put on heavy armor, with a design to make a sally on the Athenians: but they, so soon as they had received their armor, would no longer obey their governors, but assembling together in bodies, ordered those in authority either publicly to produce what provisions they had, and divide equally among them, or otherwise they would immediately make their own terms with the Athenians, and give up

THUC.

VOL. I.

R

the city. Those in command being sensible that they had not force sufficient to hinder this, and that their own danger would be extreme, should they by standing out be excluded the capitulation, joined with them in procuring the following terms from Paches and the Athenians :—

‘ That it should be submitted to the people of Athens to determine as they please in relation to the Mityleneans.

‘ That the Mityleneans should immediately receive their army into the city, and despatch an embassy to them to know their pleasure.

‘ That sufficient respite shall be indulged for this, during which Paches should put no one Mitylenean in chains ; should make none a slave ; should put none to death.’

These were the terms of the surrender. But those of the Mityleneans who had been most active in all the negotiations with the Lacedæmonians were thrown into the utmost consternation, and being quite in despair when the army took possession of the place, seated themselves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, having ordered them to arise, with a promise of protecting them from insults, sent them over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleasure of the Athenians. Having farther despatched some triremes to Antissa, he took it in, and made all other dispositions he judged expedient in regard to his army.

The Peloponnesians on board the squadron of forty ships, who ought to have made the utmost expedition, but instead of that had loitered on the coast of Peloponnesus, and made the rest of the voyage in a leisurely manner, had proceeded so far as Delos before their motions were known at Athens. Being advanced from Delos to Icarus and Myconus, they received the

first intelligence that Mitylene was taken: but being desirous of certain information, they sailed forwards to Embatus of Erythræa. Mitylene had been taken about seven days before they came up to Embatus. Here, assured of the truth, they consulted what was now to be done; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, gave his opinion thus:—

‘To you, O Alcidas, and as many other Peloponnesians as are joined with me in the present command, I freely declare it to be my own opinion that we should sail to Mitylene, as we are, before the enemy is apprised of our arrival. It is probable, as they are so lately possessed of the city, we shall find it very remissly and imperfectly guarded; and towards the sea intirely neglected, as on that side they cannot in the least expect the approach of an enemy, and our strength in that element is superior. It is probable also that their land force is dispersed, in that negligent manner which victory indulges, into the scattered houses of refreshment. If therefore we can come on them by surprise and by night, I hope, by the assistance of our friends within, if really within we have a friend remaining, to give a new turn to our own affairs. Let us not be staggered at the danger of the attempt, but remember that all the turns of war are owing to some such reverse as this: which, that commander who is most on his guard against, and who can discern and seize such critical moments for assaulting his enemies, must be most frequently successful.’

He gave his opinion thus; but it had no effect on Alcidas. Some other persons, exiles from Ionia, and some Lesbians who were also on board, advised him farther, ‘That since he seemed to be discouraged by the apparent danger of that attempt, he should seize some city in Ionia, or Cyme in Ætolia: that, by favor

of such a hold for war, they might bring about the revolt of Ionia: that in such a step success might justly be hoped, as his presence would be highly acceptable there: that, if they could cut off the very great revenue which accrued thence to the Athenians, the loss, added to the expense of endeavoring a recovery, must drain their treasure: that they farther thought they could prevail on Pissuthnes to join with them in the war.'

But Alcidas would not listen to these proposals, and got a majority to support his own opinion, 'That, since it was too late to succor Mitylene, they should without loss of time return to Peloponnesus.' Weighing therefore from Embatus, he put again to sea; and, touching at Myonesus of the Teians, he there butchered in cold blood a number of prisoners, whom he had taken in the voyage. Putting afterwards into Ephesus, he was attended there by an embassy from the Samians of Anæa, representing to him, 'That it was no honorable method of vindicating the liberty of Greece to butcher men who had not so much as lifted up the hand against him, who were not enemies in heart, but of mere necessity dependent on the Athenians: that, unless he changed his conduct, he would bring over but few of his enemies into friendship, but turn a far greater number of friends into enemies.' He was wrought on by this remonstrance, and set all the Chians and others, whom he had yet reserved, at liberty: for those who had at any time descried this squadron had never thought of flying, but boldly approached it as certainly Athenian. They really had no ground to imagine, that whilst the Athenians were masters of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet should dare to put over to Ionia.

From Ephesus, Alcidas made the best of his way, or rather fled outright; for he had been discovered by the Salaminian and the Paralus, whilst he lay at anchor

near Claros. These vessels happened at that time to be on a cruise from Athens. He was now apprehensive of a chase, and so stretched out to sea; determining, if possible, not to make any land again till he had reached Peloponnesus. Notice of him came first to Paches and the Athenians from Erythræa: it was then repeated from all parts: for as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, the sight of the Peloponnesians on that coast had struck a panic, lest, though their intention was not to continue there, they should at once assault and destroy their cities. The Salaminian also and Paralus,<sup>1</sup> after they had descried him at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the tidings. Paches set on the chase with warmth, and pursued it as far as the isle of Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reaching him, he turned back again for his post; and since he had not been able to come up with them by sea, thought a great point was carried in not finding them refuged in any harbor, where they must have been under a necessity to fortify their station, and oblige him to a regular procedure and attack.

In sailing back he touched at Notium of the Colophonians, in which at this time the Colophonians resided, the upper city having been taken by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had broken in by favor of an intestine sedition. It was taken about the time that

<sup>1</sup> These two vessels seem to have been the packets or yachts of the state of Athens. Their force was small in comparison of the ships of war, as they were chiefly designed for nimbleness and expedition. They carried ambassadors to and fro, went on all public errands whether of a civil or religious nature, and transported magistrates and generals to and from their posts. They were navigated only by freeborn citizens of Athens, who besides receiving more pay, esteemed it also a greater honor to serve on board these vessels, which were sacred.



the Peloponnesians made their second incursion into Attica. But in Notium a second sedition broke out between those who resorted thither for refuge and the old inhabitants. The latter having obtained an aid of Arcadians and barbarians from Pissuthnes, kept within a part separated by a transverse wall, and the management of affairs was in the hands of some Colophonians of the upper city, who were in the Medish interest, and had been received amongst them as an aid. But the former, who had resorted hither for refuge, and were a body of exiles, applied to Paches for protection. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians within the transverse wall, to come out to a conference, assuring him, 'if they came to no agreement, he would replace him within both safe and sound.' On this Hippias came out; and Paches immediately put him under an arrest, but laid no bonds on him. This done, he on a sudden assaulted the wall; by favor of the surprise carried it; and put all the Arcadians and barbarians within to the sword. After this, he replaced Hippias within, in the same state he had promised; but when he had him there immediately apprehended him again, and shot him to death with arrows. Notium he delivered into the hands of the Colophonians, excluding those only who were in the interest of the Mede. In process of time, the Athenians having sent leaders thither on purpose, and declared Notium an Athenian colony, settled in it the Colophonians that were any where to be found, under the accustomed regulations.

Paches, being returned to Mitylene, completed the reduction of Pyrrha and Eressus; and having apprehended Salæthus the Lacedæmonian, who had been concealed in the city, sent him to Athens along with *those* citizens of Mitylene from Tenedos, whom he had

kept in safe custody there, and all others who appeared to have been concerned in the revolt. As an escort to these he sent away also the greater part of his army. With the remainder he himself stayed behind to regulate the affairs of Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos, to the best of his discretion.

When the authors of the revolt and Salæthus were arrived at Athens, the Athenians instantly put Salæthus to death. He made them many fruitless proposals to save his life; and amongst the rest, that the siege of Plataea should be raised, which was still besieged by the Peloponnesians. They next entered into consultation what should be done with the revoltors; and in the warmth of anger decreed—‘That not only those who were now at Athens should be put to death, but the same sentence should extend to all the men of Mitylene who were adult; and the women and children be sold for slaves.’ They were exasperated against them not only because they had revolted, but because they had done it without the provocation which others had received in the rigor of their government. The Peloponnesian fleet added the greater impetuosity to this their resentment, as they had dared to venture so far as Ionia in aid of the rebels: for it plainly appeared to them that the revolt had not been made without most previous deliberation. In short, they despatched a trireme to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to see it put in immediate execution on the Mityleneans.

The day following, repentance on a sudden touched their hearts, moved by the reflection that they had passed a savage and monstrous decree in dooming a whole city to that destruction which was only due to the authors of the guilt. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenean ambassadors then residing at Athens

and such of the Athenians as inclining to mercy had a mind to save them, than they addressed themselves to the magistrates, begging the decree might be again debated. Their request was the more easily granted as the magistrates had discovered that the bulk of the city were desirous to have a second opportunity of declaring their sentiments. An assembly of the people was again convened, and various opinions were offered by different persons, till Cleon, the son of Cleanetus, who in the former assembly had proposed and carried the murdering sentence, who in all other respects was the most violent of all the citizens, and at this time had by far the greatest influence over the people, stood forth again and spoke as follows:—

‘ On many other occasions my own experience has convinced me that a democracy is incapable of ruling over others; but I see it with the highest certainty now in this your present repentance concerning the Mityleneans. In security so void of terror, in safety so exempt from treachery, you pass your days within the walls of Athens, that you are grown quite safe and secure about your dependents. Whenever, soothed by their specious intreaties, you betray your judgment or relent in pity, not a soul amongst you reflects that you are acting the dastardly part, not in truth to confer obligations on those dependents, but to endanger your own welfare and safety. It is then quite remote from your thoughts that your rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that they are ever intent on prospects to shake off your yoke—that yoke, to which they ever reluctantly submitted. It is not forgiveness on your part, after injuries received, that can keep them fast in their obedience, since this must be ever the consequence of your own superior power and not of gratitude in them.

‘ Above all, I dread that extremity of danger to which we are exposed, if not one of your decrees must ever be carried into act, and we remain for ever ignorant—that the community which uniformly abides by a worse set of laws has the advantage over another, which is finely modelled in every respect, except in practice ; that modest ignorance is a much surer support than genius which scorns to be controlled ; and that the duller part of mankind in general administer public affairs much better than your men of vivacity and wit. The last assume a pride in appearing wiser than the laws ; in every debate about the public good they aim merely at victory, as if there were no other points sufficiently important wherein to display their superior talents ; and by this their conduct they generally subvert the public welfare : the former who are diffident of their own abilities, who regard themselves as less wise than the laws of their country—though unable to detect the specious orator, yet being better judges of equity than champions in debate, for the most part enforce the rational conduct. This beyond denial is our duty at present ; we should scorn competitions in eloquence and wit, nor wilfully and contrary to our own opinion mislead the judgment of this full assembly.

‘ For my part, I persist in my former declarations, and I am surprised at the men who proposed to have the affair of Mitylene again debated, who endeavor to protract the execution of justice, in the interest of the guilty more than of the injured : for by this means the sufferer proceeds to take vengeance on the criminal with the edge of his resentment blunted ; when revenge, the opposite of wrong, the more nearly it treads on the heels of injury, generally inflicts the most condign punishment. But I am more surprised at him, whoever he be, that shall dare to contradict, and pretend

---

to demonstrate that the injuries done by the Mityleneans are really for our service, and that our calamities are hardships on our dependents. He certainly must either presume on his own eloquence, if he contends to prove that what was plainly decreed was never decreed; or, instigated by lucre, will endeavor to seduce you by the elaborate and plausible artifice of words. In such contentions the state indeed awards the victory to whom she pleases, but she sustains all the damage herself. You are answerable for this, Athenians! You! who fondly doat on these wordy competitions! You! who accustomed to be spectators of speeches and hearers of actions! You measure the possibility of future effects by the present eloquence of your orators; you judge of actions already past, not by the certain conviction of your own eyes, but the fallible suggestions of your ears when soothed by the inveigling insinuating flow of words. You are the best in the world to be deceived by novelty of wit, and to refuse to follow the dictates of the approved judicious speaker; slaves as you are to whatever trifles happen always to be in vogue, and looking down with contempt on tried and experienced methods. The most earnest wish that the heart of any of your body ever conceived is, to become a speaker; if that be unattainable, you range yourselves in opposition against all who are so, for fear you should seem in judgment their inferiors. When any thing is acutely uttered, you are ready even to go before it with applause, and intimate your own preconception of the point, at the same time dull at discerning whither it will tend. Your whole passion, in a word, is for things that are not in reality and common life; but of what passes before your eyes you have no proper perception. And, frankly, you are quite infatuated by the lust of hearing, and resemble more the idle spectators of contending sophists than

men who meet to deliberate on public affairs. From such vain amusements endeavoring to divert you, I boldly affirm, that no one city in the world has injured you so much as Mitylene.

‘Those who, unable to support the rigor of your government, or who, compelled to do it by hostile force, have revolted from you, I readily absolve. But for a people who inhabit an island, a fortified island; who had no reason to dread the violence of our enemies, except by sea; who even at sea, by the strength of their own shipping, were able to guard themselves against all attacks, who enjoyed their own model of government, and were ever treated by us with the highest honor and regard; for such a people to revolt in this manner is never to be forgiven. Is not their whole procedure one series of treachery? Have they not rather made war on than revolted against us? for revolt can only be ascribed to those who have suffered violence and outrage. Have they not farther sought out our implacable foes, and begged to participate with them in our destruction? This certainly is a much greater aggravation of guilt, than if merely on their own domestic strength they had rebelled against us. They would not be deterred by the calamities of their neighbors who have frequently before this revolted, and been punished for it by a total reduction; nor would they so far acquiesce in present felicity, as not to hazard the dangerous reverse of misery. Audacious in regard to the future, presumptuous above their strength, but below their intention, they made war their choice, and in preferring violence to the just observance of duty have placed their glory. For, though uninjured and unprovoked, the first moment they saw a probability of prevailing, they seized it and rebelled.

‘*It is the usual effect of prosperity, especially when.*

felt on a sudden, and beyond their hope, to puff up a people into insolence of manners. The successes of mankind, when attained by the rational course, are generally of much longer continuance than when they anticipate pursuit: and, in a word, men are much more expert at repelling adversity than preserving prosperity. By this ought we long ago to have adjusted our conduct towards the Mityleneans, never distinguishing them above others with peculiar regard; and then they never would have been that insolent people we have found them now: for so remarkably perverse is the temper of man, as ever to contemn whoever courts him, and admire whoever will not bend before him.

‘ Let condign punishment therefore be awarded to their demerits. Let not the guilt be avenged on the heads of the few, and the bulk of offenders escape unpunished. The whole people to a man have rebelled against us, when it was in their power to have been sheltered here, and now again to be reinstated in their former seats. But they judged the danger would be lessened by the general concurrence with the few, and so all revolted in concert.

‘ Extend farther your regards to the whole body of your dependents; for if you inflict the same punishments on those who revolt by compulsion of enemies, and who revolt on pure deliberate malice, which of them, do you think, will not seize the least pretext to throw off your yoke; when, if he succeeds, his liberty is recovered, and though he fails, the hurt is so easy to be cured? Besides this, our lives and fortunes will be endangered on every attempt which shall be made. Suppose we succeed, we only recover *an exhausted ruined city*, but shall for the future be *deprived of the revenue arising from it, the essence of our strength*; but, if we cannot prevail, we shall

enlarge the number of enemies we already have ; and at a time when we ought to be employed in resisting our present adversaries, we shall be intangled in wars against our own dependents. We ought not therefore to encourage the hope, whether raised by the force of intreaty, or purchased by the force of corruption, that their errors are but the errors of men, and shall therefore be forgiven. The damage they have done was not involuntary, but they have been deliberate determined villains : forgiveness is only for those who erred not by design.

‘ Moved by the ardency and zeal of my former plea, you made the decree ; and now I earnestly conjure you, not to repent of your own determinations, not to plunge yourselves in inextricable difficulties, through pity, through delight of hearing, and soft forbearance, the three most prejudicial obstacles of power. It is just to show pity to those who are its proper objects, and not to men who would never have felt compassion for us, not to foes who must of necessity be implacable. The orators, those delights of your ears, will have room in debates of lesser moment to catch at your applause, but should be silenced here, where they only can give the public a short-lived pleasure, whilst they embroil it with perplexities not easy to be surmounted, and themselves alone in requital of speaking well will be well rewarded for it. Forbearance, farther, may be shown to those who are willing to be, and will for the future prove themselves our friends ; but not to such inveterate souls as these, who, if suffered to live, will live only to wreak their malice against you.

‘ I shall wave enlargements, and give you only one short assurance, that if you hearken to my admonitions, you will at the same time do justice to the Mityleneans and service to yourselves ; but if you resolve in any other manner, you will receive no thanks



from them, and will establish the clearest evidence for your own condemnation : for, if these men had reason to revolt, it follows that you have tyrannically used them. Grant the injustice of such a rule, but yet that you have presumed to be guilty of it ; why then, on the mere motive of interest, you ought now to chastise them beyond what is right, or immediately to forego your power, and dropping yourselves down into impotent security, to set about the practice of humanity and virtue. But adieu to this vain expedient ! and at once resolve to make them feel that weight of misery they designed for us. Convince them that those who have escaped it can feel as strong resentments as those who projected the fatal blow. Determine now, by recollecting with yourselves what kind of usage you would have received from them, had they succeeded in their plots : they ! the uninjured, unprovoked aggressors. It is an allowed truth, that men, who without the least provocation have recourse to acts of malice, will be sated with nothing less than complete destruction, as they must ever be terrified at the sight of a surviving foe. For he who suffers from a quarter whence he never deserved it ; will not so easily lay down his resentments, as when mutual enmity has kindled the contention. Be not therefore traitors to your own selves. Figure to yourselves, as strongly as you can, the miseries they designed you ; remember how you wished for nothing in this world so much as to have them in your power, and now retaliate on them. Relent not at the scene of horror imagination may present to your fancy, but fix your remembrance fast on that weight of misery which was just now suspended over your own heads. Punish these wretches according to their deserts ; make them a notable example to the rest of your dependents, that death must be the portion of whoever

---

dares revolt: for when once they are certain of this, your arms will no more be recalled from your foreign enemies, to be employed in the chastisement of your own dependents.'

In this manner Cleon<sup>1</sup> supported the decree, and when he had concluded, Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who in the former assembly had most strenuously opposed the bloody sentence against the Mityleneans, stood forth, and thus replied:

'I neither blame those who proposed the resumption of the decree against Mitylene, nor do I praise the men who inveigh against repeated consultations on

<sup>1</sup> From the short sketch of Cleon's character given before by Thucydides, and the speech he has now made, he is likely to be no favorite with the reader. Cicero has styled him 'a turbulent but eloquent Athenian.' By means of his eloquence, and an impudence that never could be dashed, he was now a prime favorite with the people, but the scorn and terror of all good men at Athens. He had ever been a snarler at Pericles, but so long as he lived could obtain no share in the public administration. He had now got the ascendant by cajoling the people, and by his loud and daily invectives against their ministers and commanders. He will make a very splendid and very despicable figure in the sequel. Aristophanes, who had a particular grudge against him, has exhibited him in the most distasteful light. His comedy of the *Horsemen* or *Knights* is intirely employed to show him off. He calls him throughout the *Paphlagonian*, to brand his low and brutal disposition, who 'quitting his original trade of selling leather, vile leather, since people rather swam than walked in the shoes made of it, was now become the leading politician, the scourge and pest of the republic.' The chorus of the play salutes him with the most villanous titles; and an oracle is cooked up, which prophesies that they shall never get rid of Cleon till he is overpowered by a greater scoundrel than himself. A dealer in black puddings is at last procured to be his competitor. The contest is carried on with all the ribaldry and scurrility that unbridled wit could forge for such characters, and Cleon is at length defeated. This is the event on the stage, but was by no means so in the state of Athens. The wit of Aristophanes seldom hurt knaves and scoundrels; it wounded and was mischievous only to the ablest ministers and the warmest patriots.

points of the greatest importance. But I lay it down for certain that there are no two greater impediments of sound mature counsel than precipitation and anger; of which, the one is closely connected with madness, the other with raw inexperience and short liminary judgment.

‘It may indeed be warmly asserted, that words are not the proper guides to actions. But the author of such an assertion is either wanting in discernment, or confines it only to his own selfish views. He is wanting in discernment, if he imagines there is any other possible method of putting light into things that are future or unseen; or confines it only to himself, if willing to recommend a scandalous measure, and conscious he has not eloquence enough to support it openly, he launches out into plausible calumnies, to intimidate his opponents as well as his audience.

‘But odious beyond all support is their procedure who prematurely condemn the advice of others as purchased and corrupt: for would they only acquiesce in the charge of ignorance, the defeated opponent goes off with the bare character of a man, less enlightened indeed, but quite as honest. If he be charged with corruption, his point he may carry, but his honesty will ever be suspected; and if his point be lost, he must pass for knave and blockhead both. Such methods can never be conducive to the public good. The men best able to advise are by this means intimidated: though the public welfare would then be best secured, if every person of so disingenuous a temper was not able to open his mouth; for then, by his seducements, the public could never be misled. But it is the duty of every true patriot to despise the slanders of opponents, and on fair and impartial views to get his own advice accepted. It is the duty of every well-regulated public, not indeed to load a man with honors for

having given the best advice, but, never to abridge him of his present portion; and if he cannot prevail, by no means to disgrace, much less to punish him: for then, neither would the successful debater, from a view of enhancing his own personal honors, ever speak against conscience, or aim merely at applause; nor would he, who has been unsuccessful in his motions, be greedy of proposing whatever may cajole, and so earn popularity for himself. But the method in vogue with us is the reverse of this; and what is worse, if a person be suspected of corruption, though he advise the most prudent expedients, yet the odium raised against him on the weak suggestion of lucre, quite weighs him down, and we are deprived of the manifest service he could do to the state: nay, such is our method, that even the best advice, if readily offered, can escape suspicion no more than the worst. And hence it is necessarily incumbent, as well on him who would persuade the public into the most prejudicial measures, to seduce the people with art, as on him who would advise the best, to disguise the truth in order to prevail. Amidst these jugglings, the public alone is debarred the service of its most able counsellors, since in a plain and open method they cannot possibly act, and artifice must clear the way before them: for the man who openly bestows any benefits on it is constantly suspected of doing underhand a greater to himself.

‘When affairs therefore of so high concern are before you, when the general temper is so overrun with jealousy, we, who presume to advise, must enlarge our prospect farther than you, who only assist at a transient consultation; because we are accountable for what we propose, and you are not accountable for the prejudices with which you hear: for if not only he who proposed, but he who complied, were equally answer-

THUC.

VOL. I.

able for events, your determinations would be better framed than they are at present. But now, hurried along as you are by your hasty resentments on any sinister event, you wreak your fury only on the single opinion of the person who advised, and not on your own joint opinions, by concurrence of which the mis-carriage was incurred.

‘For my part, I neither stand up to deny certain facts in favor of the Mityleneans, nor to waste the time in fruitless accusations. We are not debating now what wrongs they have done us, since that would be a reproach to sense ; but what determination about them is best: for though I can prove, beyond a scruple, that they have injured us in the most outrageous manner, yet I shall not for that reason advise you to butcher them, unless it be expedient ; nor, were they objects of forgiveness, should I advise forgiveness, unless I judged it for the interest of the public. I apprehend that our consultations turn more on a future than a present view. And Cleon here most confidently asserts, that the surest expedient of your future welfare is, to prevent all other revolts by inflicting death in doom of this ; but, equally confident of the just expedient of future security, I declare quite on the other side : and I intreat you by no means to reject the real advantage of mine for the specious colorings of his advice. Strict justice, I grant, may be with him ; and, enraged as you are against the Mityleneans, may have a sudden influence on you. But we meet not here in judgment on them, and justly to decide is not now our employment ; we are only to consult how to dispose of them best for our own advantage.

‘In the public communities of men death is the penalty awarded to several crimes ; to such as are not enormous like this, but of a less guilty nature. Yet puffed up with hope, men run all hazards ; and no one

ever yet has boldly incurred the danger, if self-convinced beforehand that he could not survive the attempt. Where was the city so bent on revolt, that when its own domestic strength, or the aid of others, were judged unequal to the work, durst ever attempt it? The whole of mankind, whether individuals or communities, are by nature liable to sin; and a law of infallible prevention will never be enacted. Men by repeated trials have enforced all kinds of punishment; attentive, if possible, to restrain the outrages of the wicked: and in the early age, it is probable that milder penalties were assigned for the most enormous wrongs; but, being found by experience ineffectual, they were afterwards extended generally to loss of life: this however is not yet effective. Some terror therefore must be invented, even more alarming than this, or this will never sufficiently restrain. But then there is a poverty which renders necessity daring; there is a power which renders pride and insolence rapacious. There are other contingences which, in the fervor of passions, as every human mind is possessed by some too stubborn to admit a cure, drive them on boldly to confront extremities. But the greatest incentives of all are hope and love: this points out a path, and that moves along according to direction: this thoughtlessly proposes the scheme, and that immediately suggests a certainty of success. These are the sources of all our evils; and these invisible principles within us are too strong for all the terrors that are seen without. To these add Fortune, who contributes her ample share to divest the mind of its balance. She shows herself by unexpected starts, and encourages even the incompetent to venture dangers; and has a greater influence over communities, as the ends proposed by them are of the greatest concern; such as liberty or dominion,

---

where every individual, amidst the universal ardor, unaccountably plumes himself up, and acts with a spirit above himself. But, in truth, it is quite impossible: it is a proof of egregious folly to imagine, when human nature is impelled by its own impetuous passions towards such objects, that the force of laws or any intervening terror is strong enough to divert them from the mark. Hence therefore arises the strongest dissuasive to us from confiding in the penalty of death as the only pledge of our future safety; which must betray us into weak prejudicial measures; which must drive all revolters into utter despair, by showing them plainly that we shall never accept repentance; shall not give them one moment's indulgence to palliate their offences.

‘Consider with yourselves, in the merciful light, that a revolted city, when for certainty assured that it cannot hold out, may submit on our own conditions, whilst yet in a capacity to reimburse our expenses, and to advance the future. But in the opposite case, can you imagine there is any city which will not better prepare itself for revolt than Mitylene has done, and hold out a siege to the last extremity? Is there no difference between a quick and a slow submission? Shall not we be hurt, if forced through their despair to continue a tedious and expensive siege; and when the place is taken, to be masters only of one heap of desolation, unable for the future to squeeze the least pittance or revenue from it? It is revenue alone which renders us a terror to our foes. We ought not therefore, with the rigor of judges, to inflict the exactest punishments on these offenders. We ought rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate correction still to preserve those cities in a full capacity of paying us the needful tribute. To keep men firm in their duty, we should

scorn the expedient of severe and sanguinary laws, since mild discretionary caution would better answer the purpose. This prudent conduct we are now reversing, if, when repossessed of a city stripped of its former liberty and ruled with violence, sufficient motives of revolt, that it may again become independent; if now we judge that this ought to be avenged with a weight of severity. Men who have known what liberty is ought not to be too severely chastised if they have dared to revolt; but we ought to observe them with timely vigilance before they revolt, to prevent their taking the least step towards it, or even once entertaining a thought about it; at least, when we have quelled the insurrection, the guilt should be fastened on as few as possible.

‘ Consider, I beseech you, with yourselves, how greatly you will err in this, and in another respect, if Cleon’s advice be approved: for now, the populace of all the cities are generally well affected towards us. They either refuse to concur with the few in their revolts; or, if their concurrence be forced, they instantly turn enemies to those who forced them; and you proceed to determine the contest, assured that the populace of the adverse city will be active in your favor. But if you doom to general excision the people of Mitylene, those who had no share in the revolt; who, when once they had got arms into their hands, spontaneously delivered up the place; you will be guilty, first of base ingratitude, for murdering your own benefactors; and you will, next, establish such a precedent, as the factious, great above all things, wish to see: for then, whenever the latter effect the revolt of cities, they will instantly have the people attached to their party; since you yourselves have enforced the precedent, that punishment must fall on the heads,



not only of the guilty, but even of the innocent. Whereas, indeed, though they had been guilty, we ought to have dissembled our knowledge of it, that we might not force the only party which ever takes our side into utter enmity and aversion. And I esteem it much more conducive to the firm support of empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may have felt, than in all the severity of justice to destroy those persons whom in interest we ought to spare: and thus that union of justice to others, and duty to yourselves, in this instance of punishing the Mityleneans, as alleged by Cleon, is plainly found to be grossly inconsistent; to be utterly impossible.

‘Own yourselves therefore convinced that the greatest advantages will result from the conduct which I have recommended; and, without giving too wide a scope to mercy or forbearance, by which I could never suffer you to be seduced, follow my advice, and in pursuance of it resolve ‘To judge and condemn, at your own discretion, those guilty Mityleneans whom Paches has sent hither to attend your decisions, and to let the others continue as they are.’ These are expedients of your future welfare and of immediate terror to your foes. For they who can form the soundest deliberations stand stronger up against hostile opposition than the men who rush to action with indiscreet unpremeditating strength.’

Diodotus ended here. And when these two opinions, diametrically opposite to one another, had been thus delivered, the Athenians had a stiff contest in support of each, and on holding up of hands, there seemed near an equality; but the majority proved at last to be along with Diodotus.

On this they immediately sent away another trireme, enjoining all possible dispatch, lest this second,

not coming in time, might find the city already destroyed, as the other had got the start of a day and a night. The Mitylenean ambassadors amply furnished them with wine and barley-cakes, and promised them great rewards, if they arrived in time. By this means they were so eager to accelerate the passage, that even whilst plying the oar they ate their cakes dipped in wine and oil: and whilst one half of the number refreshed themselves with sleep, the other kept rowing amain. So fortunate were they that not one adverse blast retarded their course. The former vessel, as sent on a monstrous errand, had not hastened its passage in the least; and the latter was most intently bent on expedition. That indeed got before to Mitylene, but only long enough for Paches to read over the decree, and orders for its immediate execution. At that crisis the latter arrived, and prevented the massacre. To such an extremity of danger was Mitylene reduced.

The other Mityleneans, whom Paches<sup>1</sup> had sent to Athens as deepest concerned in the revolt, were there put to death, according to the advice of Cleon. And the number of these amounted to somewhat above a thousand.

The Athenians, farther, demolished the walls of Mitylene and took away their shipping. They did not for the future enjoin an annual tribute on the Les-

<sup>1</sup> We hear no more in this history of Paches, who certainly in the reduction of Lesbos had done a great service to his country, and had behaved through the whole affair with great discretion and humanity. And yet Plutarch tells us in two passages, in the lives of Aristides and Nicias, that at his return he was called to account for his conduct during his command, and finding he was going to be condemned, his resentment and indignation rose so high, that he instantly slew himself in court.

bians, but dividing the whole island into shares, except what belonged to Methymne, three thousand in the whole, they set apart three hundred of these as sacred to the gods, and sent some of their own people who were appointed by lot, to take possession of the rest, as full proprietors. The Lesbians, as tenants of these, were obliged to pay them two minæ<sup>1</sup> yearly for every share, in consideration of which they had still the use of the soil. The Athenians also took from them several towns on the continent which had belonged to the Mityleneans, and which continued afterwards in subjection to the Athenians. Thus ended the commotions of Lesbos.

The same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians, commanded by Nicias,<sup>2</sup> the son of Ni-

<sup>1</sup> 6*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.* sterling.

<sup>2</sup> Nicias is now for the first time in the chief command, who is to act parts of very great importance in the sequel of the war. We should therefore take some notice of him on his first appearance. Plutarch, who has written his life, gives light into several circumstances, which fall not within the cognisance of a general historian. He was born of a noble family in Athens, and was one of the most wealthy citizens. Beside his estates, he had a large annual income from the silver mines at Laurium. Not that these mines belonged to him, as one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patrimony of the state annexed to it by Themistocles for the support of the navy: but, as Xenophon relates, in his treatise of revenue, Nicias had a thousand slaves constantly employed in working these mines. He hired them out to Sostris the Thracian, who was undertaker of the work, on condition to receive a clear obole a day for every one of them; and he always kept up the number. His income from hence was therefore near 2000*l.* sterling a year. He acted under Pericles so long as he lived; and, after his death, was set up by the more sober and sensible Athenians as a balance to Cleon, who was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of his country, of unblemished integrity, and very gentle and complacent in his manners. His good qualities were numerous and shining; his foibles were, a great diffidence of himself, and a dread of the people, which made him court them

teratus, executed a design on Minoa, the island which lies before Megara. The Megareans, having built a fort on it, used it as a garrison. But it was the scheme of Nicias to fix the post of observation for the Athenians there, as being much nearer situated, and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. This would prevent the sudden courses of the Peloponnesians, frequent from thence; would curb the piratical cruises; and, at the same time, stop all importations into Megara. Beginning therefore with the two forts detached from Nisæa, he took them by means of the engines he played against them from the sea; and having thus opened the channel between them and the island, he took in by a wall of fortification that part of the main-land from whence only by crossing the morass and the help of a bridge, a succor could be thrown into the island, which lay at a very small distance from the continent. This work was completed in a few days, after which Nicias, leaving behind in the island a sufficient garrison to defend the works, drew off the rest of his army.

About the same time this summer, the Platæans,

by laying out his wealth in public games and shows for their entertainment. He had an inward fund of real piety; but was superstitiously attached to the ceremonial of the religion of his country. His great wealth drew a great number of followers and parasites about him; and his benevolent disposition was always seeking occasions of doing good. 'In short,' says Plutarch, 'bad men had a sure fund in his pusillanimity, and good men in his humanity.' Nobody could either hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his interest there was great. He was always cautious, and always diffident, and under such an awe of the people in the general assemblies, that they would shout out to him by way of encouragement, as his modesty was amiable and engaging when opposed to the impudence of Cleon. Thus much may suffice at present, since his military expeditions and the whole of his political conduct will be related by Thucydides.

whose provisions were quite spent, and who could not possibly hold out any longer, were brought to a surrender in the following manner: the enemy made an assault on their wall, which they had not sufficient strength to repel. The Lacedæmonian general being thus convinced of their languid condition, was determined not to take the place by storm. In this he acted pursuant to orders sent him from Lacedæmon, with a view, that whenever a peace should be concluded with the Lacedæmonians, one certain condition of which must be reciprocally to restore the places taken in the war, Platæa might not be included in the restitution, as having freely and without compulsion gone over to them. A herald was accordingly despatched with this demand, 'Whether they are willing voluntarily to give up the city to the Lacedæmonians, and accept them for their judges who would punish only the guilty, and contrary to forms of justice not even one of those.' The herald made this demand aloud. And the Platæans, who were now reduced to excessive weakness, delivered up the city.

The Peloponnesians supplied the Platæans with necessary sustenance for the space of a few days, till the five delegates arrived from Lacedæmon to preside at their trial. And yet, when these were actually come, no judicial process was formed against them. They only called them out, and put this short question to them: 'Whether they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the present war? Their answer was, that they begged permission to urge their plea at large; which being granted, they pitched on Astymachus the son of Asopalaus, and Laco the son of Aeimnestus, who had formerly enjoyed the public hospitality of the Lacedæmonians, to be their speakers, who stood forth and pleaded thus:

‘ Placing in you, O Lacedæmonians, an intire confidence, we have delivered up our city; but never imagined we should be forced to such a process as this, when we expected only to be tried by justice and laws; when we yielded to plead, not before other judges as is now our fate, but only before yourselves. Then indeed we thought that justice might be obtained. But now we have terrible grounds for apprehending that we have at once been doubly overreached. Strong motives occur to alarm our suspicions that the point most in view is to deprive us of our lives, and that you will not prove impartial judges. We cannot but be too certain of this, when no manner of crime is formally objected, against which we might form our defence; when barely at our own intreaty we are heard, and your concise demand is such, that if we answer it with truth we condemn ourselves; if with falsehood, must be instantly refuted.

‘ Thus on all sides beset with perplexities, something of necessity must be said in our own behalf; nay, where the danger is so urgent, the only small glimpse of security appears in hazarding a plea. For persons like us distressed in silence to abandon their own defence; this may with sad compunction torture them at last, as if their safety might have been earned by speaking for themselves, though never was persuasion so much to be despaired of as at present. Were we indeed, who are the persecuted party, intirely unknown to our judges, we might then allege such evidence as through ignorance you could not overturn, and so farther our defence. But now we must speak before men who are informed of every point. Nor do our fears result from the prior knowlege you have had of us, as if you were now proceeding against us for having in valor been inferior to yourselves; but

from our own sad forebodings, that we are cited to a tribunal which has already condemned us, to gratify others. Yet, what we can justly say for ourselves in regard to all our differences with the Thebans, we shall boldly allege; the good services we have done to you and the rest of Greece we shall fairly recite; and strive, if possible, to persuade.

‘To your concise demand—whether we have done any good service in this war to the Lacedæmonians and their allies? we answer thus: ‘If you interrogate us as enemies, though we have done you no good, yet we have done you no harm; if you regard us as friends, you have offended more than we, in making war on us.’ In regard to the peace and against the Mede, we have ever honestly performed our duty: the peace was not violated first by us against him; we alone of all the Boeotians attended you in the field to maintain the liberty of Greece: for though an inland people, we boldly engaged in the sea-fight at Artemisium; and in the battle, fought on this our native ground, we assisted you and Pausanias; and whatever the danger to which Greece, in that troublesome period of time was exposed, in all we bore a share beyond our strength. To you in particular, O ye Lacedæmonians, in that greatest consternation Sparta ever felt, when after the earthquake your rebellious helots had seized on Ithome, we immediately despatched the third part of our force for succor. These things you are bound in honor never to forget: for thus on former, and those most critical occasions, we with honor showed ourselves your friends. But at length we became your enemies! For that blame only yourselves: because when we stood in great want of support against the violence and oppression of the Thebans, to you we applied, and by you were rejected. You commanded us then to address ourselves to Athens.

Athens you said was near, but Sparta lay too remote to serve us. Yet, notwithstanding this, in the present war we have committed no one dishonorable act in regard to you, nor should ever have committed. You enjoined us indeed to revolt from the Athenians, and we refused to comply; but in this we have done no injustice: for they marched cheerfully to our succor against the Thebans, when you shrunk back; and to betray them afterwards had been base in us; in us, who were highly indebted to them, who at our own request were received into their friendship, and honored by them with the freedom of Athens. No, it was rather our duty boldly to advance wherever they pleased to order. And whenever either you or the Athenians lead out your allies into the field, not such as merely follow you are to be censured for any wrong you may respectively commit, but those who lead them out to its commission.

‘Manifold and notorious are the instances in which the Thebans have injured us. But outrageous above all is the last, about which you need no information, since by it we are plunged into this depth of distress. A right undoubtedly we had to turn our avenging arms on men who, in the midst of peace, and what is more, on the sacred monthly solemnity, feloniously seized on our city. We obeyed herein that great universal law which justifies self-defence against an hostile invader; and therefore cannot, with any appearance of equity, be now doomed to punishment at their instigation: for, if your own immediate interest, and their present concurrence with you in war, is to prescribe and regulate your sentence, you will show yourselves by no means fair judges of equity, but partially attached to private interest. What! though these incendiaries seem now a people well worth your gaining? There



was a season, a most dangerous and critical season, when you yourselves, and the other Grecians, were in different sentiments. Now indeed, incited by ambition, you aim the fatal blow at others; but at that season, when the barbarian struck at enslaving us all, these Thebans were then that barbarian's coadjutors. And equitable certainly it is that our alacrity at that season should be set in the balance against our present transgressions, if transgressors at present we have been. You then would find our greater merits quite outweighing our petty offences; and our merits to be dated at a time when it was exceeding rare to see Grecian bravery ranged in opposition to the power of Xerxes; when praise was ascribed, not to those who, intent on self-preservation, dropped all the means of withstanding his invasion, but who chose, through a series of danger, courageously to execute the most glorious acts. Of this number are we, and as such have been pre-eminently most honorably distinguished. And yet, from this original we fear our ruin now may have taken its rise, as we chose to follow the Athenians from a regard to justice, rather than you from the views of interest. But so long as the nature of things continues to be the same you also ought to convince the world that your sentiments about them are not changed; that your principles still suggest it to you as your greatest interest; that whenever your gallant compatriots have laid on you an obligation strong enough to be eternally in force, something on every present occurrence should be done for us by way of just acknowledgement.

‘ Reflect farther within yourselves that you are now distinguished by the body of Greece as examples for upright disinterested conduct. Should you therefore determine in regard to us what in justice cannot be supported, for the eyes of the world are now intent

on your proceedings, and as judges applauded for their worth you sit on us whose reputation is yet unblemished; take care that you do not incur the general abhorrence, by an indecent sentence against valuable men, though you yourselves are more to be valued; nor reposit in her common temples those spoils you have taken from us the benefactors of Greece. How horrible will it seem for Platæa to be destroyed by Lacedæmonians! that your fathers inscribed the city on the tripod of Delphos in justice to its merit, and that you expunged its very being from the community of Greece to gratify the Thebans! To such excess of misery have we been ever exposed, that if the Medes had prevailed we must have been utterly undone; and now must be completely ruined by the Thebans, in the presence of you who were formerly our most cordial friends! Two of the sharpest, most painful trials we are to undergo, who but lately, had we not surrendered our city, must have gradually perished by famine; and now stand before a tribunal to be sentenced to death. Wretched Platæans, by all mankind abandoned! We, who beyond our strength were once the supports of Greece, are now quite destitute, bereft of all redress! Not one of our old allies to appear in our behalf; and even you, O ye Lacedæmonians, you our only hope, as we have too much reason to apprehend, determined to give us up!

‘But, by the gods, who witnessed once the social oaths we mutually exchanged; by that virtue we exerted for the general welfare of Greece; by those we adjure you to be moved with compassion, and to relent, if with the Thebans you are combined against us. In gratitude to us, beg the favor of them, that they would not butcher whom you ought to spare; demand such a

modest requital from them for your base concurrence, and entail not infamy on yourselves, to give others a cruel satisfaction. To take away our lives would be a short and easy task ; but then, to efface the infamy of it will be a work of toil. You have no color to wreak your vengeance on us as enemies, who have ever wished you well, and bore arms against you in mere self-defence. Your decisions can in nowise be righteous, unless you exempt us from the dread of death. Recollect in time that you received us by free surrender ; that to you we held forth our hands ; the law forbids Grecians to put such to death ; and that we have been from time immemorial benefactors to you : for cast your eyes there on the sepulchres of your fathers, who fell by the swords of the Medes, and were interred in this our earth : these we have annually honored with vestments, and all solemn decorations at our public expense. Whatever has been the produce of our soil, to them we have ever offered the first-fruits of the whole ; as friends, out of the earth that was dear to them ; as companions, to those who once fought together in the same field ; and, lest all this by a wrong determination you instantly disannul, maturely reflect : for Pausanias interred them here, judging he had laid them in a friendly soil, and in the care of men with friendly dispositions. If therefore you put us to death, and turn this Platæan into Theban soil, what is this but to leave your fathers and relations in a hostile land, and in the power of those who murdered them, never again to receive the sepulchral honors ? Will you, farther, enslave the spot on which the Grecians earned their liberty ? Will you lay desolate the temples of those gods to whom they addressed their vows before that battle against the Medes, and

o were victorious? And, will you abolish the solemn sacrifices which those gallant patriots have founded and appointed?

‘ It cannot, O Lacedæmonians, be consistent with our glory to violate the solemn institutions of Greece, the memory of your forefathers, and your duty to us your benefactors, thus, merely to gratify the malice of a hostile party, to put men to death who have never wronged you. No; but—to spare, to relent, to feel the just emotions of compassion, to recall the idea not only what miseries we are designed to suffer, but what persons they are for whom they are designed! and to remember the uncertain attack of calamity; on whom, and how undeservedly it may fall! To you, as in honor and necessity too obliged, we address our intreaties; invoking aloud the gods whom Greece at her common altars and with joint devotion adores, to accept our plea; alleging those oaths which your fathers have worn,—to pay them reverence. We are suppliants now at the sepulchre of your fathers; we call on the dead reposed there, to be saved from Thebans, that the kindest of friends, as we have been, may not be sacrificed to the most deadly foes. Again, we recall to memory that day, in which having performed the most splendid achievements in company with them, we are at this day in danger of the most deplorable fate. To conclude we must, though it is hard for men in our distress to conclude; when the very moment their words are ended their very lives are most imminently endangered: yet still we insist that we surrendered not our city to the Thebans; rather than that we should have chosen the most miserable end by famine; but confiding in you, into your hands we gave it. And highly fitting it is, that if we cannot prevail, you should reinstate us in it, and leave us there at our own option

THUC.

VOL. I.

T

to take our fate. But once more we conjure you, that we, who are citizens of Platæa, who have showed ourselves the most steady patriots of Greece, and now, O Lacedæmonians, your suppliants, may not be turned over, out of your hands, out of your protection, to the Thebans, our unrelenting enemies; that you would become our saviours, and not doom to utter destruction the men to whom all Greece is indebted for her freedom.'

In this manner the Platæans spoke; and the Thebans, fearing lest their words might work so far on the Lacedæmonians as to cause them to relent, stood forth, and declared a desire to be also heard, 'since the Platæans, as they conceived, had been indulged in a much longer discourse than was requisite to answer the question.' Leave accordingly was given, and they proceeded thus:—

'We should not have requested your attention to any thing we had to offer, if these Platæans had replied in brief to the question, and had not run out into slander and invective against us; if they had not defended themselves in points quite foreign to the purpose, and not at all charged against them as crimes; and launched forth in their own praise, uncensured and unprovoked. But now it is incumbent on us, in some points to contradict, and in some to refute, to prevent the bad effects which might result, either from the criminations uttered against us, or the pompous praise they have bestowed on themselves; that you, under proper information with whom the greater truth remains, may fairly decide between us.

'Our enmity against them we openly avow, as it proceeded from just and honorable motives: since to us, who were the founders of Platæa, after we had gained possession of Bœotia and of other towns as well

as Plataea, which, after being purged from extraneous mixtures, remained in our jurisdiction,—these men disdained to pay submission, and scorned original and fundamental laws. They wilfully divided from the other Bœotians, transgressing the laws of their country, and, when likely to be forced back into their duty, they went over to the Athenians, and in concert with them accumulated wrongs on us, which have since been justly retaliated on them.

‘But when the barbarian invaded Greece they were the only Bœotians that did not join the Mede. This they allege, and hence they arrogate applause to themselves, and lavish their calumnies on us. We grant indeed they did not join the Mede; and the reason was, because the Athenians did not join him. Yet afterwards, when with the same all-grasping ambition the Athenians invaded Greece, they were the only Bœotians then who joined those Athenians. But consider farther the respective situations from which such conduct ensued in both. Our city at that time was not administered by the few who presided with a steady and equal rule, nor directed by the general voice of the people. Its state was such as with laws and sound policy is quite incompatible; it bordered close on a tyranny: the encroaching ambition of a handful of men held fast possession of it. These with no other view than the strong establishment of their own private authority in the success of the Mede, by force overawed the people, and opened their gates to the invader. This was not the act of a whole city, of a city master of its own conduct; nor ought she to be reproached for offences committed in despite of her own laws. But, on the other hand, when the Mede was once repulsed and the city repossessed of her ancient polity, you ought then to consider (fresh in-

vasion being formed by the Athenians, projects attempted to bring the rest of Greece and our dominions also into their subjection, sedition fomented amongst us, by favor of which they seized the greater part) whether in the field of Coronea we fought them and prevailed, recovered the liberty of Bœotia, proceed even now with all alacrity to regain their liberty for others, supplying them with horse and all other military provision, far beyond any other confederate. Such is the apology we make for all against us in having joined the Mede. But, that you have been the most outrageous foes to Greece, and are most deserving of whatever punishment can be inflicted on you, we shall next endeavor to demonstrate.

‘In order to procure some revenge on us, it is your own plea, you ‘became confederates and citizens of Athens.’ Be it so. You ought then to have marched in their company only against us; you ought not to have followed them in their expeditions against others. Had your own wills been averse to attend them on these occasions, it was always in your power to have recourse to that Lacedæmonian league, in which you concurred against the Mede, and about which you make at present the greatest parade. That would have been amply sufficient to turn aside our enmity from you; and, what is above all, had securely enabled you to rectify your measures. But it was not against your will, neither was it on compulsion, that you have solely adhered to the Athenians.

‘But then you rejoin, ‘It was base to betray your benefactors.’ Yet it was much more base and more enormous to betray at once the whole body of Grecians, with whom you had sworn a mutual defence, than the single Athenians: the Athenians truly have enslaved your country; and the others would regain

its freedom. You have not made your benefactors the requital which gratitude enjoined, or which is exempted from reproach. Injured and oppressed, you applied, it is pretended, to them for redress; and then you co-operated with them in oppressing others. But it is not more dishonorable to be wanting in any act of gratitude, how justly soever it may be due, than to make the return in a manner in itself unjust. You yourselves, by acting thus, have afforded undeniable proofs that you alone did not join the Mede, from a zeal for the Grecians, but merely because the Athenians did not join him. You were desirous to act in concert with the latter, but in opposition to the former; and now modestly claim to be recompensed by your country for all the iniquitous services you have done to a party: but justice will never suffer this. To Athenians you gave the preference; strive therefore from them to obtain redress. Cease vainly to allege the mutual oaths you once exchanged, as if they were obliged at present to preserve you. You renounced, you violated first those oaths, who rather concurred to enslave the Æginetæ and some other people of the same association, than endeavored to prevent it; and all without compulsion; still happy in the uninterrupted possession of your own rights, and not compelled to receive law from others, as was our fate. Nay, to the very last moment, before this blockade was formed against you, when we calmly invited you to be quiet and neutral, you insolently refused. Which therefore is the people, on whom all Greece may fasten her hatred more deservedly than on you, who have made it a point to exert your bravery in ruining your country? Those former good dispositions you have so largely boasted, you have now shown plainly to be repugnant to your genius. What your natural turn



has ever been the event has with truth ascertained. The Athenians took the road of violence, and you attended them through all the journey. And thus, ample proof has been exhibited by us, that against our wills we served the Persian; that you with most cheerful disposition have promoted the Athenian tyranny.

‘ But in regard to your finishing charge against us, as guilty of excessive outrage and injustice, that, contrary to every law, in the midst of peace, on a day of sacred solemnity, we seized on your city; this great offence, in our opinion, is less to be imputed to us than to yourselves. Had we marched indeed against your city in hostile manner; had we scaled your walls, and put your property to fire and sword, the charge had then been just. But if men of the first rank amongst you both for wealth and birth, desirous to put a stop to your foreign combinations, and recall you to the common institutions of all Beotians; if such at their own free motion invited our presence, wherein are we unjust? for the leaders, in all cases, are greater transgressors than the followers. Though, in the present, neither are they in our judgments, nor are we transgressors. They were citizens as well as you; they had larger concerns at stake: and therefore opening their gate and receiving us within their walls as friends and not as foes, they intended to prevent the corrupted part of your body from growing worse, and protect the worthy and good according to their merit. They calmly studied the welfare of your minds and your bodies; not suffering your city to become an alien, but recovering it again to its duty and relations; exempting it from being the foe of any honest Grecian, and reuniting it in the bonds of amity with them all. *There are proofs, besides, that we did not intermeddle in a hostile manner. We did not use violence*

to any one; we proclaimed aloud, that 'whoever was desirous to conform to the primitive institutions of all Bœotians, should come and join us.' You heard our voice with pleasure; you came in and entered into articles with us; you remained for a time without disturbance; but at length, having discovered the smallness of our number, and then perhaps we were judged to have proceeded inhumanly in presuming to enter without the consent of your populace, you then returned us not such treatment as you had received from us; you made no remonstrances against innovations, nor persuaded us to depart, but in open breach of articles you rushed on us. We lament not here so much the death of those whom you slew in this base attack on us; some color of law might be alleged for their destruction: but when, contrary to every law, in cold blood you murdered men who had spread their arms for mercy, and had surrendered themselves prisoners on promise of their lives, was not that a monstrous act? In one short interval of time you were guilty of three outrageous enormities; an infraction of articles, the succeeding butchery of our people, and a breach of the solemn promise made to us, that you would not kill them provided we refrained from plundering your lands. Yet still you cry aloud that we are the breakers of law: you still remonstrate that you are not debtors to justice. It is false. The point, we presume, will soon be determined right: and for these, for all offences, you shall have your reward.

'We have thus distinctly run over this affair, for your sakes, O ye Lacedæmonians, as well as for our own; that you may be convinced with how much equity you are going to condemn them, and that we have pursued the offenders on yet stronger obligations of justice. Let not the recital of their former virtues,

if virtues truly they had, mollify your hearts. Virtue should be pleaded by men who have suffered ; but, on those who have committed baseness, it should redouble their punishment, because they sin in foul contrariety to their former selves. Let them not *save* themselves by lamentations and pathetic complaints, though they cried out so movingly on the sepulchres of your fathers, and their own destitute and forlorn condition : for to stop their cries, we have proved against them that our youths when butchered by them met with a more cruel and unjust fate : those youths, some of whose fathers, reconciling Bœotia with you, died in the field of Coronea ; the rest, now advanced in years, bereft of their children, their houses desolate, prefer a supplication far more just to you, to avenge them on these Plateæans. Those are most deserving of pity who have suffered some great indignity ; but when vengeance is duly inflicted on such men as these Plateæans the world has cause to triumph. Their present destitute forlorn condition is the work of themselves. They wilfully rejected a better alliance ; and, though uninjured, broke every law against us ; executioners of hatred more than justice, though now about to suffer less than the precedent they set requires : for they shall be executed by lawful sentence ; not like men who with stretched-out hands obtained fair quarter, as they describe themselves, but who surrendered on this condition—to submit to justice.

‘ Avenge, therefore, O Lacedæmonians, the law of Greece so grossly violated by them. Retaliate all the injuries we have suffered, requiting so that cheerful friendship we have ever shown you ; and let not their flow of words overturn our just demands. Make now a precedent for Greece hereafter to follow. Show *them* that decisions must be formed, not according to

what men may say, but according to what they have done : if their actions have been right, that a short simple narration may at any time suffice ; but, if those actions have been wrong, that all studied ornamental periods are intended to disguise the truth. If those who preside at judgments, as you at present, would proceed in a summary way to a general determination against the guilty, little room would be left to disguise unjustifiable actions by plausible speeches.'

In this manner the Thebans replied ; and the Lacedæmonian judges agreed in the resolution that the question, ' whether they had received any good service from them in the war ? ' was properly and fairly conceived. They grounded this on the former proposal made to them to remain neutral, according to the old treaty of Pausanias after the Medish invasion, and on another more lately, which they had offered before they had blocked them up, to be common friends to both sides, in conformity to the same treaty. But after this double refusal, looking on themselves as no longer bound to observe those articles, which others had deliberately infringed to traverse their interest, they now proceed again to bring them forward man by man, and put the question, ' Whether they had done good service to the Lacedæmonians and allies in the present war ? ' and on their answering ' No,' led them aside and slew them. No one of the number did they exempt ; so that in this massacre there perished of Platæans not fewer than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians who had been besieged in their company ; and all the women were sold for slaves. The Thebans assigned the city, for the space of a year, to be the residence of certain Megareans, who had been driven from home in the rage of a sedition, and to those surviving Platæans who had

been friends to the Theban interest. But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, rooted up its whole foundation, and near to Juno's temple erected a spacious inn, two hundred feet square, partitioned within, both above and below, into a range of apartments. In this structure they made use of the roofs and doors that had belonged to the Platæans; and of the other movables found within their houses, of the brass and iron, they made beds, which they consecrated to Juno; in whose honor they also erected a fane of stone one hundred feet in diameter. The land being confiscated to public use, was farmed out for ten years, and occupied by Thebans. So much, nay, so totally averse to the Platæans were the Lacedæmonians become; and this merely to gratify the Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to serve them in the war which was now on foot.<sup>1</sup> And thus was the destruction of Platæa completed in the ninety-third year of its alliance with Athens.

The forty sail of Peloponnesians, which had been sent to the relief of Lesbos, after flying through the open sea to avoid the pursuit from Athens, were

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides has here been very sparing of his censure. Nothing bad enough can be said of the Lacedæmonian behavior on this occasion. To put brave men to death coolly and deliberately, who had most gallantly defended themselves, and merely for their steady attachment to liberty, shows the public spirit of Spartans at this time to have been none at all. The city of Platæa, thus barbarously demolished, was rebuilt after the peace of Antalcidas, which put an end to the Peloponnesian war. But not long after it was again demolished by the Thebans, for a refusal to join them against the Lacedæmonians. However, Alexander the Great once more re-established it, in a generous acknowledgement of the services that little state had rendered to Greece; and the Platæans continued, even in the time of Plutarch, to celebrate the annual festival in honor of those who at the famous battle of Platæa had died for the liberties of Greece.

driven by a tempest on the coast of Crete; and from thence they separately dropped into Cyllene, a Peloponnesian harbor, where they found thirteen triremes of Leucadians and Ambraciots, with Brasidas the son of Tellis, sent thither purposely to assist Alcidas with his counsel. It was now the project of the Lacedæmonians, since they had miscarried at Lesbos, to augment their fleet, and sail immediately for Corcyra, now embroiled in sedition, as there were no Athenians in those parts, excepting only twelve ships which were stationed at Naupactus; and thus their design might be effectuated before a fleet large enough to obstruct them could be sent from Athens. This was their plan, and Brasidas and Alcidas prepared for its execution.

The Corcyreans were now embroiled in a sedition, excited by the return of the prisoners, whom the Corinthians had taken in the naval engagement of Epidamnus. They had obtained their release, as was publicly given out, for the sum of eighty talents,<sup>1</sup> for the payment of which their former friends at Corinth had joined in a security; but in fact, for a secret promise they had made the Corinthians to put Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their engagements, they tampered with every single Corcyrean, in order to bring about a revolt from the Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian ship arrived at the same time with ambassadors on board. These were admitted together to an audience, at which the Corcyreans decreed, 'to maintain their alliance with the Athenians according to treaty; but to be friends to the Peloponnesians as in preceding times.' Pythias, who at that time was at the head of the people, entertained and lodged the Athenians without the public warrant: and therefore

<sup>1</sup> 15,500*l.* sterling.

against him the accomplices preferred an accusation, as plotting how to subject Corcyra to Athenian slavery. Pythias being acquitted, in his turn exhibited a charge against five of the most considerable of their number for having cut pales in the sacred grove of Jupiter and Alcinous. The fine for every pale was by law a stater.<sup>1</sup> Being condemned to pay the whole, they fled into the temples, and sat down as supplicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their fine, which was quite exorbitant. Pythias, who was also strong in the senate, got a fresh order to have it levied in all the rigor of the law. Thus debarred of any legal redress, and conscious farther that Pythias, so long as he continued in the senate, would prevail on the people to declare those their friends and those their foes who were so to Athens, they rose up from the sanctuary, and seizing daggers, rushed suddenly into the senate-house, where they stabbed Pythias, and others, both senators and private persons, to the number of sixty. Some few indeed, who were the adherents of Pythias, saved themselves on board the Athenian vessel, which yet lay in the harbor.

After this bold assassination, they summoned the Corcyreans to assemble immediately, where they justified their proceedings 'as most highly for the public good, and the only expedient of preventing Athenian slavery;' advising them 'for the future to receive neither of the rival parties, unless they came peacefully in a single vessel; if in more, to declare them enemies;' and in conclusion, they forced the ratification of whatever they had proposed. They also instantly despatched ambassadors to Athens, representing the necessity they lay under to act as they had done; and to persuade those who had fled for refuge

<sup>1</sup> 11. Os. 9d.

thither not to rush into such measures as might hurt the welfare of their country, from dread of the miseries which might thence ensue.

When these ambassadors had arrived at Athens the Athenians laid them and all their adherents under an arrest, as enemies to the state, and sent them prisoners to Ægina.

In the mean time those of the Corcyreans who had thus seized the government, animated by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a Lacedæmonian embassy, attacked the people, and overpowered them in battle. The people, by favor of the night, which approached, flew to the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, where they drew up together and secured their posts; they also got possession of the Hyllæic harbor. But their opponents seized the forum, where most of their own houses were situated, and the harbor which points towards the forum and the continent.

The day following they skirmished a little with their missile weapons, and both parties sent out detachments into the fields to invite the concurrence of the slaves, on a promise of their freedom. A majority of slaves came in to the assistance of the people, and the other party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

After one day's respite they came again to blows. The people got the better now, by the advantage of their strong posts and their numbers. The women with notable boldness assisted in the combat, by throwing tiles from the tops of the houses, and sustaining the tumult beyond their sex. About the close of the evening the few were forced to fly; and then, apprehensive lest the people should rush down on, and so at a shout seize the dock and put them to the sword, in order to stop their passage they set fire to the



houses all round the forum, and to such as were adjacent, sparing neither their own nor those of their enemies. The large effects of the merchants were consumed in the flames, and the whole city was in danger of being reduced to ashes, had a gale of wind arisen to drive the flame that way. This put a stop to the contest, and brought on a cessation, when both sides applied themselves to strict guard for the night. The Corinthian vessel, after this victory on the side of the people, stole privately away; and many of the auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repassed to the opposite shore.

The day following Nicostratus, the son of Diotrophes, who commanded the Athenian squadron, came up to their assistance with his twelve sail from Naupactus, and five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. He forthwith negotiated an accommodation, and persuaded them to make up the affair with one another, by instantly condemning the ten principal authors of the sedition (who immediately fled), and permitting all others to continue in the city, on articles signed between both parties and the Athenians 'to have the same friends and the same foes.' Having so far carried his point, he was intent on immediate departure; but the managers of the people made him a proposal to leave five ships of his squadron with them, to deter the enemy from any fresh commotion, which should be replaced by five of their own, which they would instantly man to attend him on his station. With this proposal he complied; and they named distinctly the mariners, who to a man were of the opposite party. Affrighted at this, as a pretext to convey them to Athens, they sat down in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nicostratus endeavored to raise them up and cheer *their* despondency. Yet all he could say was una-

vailing ; and the people ran again to arms, pretending that such a refusal to put to-sea was a plain proof that their intentions were insincere throughout. Then they rifled their houses of all the arms they could find ; and some of them who fell into their hands had immediately been butchered if Nicostratus had not interposed.

A second party, terrified at these proceedings, took their seats also as suppliants in the temple of Juno. The number of these was not less than four hundred. The people, grown now apprehensive of some fatal turn, persuaded them to leave their sanctuary ; and having prevailed, transported them into that island which faces the temple of Juno, whither every thing needful for their sustenance was carefully sent them.

The sedition continuing in this posture, about the fourth or fifth day after the transportation of the latter body into the island the Peloponnesian ships, which had assembled at Cyllene after the voyage of Ionia, appeared in sight to the number of fifty-three. Alcidas was commander-in-chief, as before, and Brasidas attended as his counsel. They came to anchor in the harbor of Sybota on the main ; and next morning, at break of day, steered directly for Corcyra.

Great was the tumult now at Corcyra : they were afraid of the malecontents within, and the hostile fleet approaching the city. They got sixty ships immediately afloat, and each, as fast as it was manned, advanced to meet the foe. The Athenians indeed proposed to put out first to sea themselves, and that the Corcyreans should afterwards come out and join them, when they had got all their ships together ; but, as they advanced in a straggling manner towards the enemy, two ships went directly over to them ; and on board others the mariners were at blows with one

another. In short, there was no manner of order in any of their motions. The Lacedæmonians, perceiving how it was, with twenty of their ships drew up to engage the Corcyreans, and opposed the remainder to the twelve Athenians, two of which were only the Salaminian and the Paralus.

The Corcyreans, who charged in this disorderly manner, and with few ships in a line, were on their side terribly distressed; whilst the Athenians fearing lest the other, vastly superior in number, might quite surround their little squadron, would not venture to attack them when all together, nor to break on the middle of the enemy's line; but, assaulting them towards one of the extremities, sunk one of their ships. On this, the Peloponnesians having formed a circle, the Athenians sailed round and round, and endeavored to break their order. Those who pursued the Corcyreans perceiving this, and fearing what had happened formerly at Naupactus, steered away from thence to support their own squadron. And now, with their whole embodied strength, they designed to pour on the Athenians. They, having already shifted the helm, fell gradually away. They were desirous to favor the flight of the Corcyreans beyond the possibility of a chase, and so they fell off intirely at their own leisure, keeping the enemy in their front still ranged in order. Such was this engagement, which at the setting of the sun was quite ended.

The Corcyreans were afraid lest the enemy, in prosecution of their victory, should immediately assault the city, or take up the persons in the island, or by some other method attempt to distress them: for this reason, they removed the prisoners again from the island into the temple of Juno, and applied themselves to guard the city. But the enemy, though victorious

at sea, durst not think of proceeding to attack the city ; but satisfied with taking thirteen ships belonging to the Corcyreans, they returned to the main, from whence they had sallied to the engagement. The next day also, they refrained from making any attempt on the city, where the disorder and consternation were as great as ever. Brasidas is reported urgently to have pressed it on Alcidas, but in the council of war was quite overruled. They landed however at Cape Leucymne, and plundered the country.

The Corcyrean people, whose fears were still suggesting that they should be attacked by the enemy's fleet, had conferred with the suppliants and others about the only means to preserve the city. And some of them they persuaded to join in navigating their ships ; for by some means or other they had again manned thirty, expecting every moment the enemy's approach. But the Peloponnesians continued the ravage of their fields only till noon, and then repassed to their former stations. Yet before the dawn of the succeeding day they saw sixty lights held up, to denote an equal number of Athenian ships advancing from Leucas. The Athenians, advertised of the sedition and the course of the fleet under Alcidas against Corcyra, had sent away this reinforcement under the command of Eurymedon the son of Thucles. On this the Peloponnesians, whilst yet it was night, crept homewards along the shore ; and carrying their vessels over the isthmus of Leucas, lest they should be discovered in going round it, safely retreated within their own confines.

When the Corcyreans had discovered the approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and the departure of the enemy, they received the Messenians within their walls, who till now had lodged without ; and, having

THUC.

VOL. I.

U

ordered the ships which they had manned to come about into the Hyllaic harbor, whilst they were going about in pursuance of this order, they put all the adverse faction whom they found to the sword. Those, farther, who had took on in the ships at their persuasion, they threw into the sea, and then retired. They afterwards went to Juno's temple, and persuaded a party of suppliants there, to the amount of fifty, to undergo a judicial trial, in which they were all condemned to die. The majority of suppliants, who refused to hear such persuasion, no sooner saw the fate of their brethren, than they either slew one another within the temple, or hung themselves up on the trees within its verge; each finding some expedient for his own dispatch. During those seven days that Eury-medon with his reinforcement continued at Corcyra the people of that city extended the massacre to all whom they judged their enemies. The crime on which they justified their proceedings was their attempt to overturn the democracy.

Some perished merely through private enmity; some for the sums they had lent, by the hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death was here exhibited. Every dreadful act usual in a sedition, and more than usual, was perpetrated now: for fathers slew their children; some were dragged from altars; and some were butchered at them. And a number of persons immured in the temple of Bacchus were starved to death: so cruel was the progress of this sedition, and so excessively cruel did it appear, because the first of so black a nature that ever happened. But afterwards the contagion spread, one may say, through the whole extent of Greece, when factions raged in every city, the popular demagogues contending for the Athenians, the aspiring few for the Lacedæmonians. In peace, it is

true, they were void of all pretext, of all opportunity to invite these rivals: but now, amidst declared hostilities, and the quest of alliance to afflict their enemies and add an increase of strength to themselves, opportunities were easily found by such as were fond of innovations to introduce the side they favored. The consequence of this was sedition in cities with all its numerous and tragical incidents. Such were now, and such things ever will be, so long as human nature continues the same; but under greater or less aggravations, and diversified in circumstances, according to the several vicissitudes of conjunctures which shall happen to occur. In the seasons of peace and affluence, communities as well as individuals have their tempers under better regulation, because not liable to that violence which flows from necessity: but war, which snatches from them their daily subsistence, is the teacher of violence, and assimilates the passions of men to their present condition.

By these means were cities harassed with seditions. And those to whose fate the later commotions fell, through inquiry as to what had happened in such instances before, grew enormously ambitious to suppress the machinations of others, both in policy of attempts and extravagance of revéngé. Even words lost now their former significance, since to palliate actions they were quite distorted: for truly, what before was a brutal courage, began to be esteemed that fortitude which becomes a human and sociable creature; prudent consideration, to be specious cowardice; modesty, the disguise of effeminacy; and being wise in every thing, to be good for nothing: the hot fiery temper was adjudged the exertion of true manly valor; cautious and calm deliberation, to be a plausible pretext for intended knavery: he who boiled with indignation was undoubt-

edly trusty; who presumed to contradict, was ever suspected: he who succeeded in a roguish scheme was wise; and he who suspected such practices in others was still a more able genius: but, was he provident enough, so as never to be in need of such base expedients, he was one that would not stand to his engagements, and most shamefully awed by his foes. In short, he who could prevent another in executing villany, or could persuade a well-designing person to it, was sure to be applauded.

Men now, who were allied in blood, were less valued or caressed than such as were connected by voluntary combination: since the latter, unscrupulous and uninquisitive, were more ready to embark in any scheme whatever: for now associations were not formed for such mutual advantage as is consistent with, but for the execution of such rapines as are contrary to human laws. In mutual trust they persisted, not out of any regard to religious obligation, but from the bond of communicated guilt. To the fair and honest proposals of adversaries they hearkened indeed, when such by active strength could control them, but never through candid ingenuity. Revenge on another was a more valued possession than never to have suffered injury. Oaths, if ever made for present reconciliation, had a temporary force, so long as neither knew how to break them; but never when either party had power to abet their violation. He who, at inviting opportunity, durst first incur the perjury, if the adversary was off his guard, executed his rancor with higher spirit than from enmity open and avowed. Such a step was thought most secure; and, because he had thus surpassed in guile, it was certainly extolled as a master-piece of cunning. Large is the number of villains, and such obtain more easily the reputation of dexterity

than their dupes can that of goodness: the latter are apt to blush; the former most impudently triumph.

The source of all these evils is a thirst of power, in consequence either of rapacious or ambitious passions. The mind, when actuated by such, is ever ready to engage in party feuds: for the men of large influence in communities, avowing on both sides a specious cause, some standing up for the just equality of the popular, others for the fair decorum of the aristocratical government, by artful sounds embarrassed those communities for their own private lucre. Both sides, intent on victory, carried on the contention with the keenest spirit. They most daringly projected, and then regularly executed the most dreadful machinations: their revenge was not limited by justice or the public welfare; it aimed at more ample satisfaction. Either side constantly measured it by such retaliation as was judged the sweetest; either by a capital condemnation through an iniquitous sentence, or by earning the victory with their own hands, in which they were always ready to glut the present rancor of their hearts. And hence it was, that the pious and upright conduct was on both sides disregarded: and, when any point of great importance was before them, to carry it by specious collusive oratory was the greatest enhancement of their credit. Yet all this while the moderate members of such communities, either hated because they would not meddle, or envied for such obnoxious conduct, fell victims to both.

Seditions in this manner introduced every species of outrageous wickedness into the Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is most frequently to be found in generous tempers, was laughed out of countenance, and for ever vanished. It was become the universal prac-



tice to keep up a constant enmity of intention against one another, and never to believe. No promise was strong enough, no oath sufficiently solemn, to banish such mutual diffidence. Those who excelled in shrewd consideration resigned all hope of any lasting security, and stood ever on their guard against whom it was impossible for them to trust. But persons of meaner understandings took more effectual means for their preservation. Living in constant apprehensions, from their own inferiority and the craft of their opponents, lest by words they should be overreached, or that such subtle heads might execute their treacheries on them unawares, they boldly seized the present moment, and at once despatched the men they dreaded; who, presuming too much on their own penetration, and that it was superfluous to aim a blow at those whom they could at any time supplant by cunning, despised them so far as to neglect a proper guard, and so contributed to their own destruction.

Many such daring outrages were now by way of precedent committed at Corcyra; nay, all whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge on such as before were their masters, and had exerted their superiority with savageness more than humanity, can in turn retaliate on them, were executed there. Some joined in these acts of violence to procure a discharge from their former poverty; but the greater number, through a passionate desire to seize the property of their neighbors. Or, though they were not lured by the lust of rapine, but engaged in the contest on fair and open views, yet hurried to wild extravagance through mad and undisciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole order of *human life* was for a season confounded in this city.

The human temper, too apt to transgress in spite of laws, and now having gained the ascendant over law, seemed pleased with exhibiting this public manifestation, that it was too weak for anger, too strong for justice, and an enemy to all superiority. Men could not otherwise have awarded the preference to revenge over righteous duty, and to lucre over that habit of justice in which envy never yet had power to annoy them. But more than this, when the point in view is revenge on others, men haughtily make precedents against themselves, by infringing those laws which are binding by the ties of nature, and from which alone any hope of safety can be extracted for themselves in a plunge of misery, precluding thus all possibility of redress, should they be reduced in some future extremity to make the same appeal.

And thus the Corcyreans continued to execute the rage of such cruel passions on the heads of one another, within the precincts of their own city, of which this was the first example in Greece, till Eurymedon with the Athenian fleet under his command put out again to sea.

But, after his departure, they who by flight had preserved their lives to the number of about five hundred, having seized their forts on the opposite shore, got possession of their own land on that side the water. Putting out hence, they plundered the Corcyreans in the island, and made such havoc that a violent famine ensued in the city. They farther sent a deputation to Lacedæmon and Corinth, to negotiate the means of their restoration. But nothing of this kind succeeding, they got together afterwards a body of auxiliaries and transports, and so passed over to the island of Corcyra, to the amount of six hundred men.

Having now set fire to their transports, to preclude every other expedient but gaining firm footing where they now were, they marched up to the mountain Istone, and having fortified themselves there, made cruel work with those in the city, and were masters of the country round about.

About the end of the same summer, the Athenians sent out twenty sail for Sicily, under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus and Charæadas the son of Euphiletus. A war was now on foot between the Syracusans and Leontines. Confederate with the Syracusans were, excepting Camarina, all the Doric cities, which had formerly entered into alliance with the Lacedæmonians before this war broke out, but had yet nowhere effectually joined them. With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrians sided with the Syracusans; and the Rhegians, from the motive of consanguinity, with the Leontines. The allies therefore of the Leontines sent to Athens,<sup>1</sup> petitioning the Athenians in respect of their old alliance and their Ionic descent, to send them a succor of shipping: for the Syracusans had

<sup>1</sup> One of the persons, or the chief, employed on this occasion, is said to be Gorgias of Leontium, the first rhetorician of that or of any age. When he had his audience from the Athenians to deliver the reasons of his embassy, he made a speech so smooth and flowing, so new in the manner of its turns, so pretty in the expression, and so nicely diversified by a change and opposition of figures, that he won their hearts, and succeeded in his negotiation. Our historian indeed, who takes no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reasons just after for the ready compliance of the Athenians on this occasion. It is a step which draws great consequences after it. Thucydides in the sequel will open all the plan, and give an exact detail of the operations of this new war, into which the Athenians are beginning to embark.

now blocked them up both by land and sea. The Athenians immediately sent one, giving out that they were bound in duty to take this step; but their real motive was to prevent the exportation of corn from thence to Peloponnesus, and also to sound the possibility of bringing Sicily into their own subjection. Their squadron therefore, arriving at Rhegium on the Italian shore, supported their allies in the present war; and in this the summer ended.

In the beginning of the winter the plague broke out a second time at Athens, not that during this whole interval of time it had wholly ceased, though its rage had very much abated. But now the mortality began again, and continued not less than a year; but the former had raged for the space of two. There was nothing which lay on the Athenians so hard as this, or so much impaired their strength. It appeared from the muster-rolls that there perished four thousand and four hundred of those citizens who wore the heavy-armor, and three hundred of the horsemen. The number of the lower people that died was not to be computed. There happened at the same time many earthquakes: at Athens; in Eubœa; amongst the Bœotians, and especially at the Bœotian Orchomenus.

The same winter the Athenians and Rhegians, on the coast of Sicily, formed an expedition with thirty sail against those which are called the isles of Æolus. This was not feasible in the summer season, for want of water. These isles are inhabited by the Lipareans, who were a colony from Cnidus. Their residence is chiefly in one of them called Lipara, though by no means large. They go from hence to the tillage of the others, Didyme, and Strongyle, and Hiera. It is believed by those people that Vulcan keeps his forge

in Hiera, because in the night it visibly throws forth a great quantity of fire, and in the day of smoke. These isles are situated over against the shore of the Siculi and the Messenians, and were allied with Syracuse. The Athenians having plundered the soil, and finding the inhabitants would not come in, put back again to Rhegium : and here the winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, the history of which Thucydides has compiled.

END OF VOL. I.
















The borrower must return this item on or before the last date stamped below. If another user places a recall for this item, the borrower will be notified of the need for an earlier return.

*Non-receipt of overdue notices does not exempt the borrower from overdue fines.*

<b>Harvard College Widener Library</b> <b>Cambridge, MA 02138</b> <b>617-495-2413</b>
--



**Please**

